Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Thomas Warner filed a complaint against Robert and Rebecca Hanke for conversion and negligence after Robert Hanke asserted ownership over some personal property Warner was storing on the Hanke's property. At the time the action was filed, Robert and Rebecca Hankes maintained home insurance coverage from a subsidiary of Horace Mann Insurance Company. The Hankes filed a claim with Horace Mann to request a defense against Warner's suit. Horace Mann filed a declaratory judgment action requesting a determination whether the insurance policy required Horace Mann to defend the Hankes. The district court concluded that Horace Mann did not owe coverage to the Hankes for the Warner dispute. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court (1) properly determined that the Hankes' insurance policy failed to cover the Warner dispute; (2) correctly determined that Horace Mann's decisions to provide a defense and to pay the settlement of Warner's claims nevertheless allowed Horace Mann to pursue reimbursement for the Hankes' share of the settlement; and (3) abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to Horace Mann. View "Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Hanke" on Justia Law

Defendants, an attorney and a law firm, structured a tax-deferred exchange for Plaintiffs, a husband and wife and the cattle ranch they owned. It was later determined that the exchange did not qualify for deferred tax treatment under 26 U.S.C. 1031, resulting in significant tax liability for Plaintiffs. Defendants filed an action against Defendants for professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and misrepresentation. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all claims on grounds that Plaintiffs' claims were time barred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs' tort claims were timely filed, and the issue of whether Plaintiffs' timely filed their misrepresentation claim was a question of material fact to be resolved by a jury; (2) Plaintiffs properly stated a claim for breach of contract and the claim was not time barred; and (3) the district court erred in granting Defendants a protection order to prevent discovery of alleged work product and attorney-client communications, as further analysis and fact finding were necessary to determine which documents were discoverable and which qualified for work product or attorney-client protection. Remanded. View "Draggin' Y Cattle Co., Inc. v. Addink" on Justia Law

C.R. Weaver formed Mikart Transport, LLC in January 2011. At that time, the articles of organization named Weaver and Michael Smith as members or managers. In March 2011, Smith submitted a credit application with Tri-County Implement, Inc. After Smith failed to pay Tri-County for work it performed on two vehicles, including a Volvo semi-truck titled in Weaver's name, Tri-County refused to release the Volvo from its possession pursuant to its asserted agisters' lien on the vehicle. Weaver subsequently filed a complaint against Tri-County. In response, Tri-County filed a counterclaim against Weaver and a third-party complaint against Mikart. The district court entered judgment against Mikart, ordering it to pay for the work it performed, and awarded Tri-County attorney fees and costs. The court also held Mikart, Smith, and Weaver jointly and severally liable for these amounts. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the district court's imposition of personal liability on Weaver for the work performed on the two vehicles, as there was no basis to hold Weaver individually liable for the obligations of Mikart to Tri-County. Remanded. View "Tri-County Implement, Inc. v. Weaver" on Justia Law

While attending Wolf Point High School, Dalton Gourneau committed suicide in his home. Roxanne Gourneau, acting individually and on behalf of Dalton, filed a complaint against Wolf Point, the State, and the District Superintendent, alleging that Dalton's death was the direct and proximate result of Wolf Point's negligence. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wolf Point. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record did not substantiate Roxanne's speculation that Wolf Point reasonably should have known Dalton's state of mind or that its conduct created a reasonable possibility of harm, and thus, Wolf Point owed no legal duty because Dalton's suicide was unforeseeable by Wolf Point. View "Gourneau v. Wolf Point Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Terry Willis purchased a tract of property with funds that were apparently the proceeds from illegal drug sales. After Willis failed to make a payment, David Ferterrer contributed approximately half of the late payment. Willis was later sentenced to life imprisonment for drug-related crimes, which left him unable to pay for the property as the contract for deed contemplated. The parties agreed that Ferterrer would be responsible for completing the payments to purchase the property. Ferterrer also removed funds from Willis's checking account to prevent federal authorities from seizing those funds. Armed with a notarized agreement allegedly from Willis to sell the property to Ferterrer (the Deed), Ferterrer obtained a loan to purchase the property. Willis subsequently filed an action challenging Ferterrer's ownership of the property, also alleging that Ferterrer had converted the funds from Willis's bank account. The district court affirmed the validity of the Deed and concluded that Fertterer had not converted any funds belonging to Willis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the district court's findings of fact; and (2) the district court properly determined that Willis failed to prove that Fertterer had converted funds from Willis's bank account. View "Willis v. Fertterer" on Justia Law

