Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Kevin Kichnet was babysitting his young nieces when he met three-year-old Eternity after the Head Start bus dropped her off after school. Kichnet was allegedly holding her hand as they crossed the street when Eternity collapsed. Kitchnet called 9-1-1. After Eternity reached the hospital she was pronounced dead. Kichnet was subsequently arrested for deliberate homicide and jailed. More than six months later, charges against Kichnet were dropped when it was determined that the Head Start school bus had run over Eternity. Kichnet sued (1) Butte-Silver Bow County, claiming County law enforcement officers performed their investigation negligently, resulting in Kichnet's arrest and incarceration; and (2) the State, claiming that the State Medical Examiner performed his duties negligently when he reported Eternity's death as a homicide. The district court granted the County's and State's motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment, as (1) the State was immune under the cited statutes from Kichnet's negligence claim; and (2) the court did not err in determining that there was probable cause for the arrest and incarceration of Kichnet, and that the investigation by the County was not negligent.

Employee, a truck driver, resigned from his employment with Employer after he developed arthritis. Employee later filed an occupational disease claim, which the Montana State Fund (MSF) denied. The Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) concluded that Employee's job duties were the major contributing cause of his arthritic condition, and therefore, Employee was suffering from an occupational disease. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err in concluding that Grande was suffering from a compensable occupational disease arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment, as the WCC's findings of fact were supported by substantial, credible evidence, and its conclusions of law were correct.

Judith LaPlante filed an action in tribal court against Town Pump, Inc. and Major Brands Distributing Imports, Inc. (collectively, Defendants). The case was eventually dismissed by the Ninth Circuit, which ruled that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over LaPlante's claims. LaPlante then filed a new action in state district court. District court judge Laurie McKinnon assumed jurisdiction. LaPlante attempted to commence the action in district court by transferring the tribal court action rather than filing a new complaint. The district court dismissed LaPlante's attempted transfer of the action from tribal court and provided LaPlante with twenty days to serve a complaint on Defendants. LaPlante filed a complaint as a new cause of action rather than as an amended pleading in the original transfer action. Judge McKinnon also assumed jurisdiction of the new action and consolidated the two cases. LaPlante filed a motion to substitute Judge McKinnon in the new action, which Judge McKinnon denied as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge McKinnon properly deemed LaPlante's substitution motion as untimely as the time limit elapsed well before LaPlante filed her substitution motion.

Employee filed a workers' compensation claim against Employer. Employer's Insurer accepted liability for Employee's claim. Insurer contracted with third-party Adjuster to provide services for Employee's claim. Employee and Insurer disagreed over elements of the claim, and Attorney advised Insurer on various legal matters. The claim was eventually resolved. Employee then filed the present action for unfair claims settlement practices, naming Insurer and an employee of Adjuster as defendants. Employee served Employer with a subpoena requesting, inter alia, a letter Attorney wrote to Adjuster's employee concerning the underlying case. Employer and Insurer objected to the subpoena, citing attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. The court denied the motions. Insurer then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the district court correctly applied the law of attorney-client privilege but incorrectly analyzed the work product doctrine. However, because the court reached the proper conclusion, supervisory control was unnecessary.

In 2007, Scottie and Dawn Pederson (the Pedersons) and Rocky Mountain Bank (the Bank) entered into a construction loan agreement pursuant to which the Bank agreed to lend the Pedersons several thousand dollars. In 2008, the Pedersons and the Bank agreed to finance the construction loan through three short term loans. In 2009, the Pedersons tried to refinance their loans but were unable to do so. Due to alleged failures on the part of the Bank, the Pedersons brought suit against the Bank in 2011, asserting claims for, inter alia, negligence, constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. After it was served with the complaint, the Bank filed a Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, asserting the statutes of limitations had run on all of the Pedersons' claims. The district court granted the Bank's motion and dismissed the Pedersons' claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the applicable statutes of limitations began to run in 2008 because the Pedersons' claims had accrued and they had discovered the facts constituting the claims; and (2) by filing their complaint more than three years later, the Pedersons failed to commence their action within any of the applicable statutes of limitations.

