Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

While at work, Employee was asked by his supervisor to enter a grain bin and to shovel grain into the center of the bin's conical base in order to facilitate removal of grain from the bin. Employee died of asphyxiation after being engulfed in the grain. Employer pleaded guilty to the criminal charge of willfully violating Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations by knowingly permitting an employee to enter a grain bin in violation of safety standards. The personal representative of Employee's estate (Estate) subsequently brought this action against Employer for wrongful death and assault and battery and for a declaratory judgment that either the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act did not apply or, alternatively, that it was unconstitutional on its face as applied. The district court dismissed the Estate's complaint, finding that the Act applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) despite the egregiousness of Employer's conduct, the injury was still an "accident" as defined by the Act; and (2) the Act does not thereby unconstitutionally discriminate between employees and nonemployees or employee victims of employer willful negligence and employee victims of their own willful negligence. View "Estate of Teague v. Crossroads Coop. Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2009, a sign fell on Plaintiff's pickup truck while it was parked in a lot owned by Wilkinson Development (Wilkinson). Plaintiff was injured, and his wife was killed. The sign collapsed as a result of the shearing of a section of the steel pole that held the sign. Plaintiff subsequently sued Wilkinson, Tri-City Sign Company (Tri-City), which installed the sign in 1999, and Love Signs of North Platte (Love Signs), which replaced lamps and ballasts in the sign, for personal injury and wrongful death. The district court (1) sustained Tri-City's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the action was barred by the ten-year statute of repose; and (2) sustained Love Signs' motion for summary judgment, finding there was no evidence Love Signs breached a duty of reasonable care when it performed work on the sign. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's claims against Tri-City were time barred by the applicable statute of repose; and (2) Love Signs owed Plaintiff no duty to discover any latent defect in the sign. View "Durre v. Wilkinson Dev., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff attended an aquatic physical therapy session at Premier Physical Therapy (Premier), an off-site clinic owned by Columbus Community Hospital (Columbus). Plaintiff slipped and fell on the wet floor above the clinic's pool, injuring her arm and wrist. In 2011, Plaintiff filed an action against Columbus and Premier, claiming negligence. Plaintiff's action was based upon a theory of premises liability that would be subject to a four-year statute of limitations. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding the action was subject to a two-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff's claims arose from her professional relationship with her physical therapist, they were subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-222. View "Churchill v. Columbus Cmty. Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a resident of Nebraska. In 1963, Plaintiff received a copy of the book "Revolutionary Road," which was inscribed to her by the late author Richard Yates. Plaintiff's inscribed copy of the book was later stolen. Ken Lopez and his company, Ken Lopez Bookseller (KLB), bought the book in 2009 from a seller in Georgia and sold it to a customer not in Nebraska. Plaintiff later learned that Lopez had used the inscription in the book for advertising purposes on his website. Plaintiff brought suit against Lopez and KLB for violating her right to privacy. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's complaint failed to plead facts to demonstrate that Lopez and KLB had sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Nebraska, as (1) the contacts created by the website were unrelated to Plaintiff's cause of action, and (2) under the Calder v. Jones foreseeable effects test, the pleadings failed to establish that Lopez and KLB expressly aimed their tortious conduct at the state of Nebraska. View "Abdouch v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the City of Columbus after raw sewage that Plaintiffs claimed was the result of a malfunction of the City-run sanitary sewage system flooded into Plaintiffs' home. The district court found in favor of the City on all theories of recovery, including inverse condemnation, negligence, nuisance, and trespass. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's rulings with respect to negligence and inverse condemnation. The court of appeals affirmed the district court with respect to negligence but reversed the court's finding in the City's favor with regard to inverse condemnation. The Supreme Court granted review of inverse condemnation issues and reversed, holding that Plaintiffs did not establish an inverse condemnation claim because Plaintiffs failed to show the City exercised its right of eminent domain. Remanded. View "Henderson v. City of Columbus" on Justia Law

