Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Randall Simms was injured during his employment. The Montana State Fund (MSF) provided workers compensation to Simms' employer, and later, paid continuing medical benefits for Simms. MSF subsequently utilized the services of a special investigative unit (SIU) to investigate Simms for fraud. The SIU took multiple videos of Simms in public places. The videos were deemed confidential criminal justice information (CCJI) by the district court. The court allowed them to be used in relation to Simms' workers' compensation claim in any manner consistent with the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure and workers' compensation court (WCC) procedures. Simms appealed, arguing that MSF did not having standing to file an action for dissemination under the Montana Criminal Justice Information Act of 1979, and that the district court inadequately balanced the demands of individual privacy against the merits of disclosure, did not follow established rules of statutory construction, and improperly identified and weighed the competing interests at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err when it authorized MSF to disseminate the CCJI under the Act, and the court correctly interpreted the statute and adequately engaged in the statutorily mandated balancing of competing concerns.

The City of Dillon entered an agreement with the McNeills allowing them to connect to a water main for their domestic water supply. Later, the City granted permission to the McNeills to activate an existing water service to their property. The Conners bought the McNeills' subdivided lot, and the City billed and collected for the water that was furnished to the Conners. The water main subsequently froze solid, leaving the Conners without water service for weeks. The Conners sued the City for breach of contract and negligence. The district court entered summary judgment for the City, concluding (1) there was no implied contract between the Conners and the City, and therefore, the Conners' water use was unlawful; and (2) the negligence claim was barred by City Ordinance 13.04.150, which provides that the City is not liable for claims from interruption of water service resulting from shutting off the water in its mains. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the City had a legal obligation to provide water to the Conners under an implied contract; and (2) section 13.04.150 did not bar the Conners' claims because the City did not decide to shut off the water service.

Edna Banco filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits for an occupational disease (OD) in her right shoulder. Banco worked concurrently at 4B's Restaurant and the Child Development Center on Malmstrom Air Force Base (CDC). 4B's was insured by Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation (Liberty). Liberty denied Banco's claim for workers' compensation benefits. The Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) found (1) Banco was last exposed to work of the same type and kind that gave rise to her shoulder condition while she was working at CDC; and (2) thus, since Banco was not last exposed at 4B's, Liberty was not liable under the "last injurious exposure" rule set forth in In re Mitchell. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC had substantial credible evidence upon which to find Banco was last injuriously exposed at CDC to working conditions of the type and kind that led to her OD, and thus, Liberty was not liable for Banco's OD.

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana (BCBS) and New West Health Services (collectively TPAs) administered a self-funded employee healthcare benefit plan for the State's employees. Jeannette Diaz and Leah Hoffmann-Bernhardt (Plaintiffs), who were both injured in accidents, filed suit against the state, BCBS, and New West for allegedly violating their made-whole rights by failing to conduct a made-whole analysis before exercising subrogation rights. Plaintiffs moved for class certification seeking to include in the lawsuit individuals who had their benefits reduced under the State plan, as well as individuals who had their benefits reduced under policies independently issued and administered by the TPAs. The district court denied class certification and determined that Montana's made-whole laws did not apply to TPAs. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's finding that BCBS and New West, in their capacities as TPAs in the present case, were not subject to the made-whole laws under either the subrogation statutes or under a third-party beneficiary theory; and (2) reversed the district court denial of class certification, as Diaz and Hoffmann-Bernhardt demonstrated that the requirements of Mont. R. Civ. P. 23 were met.

Meril Curtis's houseguest took his credit card and made over $7,000 in unauthorized charges. After acknowledging that the charges were unauthorized and that Curtis was not personally liable for the charges, Citibank referred the account to a collection agency called Professional Recovery Services (PRS). Curtis filed suit against Citibank, alleging libel and credit libel and violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). The district court granted summary judgment to Citibank, finding that Curtis's claims were preempted by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in finding that Curtis' state law claims were preempted by the FCRA because the FCRA does not regulate collection agencies such as PRS. Remanded.

Sellers entered an alleged contract with Buyer for the sale of property. After the parties failed to complete the sale, Buyer sued Sellers, seeking specific performance of the alleged contract. Buyer filed an amended complaint that added as a defendant Attorney, who had served as counsel for Sellers in the failed transaction, alleging fraud and other tortious conduct. Attorney filed a motion to substitute the district court judge, which the district court denied after finding Attorney's motion was untimely. At issue on appeal was whether Attorney qualified as a third-party defendant who possessed an independent right of substitution as opposed to a subsequently joined defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Attorney and Buyer qualified as adverse parties, and therefore, Attorney was a third-party defendant; and (2) Attorney timely filed his motion of substitution. Remanded.

John Miller pled guilty to two counts of deliberate homicide. Miller later filed suit against James Goetz, the attorney that defended him, and arranged for Patrick Begley's limited representation in his claims against Goetz. Begley later withdrew from representing Miller. Miller then filed suit against Begley, alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraudulent deceit. The district court granted summary judgment to Begley, finding that Begley had reasonably assisted Miller with his claims against Goetz and the dismissal of the Goetz claim was based on legal deficiencies unrelated to Begley's legal services. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Begley as Miller failed to demonstrate genuine issues of material fact existed regarding his claims.

Dane Shattuck died from injuries after being hit by an automobile. Dane received medical care at Hospital for his injuries. Dane was enrolled in a children's health insurance program (CHIP), administered by the department of public health and human services (DPHHS). Hospital submitted the bill for Dane's care to Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS), which served as third-party administrator of the CHIP program for DPHHS. Hospital then asserted a lien for the full bill amount against recoveries Gail Shattuck, as personal representative of Dane's estate, may obtain against third parties. Shattuck sued Hospital, BCBS, DPHHS, and the State, asserting that Defendants unlawfully acted to avoid application of "made whole" rules and that Hospital could not foreclose the lien because Shattuck had not been made whole. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Shattuck. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred by determining that CHIP constitutes insurance and was governed by the made whole doctrine, and (2) the district court did not err by determining that BCBS was not an insurer in its role here and, therefore, was not subject to the made whole statute. Remanded.

Rohnn Lampi's neighbor admitted liability for negligently dumping ashes that caused a wildfire that burned the trees and vegetation on Lampi's property. After the parties failed to agree on a settlement amount, Lampi brought an action in district court against his neighbor and sought a jury trial to determine damages. The jury awarded Lampi $250,000. On appeal, Lampi contended that the district court wrongly denied his motions to establish restoration damages as the appropriate measure of damages in his case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by not concluding that restoration damages constituted the appropriate measure of damages in this case. Remanded for a new trial to allow the jury to determine what reasonable amount of damages would restore Lampi's property to its pre-fire condition.

Heather Weber filed suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) to recover for personal injuries allegedly received during the course and scope of her employment with BNSF Railway Company, alleging BNSF breached its duty under FELA, violated the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), and violated the Safety Appliance Act (SAA), federal regulations, and other standards. The district court found BNSF not negligent. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in granting BNSF's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Weber's LIA claim because Weber presented sufficient evidence that presented a factual issue whether the LIA had been violated and whether that violation played a part in causing Weber's injuries; and (2) the district court did not err in granting BNSF's motion to exclude testimony from Weber's treating physician about the results of a positron emission tomography (PET) scan performed on Weber. Remanded.