Judith Newman (Newman), mother and personal representative of the estate of Karlye Newman (Karlye), appealed from certain pretrial and trial rulings made in the district court concerning the suicidal death of Karlye while at a boarding school for troubled teenagers. Newman named as Defendants Robert Lichfield and the World Wide Association of Specialty Programs and Schools. A jury found Defendants were not negligent, did not commit deceit or negligent misrepresentation, and were not liable for the possible wrongful acts of other defendants regarding Karlye's death. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court abused its discretion in limiting the scope of evidence regarding foreseeability, as the exclusion of the evidence was highly prejudicial to Newman and largely prevented her from being able to argue foreseeability, duty, and negligence on the part of Defendants. Remanded for a new trial.

Patterson Enterprises hired Archie Johnson Contracting (AJC) to perform blasting on a road construction project. During the project, an entire section of rock above one of Patterson's excavators collapsed, crushing it. Patterson filed suit against AJC, asserting various claims, including negligence and strict liability. AJC asserted various affirmative defenses, including contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. AJC also filed a counterclaim, asserting breach of contract. The jury (1) returned a verdict finding that AJC's blasting caused the damages sustained by Patterson and that Patterson and its employees assumed the risk of harm; (2) allocated fifty-one percent of the fault to AJC and forty-nine percent to Patterson, and awarded damages to Patterson in the amount of $50,000; and (3) returned a verdict in favor of AJC on its breach of contract claim, awarding damages to AJC in the amount of $19,255. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) when it permitted the defense of assumption of the risk to go to the jury; and (2) in failing to instruct the jury regarding the subjective knowledge requirement set forth in Lutz v. National Crane Corp.

Jerome Dubiel (Jerome) was traveling on a Montana highway during a high wind event that caused numerous trees to blow down. Jerome was stopped temporarily by a Montana Department of Transportation (MDT) employee who was clearing highway debris when a tree fell on Jerome's car, inflicting a fatal injury. Keevy, Jerome's wife (Dubiel), sued MDT, claiming it had negligently failed to close the highway prior to Jerome's death. Dubiel did not retain an expert to establish MDT's standard of care regarding highway safety under the circumstances leading to Jerome's death. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of MDT, finding that expert testimony was required in this case to establish the standard of care to which MDT was required to conform under the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting MDT's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Dubiel could not prove the applicable standard of care and breach thereof without expert testimony.

Burglington Northern & Sante Fe Railway Company (BNSF) contaminated the environment surrounding the Livingston Rail Yard (Yard). Plaintiffs, individuals who owned property adjacent to the Yard, sued BNSF in federal court for damages to their property based on claims of, inter alia, nuisance, negligence, and trespass. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment in favor of BNSF, finding that the applicable statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs' claims. The federal district court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether the continuing tort doctrine should apply to the claims presented by Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court held (1) the continuing tort doctrine in Montana tolls the statute of limitations for property damage claims of nuisance and/or trespass resulting from contamination that has stabilized, continues to migrate, and is not readily or easily abatable; and (2) the limitations period begins to run when abatement is not reasonable or complete abatement cannot be achieved, and a permanent injury exists.

Carl Murphy was injured while shopping at Home Depot. Murphy subsequently sued Home Depot. Counsel for both parties then began negotiating a settlement offer, but no settlement documents were executed. Home Depot moved to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing that Murphy's counsel agreed to a "global settlement" via his correspondence with Home Depot's counsel. The district court granted Home Depot's motion, determining that the parties formed a binding settlement agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no mutual consent between Murphy and Home Depot because there was no agreement on the essential terms of the settlement agreement, and therefore, no settlement agreement was ever reached between the parties. Remanded.