Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Montana Supreme Court
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The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) determining that Johnny Lee Sheldon's claim was compensable, that Contessa Bryer, Sheldon's guardian and conservator, was entitled to her attorney fees, and that a statutory penalty should be imposed against Accident Fund General Insurance Company, holding that the WCC did not err.Sheldon was rendered incapacitated and mentally incompetent after a workplace accident. Because Accident Fund General Insurance Company refused to accept liability for Sheldon's workers' compensation claim Bryer, Sheldon's guardian and conservator, petitioned the WCC for a hearing. The WCC ruled that Accident Fund was liable for Sheldon's injuries and that Bryer was entitled to attorney fees and a statutory penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err when it (1) ruled that the statute of limitations was tolled during the time that Sheldon had no appointed guardian; (2) found that substantial credible evidence supported the WCC's finding that Sheldon was working with argon when the pressure relief valve burst; and (3) awarded attorney fees under Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-611 and by imposing a penalty against Accident Fund under Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-2907. View "Bryer v. Accident Fund General Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) granting in part and denying in part Petitioner's motion for summary judgment, holding that the WCC erred in part.At issue on appeal was whether the WCC erred when it ruled that the aggregate wages of Petitioner, a disabled worker, calculated at the time of injury, are used to determine Petitioner's permanent partial disability (PPD) benefit rate regardless of Petitioner's actual wage loss at maximum healing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the WCC erred by ruling that Petitioner's PPD indemnity benefit rate was aggregated from both of her time-of-injury employments when she was only precluded from one employment upon reaching maximum medical improvement. View "Barnhart v. Mont. State Fund" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of a group of eastern Montana farmers (Farmers) and against four affiliates of USA Biofuels, LLC (Affiliates) on Farmers' claims on a variety of contract and tort theories, holding that there was no error.In 2018, Farmers entered individual written contracts with USA Biofuels to grow 10,000 acres of hemp. Farmers brought this action alleging that they never received full payment from Defendants, including USA Biofuels and various affiliates. The district court concluded on summary judgment that USA Biofuels breached its contract and awarded damages. Farmers subsequently abandoned their contract claims and secured a tort judgment against Affiliates. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it entered judgment on the punitive damages award; (2) did not err in instructing the jury; and (3) did not err in ruling on summary judgment that three shareholders were alter egos of USA Biofuels. View "Romo v. USA Biofuels, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants summary judgment on Plaintiffs' negligence-based tort claims, breach of contract claims, and Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) claims, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not erroneously grant summary judgment to Defendants on the causation element of Plaintiffs' asserted negligence-based claims; (2) did not erroneously grant summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs' asserted breach of contract claim; and (3) did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs' asserted MCPA claim. View "Kostelecky v. Peas in a Pod LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court rejecting Plaintiff's appeal of the Montana Human Rights Commission's rejection of his claims grounded in political discrimination, holding that while the district court erred in ruling that Appellant had to pursue his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim under the exclusive remedy of the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA), claim preclusion now barred him from relitigating that claim.Plaintiff, the undersheriff of Missoula County, was reassigned to the position of senior deputy when his opponent in an election race won the office of Missoula County Sheriff. Plaintiff brought a human rights complaint alleging, inter alia, retaliation, discrimination, and constructive discharge based on his demotion. The Commission denied the complaint. Thereafter, Plaintiff brought this complaint alleging wrongful discharge, intentional infliction of emotion distress, unlawful political discrimination, and unlawful retaliation. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the MHRA was Plaintiff's exclusive remedy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court improperly dismissed Plaintiff's section 1983 claim; and (2) because the underlying facts in Plaintiff's amended complaint were the same as his human rights complaint, the claims were precluded by the final judgment of the administrative proceedings. View "Clark v. McDermott" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court answered a certified question that law enforcement officers do not, as a matter of Montana law, act outside the scope of their employment when they use their authority as on-duty officers to sexually assault a person they are investigating for a crime.L.B. brought this action under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging that she was sexually assaulted by Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Officer Dana Bullcoming after she called the police and reported that her mother was driving while intoxicated. The district court granted summary judgment for the Government, concluding that Officer Bullcoming was not acting outside the scope of his employment when he sexually assaulted L.B. because he was not acting in furtherance of his employer's interest. The The Ninth Circuit certified a question of law to the Supreme Court, which answered that, under Montana law, Officer Bullcoming's sexual assault of L.B. was within the scope of his employment as a law enforcement officer. View "L.B. v. United States" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Depositors Insurance Company in its declaratory judgment action to determine any obligation it had relative to Patrick Sandidge pursuant to Ridley v. Guaranty National Insurance Co., 951 P.2d 987 (Mont. 1997), holding that the district court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not err by holding a hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment; (2) did not err by holding that Depositors had standing to bring a declaratory action pursuant to Ridley; (3) did not err by granting Depositors' motion for summary judgment; and (4) did not abuse its discretion by denying Sandidge attorney fees and costs. View "Depositors Insurance Co. v. Sandidge" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court ordering Plaintiff to pay the attorney fees and costs of Defendant, the prevailing party in a construction defect suit initiated by Plaintiff, holding that the district court erred in part.Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants alleging negligence, breach of contract, and other claims. The district court held in favor of Defendants on all of Plaintiffs' claims. The court then awarded attorney fees and costs to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred by determining that Defendant had a reciprocal right to an award of attorney fees under Mont. Code Ann. 70-19-428 and Mont. Code Ann. 28-3-704. View "Rafes v. McMillan" on Justia Law

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In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court granting the cross-motion for partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and New West Health Services and denying Allied World Assurance Company's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the district court erred in part.Dana Rolan, who serious injuries in an automobile accident, had health insurance through New West. New West denied coverage because the tortfeasor's liability insurance paid $100,000 of Rolan's medical expenses. Rolan filed a class action complaint alleging that New West violated its made-whole obligations. New West tendered the defense to its insurer, Allied. The district court certified the class and held New West liable for monetary losses. Plaintiffs and New West subsequently entered into a settlement. Allied opposed the district court's ensuing motion for final judgment, arguing that the proposed settlement amount was not covered by Allied. The district court approved the settlement between New West and Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court held that the district court (1) erred in holding that Allied was estopped from asserting a $1 million "each Claim" limit of liability under the policy; and (2) correctly concluded that Allied's "Loss" provision did not preclude Allied's indemnity obligation of the class's damages. View "Rolan v. New West Health Services" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court accepted certification of two questions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding whether a charitable write-off of medical expenses may be recovered as damages or is subject to the collateral source rule.Specifically, the Supreme Court concluded (1) for a claim that accrued prior to the effective date of Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-308 a plaintiff in a survival action may not recover the reasonable value of medical care and related services when the costs of such services or care are wholly written off under the provider's charitable care program and the patient receives a zero-balance bill; and (2) for a claim that accrued prior to the effective date of Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-308, such a charitable care write-off is not a collateral source within the meaning of section 27-1-307. View "Gibson v. United States" on Justia Law