Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Thomas Latzel was a passenger in the vehicle of Daniel Vanekelenburg, who was driving, when the vehicle collided with another vehicle driven by Patrick Gaughen. The collision occurred at an unmarked intersection of two county roads. Brothers Ronald Bartek and Doug Bartek owned the land to the southwest corner of the intersection. Before Thomas died from his injuries, his wife filed a negligence action against the drivers involved in the collision and the Barteks, alleging that the Barteks were negligent by planting corn too close to the roadside and by allowing the corn to obstruct the view of the intersection. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Barteks, concluding that the negligence of the drivers constituted an intervening cause as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the actions of the drivers constituted an efficient intervening cause of the collision, which severed the causal connection between the conduct of the Barteks and the injuries received by Thomas. View "Latzel v. Bartek" on Justia Law

A guest (“Guest”) at an apartment complex fell of a third-story apartment’s balcony, rendering him quadriplegic. Guest sued the apartment complex’s ownership (“Owner”) and management (“Manager”) under theories of joint and several liability. American Family Mutual Insurance Company held liability policies covering both Owner and Manager. Regent Insurance Company held liability policies covering Manager, but the parties disputed whether the policies also covered the “same risk” for Owner as an additional insured. American Family settled with Guest and sued Regent for equitable contribution toward the payment it made to Guest under the settlement agreement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of American Family. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its apportionment of the common obligation toward Guest’s settlement. View "Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Regent Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2009, a pickup truck and a school bus collided at a rural intersection that had limited visibility and was “blind” for both drivers. A stop sign facing the truck was missing at the intersection. Jeff Hall, the driver of the truck, filed an action against the County of Lancaster and Norris School District, the owner of the bus, alleging that the collision was proximately caused by the negligence of the County and of Ronny Aden, the driver of the bus. The district court determined that both drivers were negligent. The court also concluded that the County was liable, reasoning it would have discovered the sign was missing if it had conducted regular sign inspections. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment finding the County liable, holding that the district court was clearly wrong in determining that the County’s lack of a sign-inspection policy was a proximate cause of the accident. Remanded for reallocation of liability between Hall and Norris. View "Hall v. County of Lancaster" on Justia Law

Appellant filed this action against Prairie Fields Family Medicine, P.C., bringing claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy and alleging that a Prairie Fields employee disclosed her positive HIV test results to a third party, and as a result, the information spread throughout the community where Appellant did business and had friends. The district court (1) dismissed Appellant’s invasion of privacy claim, concluding that it was time barred; and (2) granted summary judgment for Prairie Fields on Appellant’s claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, concluding that Appellant failed to create an issue of fact that someone from Prairie Fields had disclosed her diagnosis to a third party. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s summary judgment order, holding that Appellant raised a genuine issue of material fact that someone at Prairie Fields disclosed information from her private medical records. Remanded. View "C.E. v. Prairie Fields Family Med., P.C." on Justia Law

Attorney represented Plaintiff in a negligence lawsuit against Defendant. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Attorney subsequently made an oral motion for payment of attorney fees and costs in the underlying negligence lawsuit. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order granting Attorney’s oral motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal because (1) Attorney never filed a petition in intervention, and therefore, at the time of his oral motion, Attorney was not a party to the suit; (2) furthermore, Attorney stated at the time he made his motion that he no longer represented Plaintiff; and (3) therefore, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide Attorney’s oral motion for payment. View "Wisniewski v. Heartland Towing, Inc." on Justia Law

Edwin Kuhnel, an employee of BNSF Railway Company, was injured during while working for BNSF. Kuhnel brought this action against BNSF under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), alleging that his injuries were caused by BNSF’s failure to provide him with a reasonably safe place to work and its failure to take other appropriate safety measures. Pursuant to the jury’s general verdict, the district court entered judgment for BNSF. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) the district court’s jury instructions erroneously permitted the jury to decide, as a factual determination, whether BNSF was under a duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work; and (2) the general verdict rule did not bar the court from overturning the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the jury instructions in this case did not rise to the level of plain error because the instructions implicitly recognized BNSF’s duty by requiring the jury to find that BNSF was negligent if it found that BNSF had failed to provide Kuhnel with a reasonably safe place to work. View "Kuhnel v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

In 1985, Appellant was found guilty of second degree murder. The Supreme Court later decided State v. Myers, which held that if malice was an essential element of the crime of second degree murder and the jury was not so instructed, reversal of the conviction was required. In accordance with Myers, Appellant’s conviction was vacated and a retrial ordered. Before Myers was decided, however, Appellant was charged in Lancaster County with several felonies. Appellant was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. The second degree murder charges against Appellant were eventually dismissed. In 2009, Appellant unsuccessfully filed a claim asking for compensation under the Nebraska Claims for Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment Act (Act). Appellant then filed suit against the State, alleging that he was entitled to damages for his wrongful conviction for second degree murder. After a trial, the district court found that Appellant had not shown he was innocent of the murder, as required by the Act, and dismissed Appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) requiring Appellant to prove his innocence and not finding Appellant innocent under the Act; (2) denying Appellant’s motion for counsel; and (3) considering Appellant’s Lancaster County convictions. View "Hess v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Red Willow Dairy, LLC, and Jim and Ann Huffman. The day before the order granting the default judgment was signed and file stamped, Red Willow Dairy and the Huffmans filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy. Plaintiff settled her claim in return for an assignment of rights to any causes of action Red Willow Dairy and the Huffmans might have against Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company with respect to the underlying lawsuit. Plaintiff then sued Fireman’s for breach of its duty to defend Red Willow Dairy and Huffmans. The district court found that the filing of the default judgment violated the automatic stay of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of Fireman’s. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the the filing of the bankruptcy stayed any further proceedings in the underlying action, preventing the rendition and entry of the default judgment. View "Doe v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After an infant boy died in the care of Plaintiff, a daycare provider, Plaintiff was charged with felony child abuse resulting in death. The charge was later dropped after two forensic pathologists retained by Plaintiff concluded that the infant’s cause of death was sudden infant death syndrome. Plaintiff subsequently sued the pathologist whose autopsy report was used to bring the criminal charges against Plaintiff and the pathologist’s wholly owned corporation (collectively, Defendants). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendants where differing reasonable inferences could be drawn as to whether the pathologist knowingly provided false or misleading information to law enforcement in his autopsy report. View "McKinney v. Okoye" on Justia Law

Appellee was employed as a carman for Union Pacific Railroad Company when he was injured by a chair that collapsed, causing injury to his back. Appellee filed a Federal Employers' Liability Act action against Union Pacific and also filed suit against the manufacturer of the chair, Steelcase, Inc. Appellee settled his case against Steelcase. The claim against Union Pacific proceeded to trial. A jury verdict was entered for Appellee in the amount of $1,032,375. The district court allowed Union Pacific to set off the verdict in the amount of $425,000 because of the settlement reached with Steelcase. The court also enforced a medical lien in the amount of $139,845 against that settlement. Union Pacific appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in allowing a setoff of the portion of Appellee's medical bills that were written off by Appellee's medical providers as a result of negotiations between Union Pacific and the providers; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by not modifying the allocation of Appellee's settlement with Steelcase and setting off that reallocated amount from the verdict. View "Strasburg v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law