Keith Davies was run over by a tractor-trailer driven by Paul Tychsen, who worked for Dick Irvin, Inc. Davies, who worked for Great Falls Sand and Gravel (GFSG), was directing traffic when the truck struck him. The incident occurred during a project to construct a Flying J Travel Plaza. GFSG subcontracted for the road work and submitted a traffic control plan to the State, which approved of the plan. Davies filed a negligence action against Irvin. Irvin filed a third-party complaint seeking contribution from the State, alleging that the State negligently approved the traffic control plan. Irvin subsequently settled Davies' claims. In regard to Irvin's third-party claims against the State, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that the State did not owe any duty to Irvin or Davies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State had no statutory or common law duty to Irvin or Davies. View "Dick Irvin, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law

In 1997, Plaintiff purchased a historical building that was the largest apartment house between St. Paul and Spokane when it was built in 1916. In 2013, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against various defendants, including the Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO). ARCO purchased a copper mining company (ACM) in 1977, including all of ACM's liabilities. These liabilities included claims for property damage caused by mining-related surface subsidence. Plaintiffs alleged that mining-related subsidence had caused the current damage to the building. A jury found in favor of ARCO. Plaintiffs moved for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly denied Plaintiffs' motion for judgment as a matter of law, as ARCO produced sufficient evidence to cast doubt in a juror's mind as to whether mining-related subsidence actually caused the damage alleged by Plaintiffs; and (2) correctly denied Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, as substantial credible evidence supported the jury's verdict. View "Barile v. Butte High Sch." on Justia Law

The State appealed a jury verdict that awarded damages to L. Fred Weaver, Joan Weaver and Vicki Weaver. The Weavers had sued the State over negligent fire containment procedures on their real property. The State argued on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss the Weavers' negligence claim; (2) whether the trial court did not allow the State to assert a "public duty doctrine" defense; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the jury to find the state negligent without expert testimony to establish the standard of care; and (4) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the State's motion to change venue. Finding no errors or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Weaver v. DNRC" on Justia Law

Jeremiah Bennett, the adult son of Abel and Judy Bennett, died as a result of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Jeremiah died intestate and was survived by two minor children. The district court appointed Sabrina Bennett, Jeremiah's former wife, as the personal representative of Jeremiah's estate. Sabrina subsequently petitioned the district court for a declaration that Abel and Judy (the Bennetts) had no standing to claim wrongful death damages as a result of Jeremiah's death. The district court concluded that Jeremiah's children were the sole heirs of the estate and therefore had priority over any wrongful death and survivorship claims. The Bennetts petitioned the Supreme Court for supervisory control. The Court accepted the petition and vacated the portion of the district court's order holding that the Bennetts could not recover wrongful death claims as a matter of law, holding that the Bennetts were entitled to recover wrongful death damage as Jeremiah's parents and survivors. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Bennett" on Justia Law

Whitney Schwan died in an automobile accident after Travis Turner, the driver, lost control of the vehicle. Whitney's parents sued Travis's estate and his parents (the Turners). The Turners had a homeowners policy with State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm). State Farm filed an action seeking a declaration that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify the Turners under the homeowners policy. Meanwhile, a mediation concluded with a settlement that included assignment of all of the Turners' rights and claims under the homeowners' policy to the Schwans, and the Schwans replaced the Turners in the declaratory action. The district court granted summary judgment to the Schwans on its counterclaim that State Farm had breached its duty to defend the Turners by not retaining separate counsel for the Turners in the underlying action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by concluding that State Farm had breached its duty to defend under the policy, as State Farm did ensure a full defense was provided to the Turners even though its decisions regarding counsel did not include hiring additional counsel. View "State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Schwan" on Justia Law