Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Margaret Howard was driving south and John Bradford was driving north on a two-lane highway when the two vehicles collided. Neither Margaret nor John survived. The Howards, the co-personal representatives of Margaret's estate, filed a wrongful death and survivorship action against the Bradfords, the co-personal representatives of John's estate, alleging negligence. A jury found that John was not liable in negligence for the death of Margaret. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err ruling that a defense expert's testimony was supported by an adequate factual foundation and by determining that the scientific method used by the expert to reconstruct the accident was reliable and admissible; (2) the Bradfords did not violate the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure by failing to supplement the disclosure of the defense expert; and (3) the district court did not err by denying the Howards' motion for a new trial View "Wheaton v. Bradford" on Justia Law

This matter arose from the suicide of a sixteen-year-old girl, who was residing at the Spring Creek Lodge Academy at the time of her death. Following the girl's death, her mother, Plaintiff, brought an action against the owner of the school, its on-site directors, including Teen Help, and various related entities. Claims against Teen Help were settled before trial, and the settlement was later reduced to a judgment. While Newman I proceeded to trial, Newman filed this declaratory judgment and breach of contract action against Teen Help's two insurers to collect on the settlement and judgment, arguing that the insurers breached their obligation to defend and indemnify Teen Help in Newman I. The district court determined the insurers were severally liable for the underlying judgment and awarded attorney's fees and interest on the underlying judgment. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's judgment as it pertained to the insurers, its award of interest on the underlying judgment, and its application of Montana law; and (2) reversed the court's ruling on attorney's fees. Remanded for recalculation of reasonable attorney's fees. View "Newman v. Scottsdale Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiffs sustained serious injuries in an automobile accident and incurred medical expenses in excess of $1,000,000. Plaintiffs subsequently learned that they had only $5,000 in medical payments coverage and did not have any underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage after a transfer of their Oregon State Farm policy to Montana by the Mark Olson State Farm Agency. The driver who caused the accident carried the statutory minimum automobile liability insurance limits. Plaintiffs sued State Farm and Mark Olson, requesting declaratory relief and a reformation of the contract and alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and conduct sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in entered summary judgment in favor of State Farm and Olson on Plaintiffs' negligence claims. Remanded for trial. View "Bailey v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

To help finance her purchase of a condominium (condo) for $395,000, Mary McCulley sought a residential loan from Heritage Bank (Bank) for $300,000. American Land Title Company (ALTC) provided a commitment for title insurance. McCulley signed a promissory note and signed a deed of trust as collateral. Subsequently, ALTC changed the designated use of the condo in the deed from residential to commercial. After closing, McCulley discovered the Bank had issued her an eighteen-month, $300,000 commercial property loan rather than the thirty-year residential property loan for which she applied. When she was unable to obtain long-term refinancing on the property, McCulley signed a warranty deed transferring ownership of the condo to the Central Asia Institute and used the proceeds to pay off the loan. McCulley then sued ALTC and the Bank (collectively, Defendants) for, inter alia, negligence, breach of contract, slander of title, and fraud. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's order of summary judgment in favor of the Bank on the issue of fraud, as genuine issues of material fact existed relative to McCulley's claim of fraud on the part of the Bank; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "McCulley v. Am. Land Title Co." on Justia Law

This dispute stemmed from the actions of a former Bank employee, Diane Becker, who pleaded guilty to federal fraud and money laundering charges. Becker had previously assisted Marilyn Feller with her banking and finances. Feller filed a complaint against the Bank, alleging, inter alia, negligent supervision, wrongful conversion, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, claiming that her financial standing and credit reputation were damaged by Becker and the Bank. The district court entered summary judgment for the Bank, determining (1) Feller's state law causes of action were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, (2) Feller failed to provide sufficient evidence to support her emotional distress claims, and (3) Feller failed to establish the element of unauthorized control on her conversion claim. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of the Bank on all of Feller's claims. View "Feller v. First Interstate Banksystem, Inc." on Justia Law

