Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Al Ballard and Ecosafe Gold Recovery, LLC (Ballard), appealed a district court's order entered following the Supreme Court’s remand in the first appeal of the case. The Supreme Court reversed the entry of judgment in favor of Ballard, and reversed the award of attorney fees to Ballard and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Upon remittitur, Russell and Melissa Levens moved for an order on remand that would provide various forms of relief, including attorney fees. When Ballard did not initially respond, the District Court entered an order requiring Ballard to immediately restore a 30-foot buffer zone by appropriate filling, compacting, and buttressing. The court ordered Ballard to commence work immediately and to complete the restoration within 30 days, and imposed a $100 per day penalty for every day beyond the 30-day deadline that the restoration was incomplete. The court required Ballard to mark the boundary of the buffer zone and to pay Levens' attorney fees and costs, and scheduled a hearing to determine the proper amount of fees. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err on remand of the case. "Ballard has no meritorious defense and the takings claim was raised for the first time on appeal." The District Court properly awarded attorney fees to Levens under the agreement. The Levens were likewise entitled to attorney fees on appeal. View "Ballard et al v. Levens" on Justia Law

Richard Ford suffered a work-related injury to his neck. He was diagnosed with a cervical strain, and Sentry Casualty Company accepted liability and paid benefits for this injury. During Ford’s treatment, he underwent an MRI which revealed a more serious cervical disc condition. Ford claimed that the workplace accident caused or aggravated this condition and that Sentry was liable for surgery to address it. Ford also claimed that Sentry was liable for ongoing temporary total disability benefits and that Sentry had unreasonably adjusted his claim. Sentry denied liability for Ford’s cervical disc condition based on the opinions of several doctors that the condition was not related to the industrial accident. Sentry also maintained that Ford reached maximum medical improvement, that he has been released to return to work without restrictions, and that it reasonably adjusted his claim. The dispute ultimately reached the Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC). Trial was held in early 2011. Ford and his wife testified, and numerous medical records were admitted into evidence. The WCC ruled in favor of Sentry as to each of the foregoing issues, and Ford appealed. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the WCC correctly determined that he failed to carry his burden of establishing causation with regard to his disc condition and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

In July 2009, Charles Albert’s Billings, Montana home caught fire. Despite response by the City of Billings Fire Department, the house burned to the ground. Albert sued the City for negligence of the Billings Fire Department, discrimination based upon age and disability, slander, and violation of his constitutional and statutory right to know and obtain documents held by the City. The District Court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on all issues. Albert appealed. Finding no error in the district court's consideration of Albert's case, the Supreme Court affirmed that court's decision.

Cassadie and Chris Parish were injured in a motor vehicle accident when their vehicle was struck by an uninsured driver. United Financial Casualty Insurance Company (UFC) provided insurance coverage to the Parishes, including uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. The Parishes, who had two vehicles insured on their UFC policy at the time of the accident, argued they should be permitted to stack the UM benefits provided in their policy. UFC refused, stating that the Parishes' policy did not allow stacking. The Parishes sued seeking declaratory judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of UFC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting UFC's motion for summary judgment, as, inter alia, the policy was unambiguous and UFC's insurance agreement did not create a reasonable expectation of stacked UM coverage.

Appellant Marla Ward filed suit seeking damages for personal injuries she sustained as she was sorting horses on Appellee Paul Johnson's property. Johnson resided in Pondera County. Johnson filed a motion to change venue, arguing that Pondera County was the appropriate place for trial because it was the only county where a defendant resided. Ward opposed the motion, asserting that case law permitted Ward to file her claim in Yellowstone County, her place of residence. The district court ruled in favor of Johnson. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ward's decision to file her complaint in Yellowstone County was legally correct under Mont. Code Ann. 25-2-122(2)(b); and (2) the statute permitting Ward to file her action in the county of her residence did not deprive Johnson of the equal protection of the laws.

On August 9, 2007, Philip Boude filed a Federal Employers' Liability Act claim against his employer, Union Pacific Railroad Company, asserting that he experienced a work-related injury on July 29, 2006 due to the Railroad's negligence. The jury ruled in favor of Union Pacific. Boude appealed, contending that the district court committed multiple errors during the trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Boude's termination of employment and the Public Law Board's decision affirming his termination, as the evidence was inadmissible on three separate stand-alone grounds; and (2) the admission of the evidence was prejudicial, and reversal was appropriate.

This appeal arose from a dispute between two neighboring property owners regarding a workshop addition to the home of Appellants, Neil and Seth Milner (Milner). The addition violated the city's setback requirement, and Appellee Gary Olsen reached an agreement with Milner to sell strip of his property so the building would be in compliance. The parties disagreed, however, about the terms of the agreement. Milner filed suit, and the district court rescinded and set aside the agreement. Olsen was ordered to return Milner's money and costs, and Milner was required to deed the land back to Olsen. After Olsen discovered that Milner's addition encroached past the boundary line of his property, Olsen filed suit alleging trespass and nuisance. The district court found in favor of Olsen and ordered Milner to remove the addition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining (1) Olsen's claims were not barred by res judicata; (2) Olsen's claims were not barred by equitable estoppel or waiver; and (3) Milner was liable to Olsen for trespass.

After a dispute over the purchase of a motor coach, Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants, a used car salesman, a used car dealership, and a bank, asserting claims of, inter alia, breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to compel discovery, which the district court granted. Defendants did not meet their discovery deadlines, and Defendants' counsel failed to attend several status conferences. The district court then entered a default judgment for Plaintiff as a discovery sanction and later and awarded Plaintiff $74,154 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it entered a default judgment for Plaintiff as a discovery sanction under Mont. R. Civ. P. 37(b); (2) did not abuse its discretion when it refused to set aside the sanction orders; (3) did not err as a matter of law in calculating damages; but (4) failed to property calculate and award prejudgment interest. Remanded.

Casey Stuivnga and Britni Evans were injured in a single-vehicle accident. The vehicle was owned by Stuivenga. Both Stuivenga and Evans claimed the other person was driving and was liable to the other for their injuries. They both sought proceeds available under an automobile insurance policy issued to Stuivenga by Progressive Direct Insurance Company. Progressive determined that Evans' and Stuivenga's competing claims could not be settled in an amount equal to or less than the policy's per person liability limit of $25,000. Progressive commenced an interpleader action and deposited the $25,000 with the district court, asking the court to determine to whom the funds should be issued. Ultimately, a jury found that Evans was the driver at the time of the accident and released the $25,000 to Stuivenga. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this appeal was not moot, as the issue presented at the outset of the action of who was driving had not ceased to exist, and Stuivenga's payment of the funds to third parties did not render the Court unable to grant effective relief; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Evans' motion for a new trial.

Tina Blackmore filed a complaint against Marvin Dunster alleging damages arising from an assault and unlawful restraint. The district court entered a judgment against Dunster. Dunster subsequently filed an unrelated personal injury action in the district court. While that case was pending, the clerk of the district court issued a writ of execution directing a levying officer to satisfy the balance due to Blackmore out of Dunster's personal property. The writ specifically instructed the officer to seize and sell Dunster's personal injury cause of action. Blackmore purchased Dunster's cause of action for fifty dollars. The district court set aside the sale of Dunster's cause of action on the ground that a personal injury action was not subject to levy before judgment was entered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Montana law does not allow the levy or sale of a personal injury cause of action before judgment is entered.