Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Leonard Landa was the sole managing member of a Montana limited liability corporation. Landa carried commercial general liability insurance through Assurance. After a former employee of Landa's filed a complaint alleging that Landa had committed various torts by inducing him to work for Landa under allegedly false pretenses, Landa tendered defense of the former employee's claim to Assurance. Assurance refused to defend Landa, stating that the complaint's allegations were not covered under Landa's policy. Landa filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief establishing that Assurance had a duty to defend and indemnify Landa and alleging violations of Montana's Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), negligence, and other causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Assurance, finding that the complaint's allegations were not covered under Landa's policy and that Assurance was not liable under the UTPA because the denial of coverage was grounded on a legal conclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Assurance correctly declined to provide a defense where the former employee's complaint did not allege an "occurrence" and, as a result, did not trigger a duty to defend under the policy. View "Landa v. Assurance Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a patron at the Crystal Bar when she was hit on the head by Jason Howard, a friend of the bouncer, causing him to fall and strike his head. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Crystal Bar, alleging, among other claims, negligence and liquor shop liability, or a "dram shop" claim. The district court entered summary judgment for the Crystal Bar on Plaintiff's negligence and dram shop claim, holding (1) there was no interaction between Plaintiff and Howard that should have alerted Crystal Bar employees that Howard posed any danger to plaintiff, and (2) it was uncontested that Howard was not intoxicated and had not been served at the Crystal Bar. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Crystal Bar on Plaintiff's dram shop claim, as there was no evidence Howard was served alcohol by the Crystal Bar prior to the altercation; but (2) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claims, as genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the Crystal Bar had knowledge of the conflict between Plaintiff and Howard and whether Crystal Bar satisfied its duty of reasonable care under the circumstances. Remanded. View "Harrington v. Crystal Bar, Inc." on Justia Law

A plane owned by Metro Aviation crashed in Montana, killing two passengers. Metro filed suit under against the United States in a U.S. district court in Montana, alleging negligence by FAA air traffic controllers. Metro asserted alternative claims of indemnity and contribution seeking to recover settlement amounts paid by Metro to the passengers' estates. The case was subsequently transferred to a U.S. district court in Utah. The United States moved for partial summary judgment on Metro's indemnity and contribution claims, asserting that under Utah and Montana law, the claims were barred. The federal Utah court concluded that Montana law applied but that the law in this area was unsettled. The Montana Supreme Court accepted the court's certified questions about these questions of law and answered, (1) Metro could not seek contribution from the United States with respect to the estate of one passenger, whose claim was settled without any litigation having been filed; (2) Metro could not seek contribution from the United States with respect to the estate of the second passenger because Metro settled with the estate prior to trial without joining the United States as a party; and (3) Metro was not entitled to indemnity from the United States. View "Metro Aviation, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff injured his shoulder while working for his employer, who was insured by the Montana State Fund. The State Fund paid for Plaintiff's two shoulder injuries and paid temporary total disability (TTD) benefits after informing Plaintiff that if he returned to gainful employment without the State Fund's knowledge and continued to receive benefits, he would be subject to legal action or criminal prosecution. After the State Fund discovered that Plaintiff had built and sold furniture and worked at a vacuum cleaner store while receiving TTD benefits, the assistant attorney general charged Plaintiff with theft, a felony. The State Fund subsequently terminated Plaintiff's TTD benefits. Plaintiff filed suit against the State fund and its private investigators, alleging that Defendants violated Montana's Insurance Code regarding unfair claim settlement practices and pleaded a variety of common law causes of action. The district court ruled in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's entry of judgment in favor of the State Fund, holding that the district court did not err in (1) granting the State Fund's motion to dismiss Defendant's claims under the Insurance Code; and (2) granting the State Fund's motion for summary judgment regarding Plaintiff's common law claims. View "White v. State ex rel. Mont. State Fund" on Justia Law

