Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Bilt Rite Construction and Landscaping, LLC (Bilt Rite) opened a credit account with Larson Lumber Company (Larson) in 2003. Bilt Rite did not make the required payments, and as of 2006, when Bilt Rite had ceased operations, it owed approximately $14,000. That same year, Bilt Rite transferred real property it had purchased to Anita Bartz, who had loaned Rankin or Bilt Rite $45,000. In 2007, Casey Rankin, a partner in Bilt Rite, signed a contract agreeing to pay Larson Bilt Rite’s debt. In 2009 and 2010, Larson Lumber Company (Larson) filed suit against Bilt Rite, Rankin, and Bartz, among others. The district court entered judgment in favor of Larson, holding (1) Rankin and Bilt Rite breached a written contract with Larson; and (2) the transfer of the real property from Bilt Rite to Bartz was fraudulent. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err by denying summary judgment to Defendants; (2) did not err by holding that Rankin and Bilt Rite were jointly and severally liable to Larson; (3) erred by holding that the Bartz loan was made to Rankin personally; and (4) erred by holding that the transfer of the real property to Bartz was a fraudulent transfer. View "Larson Lumber Co. v. Bilt Rite Constr. & Landscaping LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident caused by another driver. As a result of the accident, Plaintiff sustained both bodily injury and property damage. Plaintiff carried an automobile insurance policy through United Services Automobile Association General Indemnity Company (USAA). USAA paid vehicle repair and car rental costs, after which it sought subrogation for the property damage expenses from the tortfeasor’s automobile liability insurer. Plaintiff subsequently filed an action on behalf of himself and a putative class of plaintiffs, alleging that USAA violated Montana law by seeking subrogation for property damage loss before its insured had been made whole with respect to related personal injuries. The U.S. district court certified a question to the Montana Supreme Court, which answered by holding that Montana law does not prohibit an insurer from exercising its right of subrogation under the limited, specific circumstances presented in the certified question. View "Orden v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Mid-Continent Casualty Company provided comprehensive general liability insurance to Scentry Biologicals, the manufacturer of NoMate, a pest control product designed to protect agricultural crops from destructive insects. Applewood Orchards purchased NoMate from Wilbur-Ellis (W-E), a distributor of NoMate, and used the product on its apple crop to protect against moths. After Applewood discovered significant moth damage, it filed a tort action against Scentry and W-E. Scentry and W-E requested that Mid-Continent defend them under Scentry’s policy. Mid-Continent agreed to defend Scentry, reserving its right to determine its coverage obligations later, but refused to defend W-E. Applewood settled with W-E, and a court ruled against Scentry and in favor of Applewood. Meanwhile, Scentry filed a declaratory judgment against against Mid-Continent seeking declaratory relief on coverage issues. W-E and Applewood intervened. The district court granted summary judgment for and awarded damages to Scentry, Applewood, and W-E. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting the summary judgment motions filed by Scentry, Applewood, and W-E. View "Scentry Biologicals, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, filed a complaint against Defendant for defamation. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff did not file a brief in response. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment due to Plaintiff’s failure to respond. Plaintiff sought relief under Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) for excusable neglect because she “simply forgot to file the brief.” The court denied Plaintiff’s motion, concluding that all litigants should adhere to procedural rules and that Plaintiff was familiar with the rules of the court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting Defendant summary judgment, and therefore, the Court need not reach the second issue raised by Plaintiff of whether the district court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 60(b) motion. View "Chapman v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Rober Spoja represented Duste White regarding White’s probation revocation. The sentencing court sentenced White but did not mention whether the sentence was to be served concurrently with other sentences. White petitioned to correct his sentence. The court entered an amended re-sentencing order allowing him to serve his term concurrently with other sentences, resulting in an earlier discharge date. Believing he was incarcerated for fourteen months longer than his actual sentence, White retained Bryan Tipp to represent him in a civil action against Spoja and Spoja’s law firm. After Tipp discovered the sentencing court had not ordered concurrent sentences, Tipp moved successfully to dismiss the case without informing Spoja. Spoja subsequently filed a civil action against White, Tipp, and Tipp’s law firm. The district court dismissed Spoja’s claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the entry of summary judgment against Spoja’s attorney deceit claim, and the award of costs, as a trier of fact could find Tipp acted deceitfully and intended to do so; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of Spoja’s malicious prosecution claim and the award of summary judgment against his abuse of process claim. View "Spoja v. White" on Justia Law

