Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants summary judgment on Plaintiffs' negligence-based tort claims, breach of contract claims, and Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) claims, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not erroneously grant summary judgment to Defendants on the causation element of Plaintiffs' asserted negligence-based claims; (2) did not erroneously grant summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs' asserted breach of contract claim; and (3) did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs' asserted MCPA claim. View "Kostelecky v. Peas in a Pod LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court rejecting Plaintiff's appeal of the Montana Human Rights Commission's rejection of his claims grounded in political discrimination, holding that while the district court erred in ruling that Appellant had to pursue his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim under the exclusive remedy of the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA), claim preclusion now barred him from relitigating that claim.Plaintiff, the undersheriff of Missoula County, was reassigned to the position of senior deputy when his opponent in an election race won the office of Missoula County Sheriff. Plaintiff brought a human rights complaint alleging, inter alia, retaliation, discrimination, and constructive discharge based on his demotion. The Commission denied the complaint. Thereafter, Plaintiff brought this complaint alleging wrongful discharge, intentional infliction of emotion distress, unlawful political discrimination, and unlawful retaliation. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the MHRA was Plaintiff's exclusive remedy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court improperly dismissed Plaintiff's section 1983 claim; and (2) because the underlying facts in Plaintiff's amended complaint were the same as his human rights complaint, the claims were precluded by the final judgment of the administrative proceedings. View "Clark v. McDermott" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question that law enforcement officers do not, as a matter of Montana law, act outside the scope of their employment when they use their authority as on-duty officers to sexually assault a person they are investigating for a crime.L.B. brought this action under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging that she was sexually assaulted by Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Officer Dana Bullcoming after she called the police and reported that her mother was driving while intoxicated. The district court granted summary judgment for the Government, concluding that Officer Bullcoming was not acting outside the scope of his employment when he sexually assaulted L.B. because he was not acting in furtherance of his employer's interest. The The Ninth Circuit certified a question of law to the Supreme Court, which answered that, under Montana law, Officer Bullcoming's sexual assault of L.B. was within the scope of his employment as a law enforcement officer. View "L.B. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Depositors Insurance Company in its declaratory judgment action to determine any obligation it had relative to Patrick Sandidge pursuant to Ridley v. Guaranty National Insurance Co., 951 P.2d 987 (Mont. 1997), holding that the district court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not err by holding a hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment; (2) did not err by holding that Depositors had standing to bring a declaratory action pursuant to Ridley; (3) did not err by granting Depositors' motion for summary judgment; and (4) did not abuse its discretion by denying Sandidge attorney fees and costs. View "Depositors Insurance Co. v. Sandidge" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court ordering Plaintiff to pay the attorney fees and costs of Defendant, the prevailing party in a construction defect suit initiated by Plaintiff, holding that the district court erred in part.Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants alleging negligence, breach of contract, and other claims. The district court held in favor of Defendants on all of Plaintiffs' claims. The court then awarded attorney fees and costs to Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred by determining that Defendant had a reciprocal right to an award of attorney fees under Mont. Code Ann. 70-19-428 and Mont. Code Ann. 28-3-704. View "Rafes v. McMillan" on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court granting the cross-motion for partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and New West Health Services and denying Allied World Assurance Company's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the district court erred in part.Dana Rolan, who serious injuries in an automobile accident, had health insurance through New West. New West denied coverage because the tortfeasor's liability insurance paid $100,000 of Rolan's medical expenses. Rolan filed a class action complaint alleging that New West violated its made-whole obligations. New West tendered the defense to its insurer, Allied. The district court certified the class and held New West liable for monetary losses. Plaintiffs and New West subsequently entered into a settlement. Allied opposed the district court's ensuing motion for final judgment, arguing that the proposed settlement amount was not covered by Allied. The district court approved the settlement between New West and Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court held that the district court (1) erred in holding that Allied was estopped from asserting a $1 million "each Claim" limit of liability under the policy; and (2) correctly concluded that Allied's "Loss" provision did not preclude Allied's indemnity obligation of the class's damages. View "Rolan v. New West Health Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted certification of two questions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding whether a charitable write-off of medical expenses may be recovered as damages or is subject to the collateral source rule.Specifically, the Supreme Court concluded (1) for a claim that accrued prior to the effective date of Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-308 a plaintiff in a survival action may not recover the reasonable value of medical care and related services when the costs of such services or care are wholly written off under the provider's charitable care program and the patient receives a zero-balance bill; and (2) for a claim that accrued prior to the effective date of Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-308, such a charitable care write-off is not a collateral source within the meaning of section 27-1-307. View "Gibson v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the district court that the State was covered by an insurance policy it had with National Indemnity Company (National) for claims made against the State for injury and death resulting from asbestos exposure but reversed the district court's rulings regarding qualifying "occurrences" under the policy, holding that remand was required for further consideration of these issues.This insurance dispute followed litigation between the State and claimants who alleged that they were harmed by the State's failure to warn them of the hazards of asbestos exposure over years of mining and milling operations in Libby, Montana. National insured the State against general liability from 1973-1975. National filed this action seeking determinations that it had no obligation to defend the State or to cover the claims. The State concluded that National breached its duty to defend the State but disagreed with the district court's determination of the number of "occurrences" eligible for coverage under the policy, holding that remand was required for further factual findings. View "National Indemnity Co. v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the orders of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant and dismissing Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim with prejudice, holding that the district court erred.Defendant filed a civil complaint on behalf of Whitefish Credit Union (WCU) alleging that Plaintiff committed fraud when she foreclosed on certain property. Defendant also reported the fraud allegations to federal law enforcement authorities, resulting in Plaintiff's indictment. Before Plaintiff's resulting criminal charges and civil fraud claims were eventually dismissed Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy and received a discharge. Plaintiff filed a civil lawsuit alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and constructive fraud based on Defendant's involvement in initiating fraud proceedings against her. Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiff was judicially estopped from pursuing her claims because she failed to disclose the claims as assets in her personal bankruptcy. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's civil malicious prosecution claim; and (2) properly granted summary judgment to the extent it applied judicial estoppel to Plaintiff's claim as premised on the criminal charges that were brought against her. View "McAtee v. Morrison & Frampton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Defendant summary judgment on Plaintiff's asserted negligence (liquor liability) and negligence (premises liability) claims, holding that the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff's co-pled negligence (premises liability) claim was subject to the two-year Montana Dram Shop Act statute of limitations. See Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-710(6).Plaintiff pled two base tort claims against Defendant - a negligence (liquor liability) claim and a separate negligence (premises liability) claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that both of Plaintiff's base tort claims were time-barred by the two-year Dram Shop Act statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the district court erroneously concluded that section 27-1-710(6) time-barred Plaintiff's negligence (premises liability) claim. View "Babcock v. Casey's Management, LLC" on Justia Law