The Leonards entered into contracts with Centennial for the sale of a log home kit and construction of a custom log home. The Leonards later released Centennial from any claims for damages for defective construction or warranty arising out of the home's construction. Greg and Elvira Johnston held a thirty-six percent interest in the property at the time the release was signed. Eventually, all interest in the property was transferred to the Elvira Johnston Trust. A few years later, because of a number of construction defects affecting the structural integrity of the house, the Johnstons decided to demolish the house. The Johnstons sued Centennnial for negligent construction, breach of statutory and implied warranties, and other causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Centennial, finding that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and were waived by the Leonards' release. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court's ruling that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and directed that the decision on remand apply only to the interest owned by the Johnstons at the time the release was executed; and (2) affirmed the district court's conclusion that the release was binding on the Leonards' sixty-four percent interest, later transferred to the Trust. View "Johnston v. Centennial Log Homes & Furnishings, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2012, Plaintiff sought and obtained a temporary order of protection against Defendant in a civil action. Subsequently, Plaintiff obtained a no contact order against Defendant in a criminal action. Defendant moved to have the civil action dismissed with prejudice as a discovery sanction. Plaintiff moved to have the civil action dismissed without prejudice in the event she needed a future civil order of protection. The district court granted Plaintiff's motion and dismissed the civil action without prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances, it made sense to dismiss the action without prejudice so that, if necessary, Plaintiff could resurrect her action quickly; and (2) Defendant failed to establish that Plaintiff should be sanctioned with a dismissal of her proceeding with prejudice for her failure to appear for a deposition. View "Lear v. Jamrogowicz" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs leased an apartment from Defendant for thirteen months. Before the lease term expired, a dispute arose between the parties. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging breach of the terms of the lease, negligence, and negligence per se. The justice court found in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendant appealed, seeing a trial de novo. After a bench trial, the district court ruled in Plaintiffs' favor on their breach of lease claim and awarded them damages, costs, and attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to add a claim that had not been pled during the justice court proceedings; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion in limine to prohibit any reference to the testimony and evidence presented during the justice court proceedings; and (3) because the district court's references to the prior proceedings did not suggest that the district court was unduly influenced by the justice court proceedings, Defendant was not denied her right to a trial de novo. View "McDunn v. Arnold" on Justia Law

Margaret Howard was driving south and John Bradford was driving north on a two-lane highway when the two vehicles collided. Neither Margaret nor John survived. The Howards, the co-personal representatives of Margaret's estate, filed a wrongful death and survivorship action against the Bradfords, the co-personal representatives of John's estate, alleging negligence. A jury found that John was not liable in negligence for the death of Margaret. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err ruling that a defense expert's testimony was supported by an adequate factual foundation and by determining that the scientific method used by the expert to reconstruct the accident was reliable and admissible; (2) the Bradfords did not violate the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure by failing to supplement the disclosure of the defense expert; and (3) the district court did not err by denying the Howards' motion for a new trial View "Wheaton v. Bradford" on Justia Law

This matter arose from the suicide of a sixteen-year-old girl, who was residing at the Spring Creek Lodge Academy at the time of her death. Following the girl's death, her mother, Plaintiff, brought an action against the owner of the school, its on-site directors, including Teen Help, and various related entities. Claims against Teen Help were settled before trial, and the settlement was later reduced to a judgment. While Newman I proceeded to trial, Newman filed this declaratory judgment and breach of contract action against Teen Help's two insurers to collect on the settlement and judgment, arguing that the insurers breached their obligation to defend and indemnify Teen Help in Newman I. The district court determined the insurers were severally liable for the underlying judgment and awarded attorney's fees and interest on the underlying judgment. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's judgment as it pertained to the insurers, its award of interest on the underlying judgment, and its application of Montana law; and (2) reversed the court's ruling on attorney's fees. Remanded for recalculation of reasonable attorney's fees. View "Newman v. Scottsdale Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiffs sustained serious injuries in an automobile accident and incurred medical expenses in excess of $1,000,000. Plaintiffs subsequently learned that they had only $5,000 in medical payments coverage and did not have any underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage after a transfer of their Oregon State Farm policy to Montana by the Mark Olson State Farm Agency. The driver who caused the accident carried the statutory minimum automobile liability insurance limits. Plaintiffs sued State Farm and Mark Olson, requesting declaratory relief and a reformation of the contract and alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and conduct sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in entered summary judgment in favor of State Farm and Olson on Plaintiffs' negligence claims. Remanded for trial. View "Bailey v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law