Before he resigned, Plaintiff worked as the education director for Defendant, a farm organization. Plaintiff filed this action, claiming (1) Defendant failed to pay him for overtime, for vacation, and for his work handling the duties formerly assigned to the executive director; (2) Defendant's president (President) interfered with his employment relationship with Defendant; and (3) Defendant constructively discharged him because he refused to violate the law regarding payment of wages and overtime. The jury returned a special verdict form in all respects favorable to Plaintiff and awarded $232,439 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in denying summary judgment on Plaintiff's wage claims; (2) the district court erred in denying judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's claim against President individually; (3) Defendant was not entitled to a new trial on Plaintiff's constructive discharge claim; and (4) the punitive damages claim properly went to the jury, but the trial court should have limited the award to three percent of Defendant's net worth as required by Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-220(3). View "Harrell v. Farmers Educ. Coop. Union of Am., Mont. Div." on Justia Law

NorthWestern Energy (NWE) disconnected electric service to Plaintiff's residence based on an outstanding balance on Plaintiff's utility bill. Plaintiff filed an action alleging property damage due to NWE's negligence and negligence per se, claiming that the termination of his electric service caused his furnace to fail, which led to water pipes freezing and bursting. NWE filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the Public Service Commission (PSC). The district court granted NWE's motion and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PSC had no authority to adjudicate Plaintiff's damage claim, and a negligence action seeking damages could be maintained against the power company in district court. View "Schuster v. NorthWestern Energy Co." on Justia Law

Appellant was involved in a car accident with Kent Blough. Appellant's insurer, USAA Casualty Insurance Company, concluded that Appellant was the majority at fault for the accident and refused to honor Appellant's $300,000 UM/UIM coverage. Appellant filed suit against Blough, and in an apparent attempt to prevent Appellant from prevailing, USAA unsuccessfully tried to intervene in the lawsuit. Blough's insurer paid Appellant the limit of Blough's insurance policy. USAA's expert eventually determined that Blough, whom USAA had already paid under Appellant's policy, had been the majority at fault. USAA then tendered to Appellant its $300,000 UM/UIM policy limit. Appellant filed a complaint against USAA for, among other claims, violations of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act and emotional distress as a result of the mishandling of her claim. The district court entered summary judgment for USAA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred in determining that Appellant may not pursue a claim based upon USAA's alleged failure to reasonably investigate her claim as required under Mont. Code Ann. 33-13-201(4); and (2) erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of USAA regarding Appellant's claim for damages arising from emotional distress. View " McVey v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Burcalow Family, LLC purchased property that sat adjacent to The Corral Bar, Inc. property. Burcalow and The Corral signed a license agreement whereby The Corral agreed to pay Burcalow for the use of Burcalow's property for its drain field and well. After the license agreement expired, Burcalow filed suit against The Corral, alleging claims for trespass and a declaratory judgment. The Corral counterclaimed for, inter alia, prescriptive easement, detrimental reliance, and mistake. The district court (1) determined that The Corral possessed a prescriptive easement over and across Burcalow's property, and (2) rescinded the license agreement, ordering Burcalow to refund the fees The Corral had paid under the license agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) The Corral failed to demonstrate the elements required to establish a prescriptive easement; and (2) Burcalow's counsel did not make fraudulent representations entitling The Corral to rescind the parties' license agreement, and therefore, Burcalow did not have to return The Corral's payments made pursuant to the agreement. Remanded. View "Burcalow Family, LLC v. The Corral Bar, Inc." on Justia Law

Teresa and Dee Carestia sued Jeffrey Robey, claiming damages resulting from a car accident. The jury found Jeffrey's negligence was the cause of the accident and that Dee was contributorily negligent. The jury awarded Teresa $872 in medical expenses but awarded nothing for her past and future pain and suffering or loss of capacity to pursue her established course of life. Both parties subsequently filed a bill of costs. The district court allowed the Carestias to recover costs from Jeffrey and Jeffrey to recover costs from the Carestias. Teresa appealed. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) a portion of the jury's damage award was not supported by substantial credible evidence, as Teresa was entitled to some award of damages for her past pain and suffering proven in this case; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Carestias' objection to Jeffrey's bill of costs. Remanded. View "Carestia v. Robey" on Justia Law