During a lighthearted moment at work, a doctor used his hand to tap or strike the back of a nurse's neck. The nurse sued the doctor for battery, among other things, claiming that the contact caused serious injuries. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for the doctor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict in the nurse's favor on the issue of battery or in submitting the issue to the jury that a battery occurred, as reasonable minds could conclude that the nurse consented to the contact by the doctor and that the contact did not cause the nurse's injuries. Because there was competent evidence presented to the jury upon which it could find for the doctor, the verdict was not clearly wrong. View "Wulf v. Kunnath" on Justia Law

Appellees brought this negligence action in the district court against Appellant, the County of Madison, under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act after two of Appellees were injured in a single-vehicle accident after they drove into a washout on a vacated county road. Appellees claimed the County should have maintained a "Road Closed" warning sign at the entrance to the road. The district court found the County liable for negligence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred when it based its negligence determination in favor of Appellees on its erroneous determination that the County breached its duty to maintain the road, as the central issue in this case was whether the County had met its obligations relative to the warning sign it had chosen to erect. Remanded with directions to find whether the County had actual or constructive notice that its warning sign was down on the date of the accident and whether the County had reasonable time to correct the problem. View "Blaser v. County of Madison" on Justia Law

Prime Realty, Inc. (Prime) acted as general partner for two limited partnerships (collectively, the Partnerships). Without the Partnerships' limited partners' knowledge, Prime took out two loans from a bank (the Bank) and, by deed of trust, secured the loans with Partnerships' property. The Bank ultimately sold the collateral and applied the proceeds to the loans. The Partnerships sued the Bank for conversion, alleging that the loans were for a nonpartnership purposes and, as such, Prime lacked authority to offer the Partnerships' property as collateral without the limited partners' consent under the Partnership agreements. The district court concluded that the Bank had converted the Partnerships' property and awarded the Partnerships damages and prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Partnerships' complaint was timely; (2) the Bank converted the Partnerships' property; (3) the district court improperly awarded damages in the full amount of the proceeds applied to the loans because a portion of the first loan served a Partnership purpose; and (4) prejudgment interest was proper only in the amount the Bank applied to the second loan. View "Brook Valley Ltd. P'ship v. Mut. of Omaha Bank" on Justia Law

Law Firm represented Employee in a workers' compensation action against Employee's Employer. After a trial, Employee was awarded compensation, including medical expenses incurred by Employee with Medical Clinic. Employer paid sums owed to Medical Clinic pursuant to the award. Law Firm subsequently filed a complaint against Medical Clinic, seeking attorney fees under the common fund doctrine. Following a hearing, the district court dismissed Law Firm's complaint, concluding that Law Firm was not permitted to recover attorney fees from Medical Clinic under the doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain language of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-125(2)(a) prohibits the charging of attorney fees against medical providers in workers' compensation court; and (2) the common fund doctrine may not be applied in this case to allow Law Firm a fee from Medical Clinic from the district court when it would not be entitled to such a fee from the workers' compensation court. View "Walentine, O'Toole, McQuillan & Gordon, LLP v. Midwest Neurosurgery, PC" on Justia Law

While employed as a nurse, Appellant was attacked by a psychiatric patient at her place of employment. Appellant filed a workers' compensation case against Employer. The trial court found that Appellant suffered a compensable injury and that the incident caused an aggravation of a non-work-related condition. The trial court found medical treatment, including surgery, was necessary and reasonable. However, the court denied all compensation fro treatment and bills from medical providers other than one particular doctor, concluding that Appellant failed to produce evidence of a "chain of referral" for the medical providers and that some of the treatment Appellant received was not related to the incident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in requiring chain-of-referral proof for all medical treatment Appellant received, as Employer denied compensability for Appellant's injury, and Appellant was thereby entitled to choose her treating physicians and avoid the chain of referral. View "Clark v. Alegent Health Neb." on Justia Law