Mother and Child were seriously injured in an automobile accident. Mother and her husband (Husband) hired Viscomi & Gersh (Viscomi) to represent Mother and Child in their claims for damages resulting from the accident. Matthew O'Neill was subsequently appointed to act as guardian ad litem (GAL) and conservator for Child. After Mother's case settled, Mother and Husband agreed with Morales Law Office (Morales) that Morales would represent Child. Morales then filed a motion to disqualify counsel. The district court denied the motion because it did not contain the consent of Viscomi and O'Neill. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when Mother and Husband consented to the appointment of a GAL and conservator to act in Child's best interests in the legal claims she had arising from the accident, they divested themselves of the right to determine who should represent Child in her personal injury claim; (2) Mont. Code Ann. 37-61-403 and Mont. Code Ann. 72-5-427 are not unconstitutional as applied in this case; and (3) section 37-61-403 does not conflict with the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct. View "In re Estate of C.K.O." on Justia Law

Edythe Rice, who was in her late eighties, owned a cattle ranch. Edythe's son, Clark Rice, assisted Edythe in performing ranch duties. In 2006, Clark was driving a tractor in "advanced twilight" without illuminated lights. Juanita Stands struck the tractor's left rear tire. The impact caused Juanita's vehicle to spin into the neighboring lane, where it collided with Vianna Stewart's vehicle. Juanita and Vianna sustained injuries from the accident. The tractor and automobiles were total losses. After five years in litigation, the district court (1) concluded that Clark was negligent per se for violating three traffic statutes; (2) determined Edythe was vicariously liable for the injuries; and (3) concluded that Clark and Edythe were jointly and severally liable for eighty percent of Juanita's claimed damages and one hundred percent of Vianna's claimed damages. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's judgment against Edythe, holding that the district court erred by proceeding to trial without addressing Edythe's competency or ensuring the parties met statutory notice requirements; and (2) otherwise affirmed. Remanded the case for an evaluation of Edythe's need for a conservator and new trial as to Edythe's vicarious liability only. View "Stewart v. Rice" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her minor daughter were injured when their vehicle was involved in a collision with a pickup truck driven by Michael Morris, Jr. (Son), a Glacier County resident. The pickup truck was owned by Michael Morris, Sr. (Father), a Teton County resident. The collision occurred in Teton County but Plaintiff's vehicle was propelled across the county line and came to rest in Cascade County. Plaintiff filed a complaint in Cascade County against both men, claiming Son was negligent in his operation of the vehicle and Father negligently entrusted Son with the pickup truck. Son moved to change the venue to either Glacier or Teton county. The district court granted the motion and moved the proceeding to Glacier County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Cascade County was an improper place for trial, as the tort was not committed in Cascade County and Defendants lived in Teton and Glacier counties. View "Yeager v. Morris" on Justia Law

Peter Carter was driving a Ford Explorer rented from Overland West when Todd Durham's vehicle collided with Carter's vehicle. The impact caused the Explorer to roll five times, partially ejecting Carter and killing him. Carter's estate filed a wrongful death and survival claim against Ford, Overland, and Durham (collectively, Defendants) under strict products liability and negligence theories. After a jury trial, the district court concluded that Durham was liable in negligence and that Ford and Overland were not liable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) denying the estate's motion for default judgment on liability as a sanction against Ford for withholding evidence of other incidents; (2) excluding the estate's proffered evidence of other incidents; (3) excluding evidence related to Ford's actions in making a Safe Canopy System a standard feature in the United States in 2007 and some other countries in 2002, and by permitting Ford to present a "consumer-choice" defense; and (4) excluding an indemnity agreement between Ford and Overland and limiting questioning about the agreement and the parties' prior adversarial position. View "Stokes v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was driving her vehicle on a public highway when she was struck by a truck owned by Stockton Oil Company (Stockton) and driven by Ronald Gerber. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Stockton and Gerber seeking damages for the injuries she sustained as a result of the accident. Stockton was served but Gerber was not. Stockton did not respond to the complaint, and a default was subsequently entered against it in February 2011. A judgment for damages was entered in April 2011. In October 2011, Stockton moved to set aside the default judgment. Sixty-eight days later, the district court granted Stockton's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred in granting Stockton's motion to set aside default judgment, as the court ignored the expiration of the sixty-day deadline in doing so; (2) thus, the motion was deemed denied by operation of law; and (3) the deemed denial did not constitute a slight abuse of discretion. Remanded for reinstatement of the default judgment. View "Green v. Gerber" on Justia Law