Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Appellees brought this negligence action in the district court against Appellant, the County of Madison, under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act after two of Appellees were injured in a single-vehicle accident after they drove into a washout on a vacated county road. Appellees claimed the County should have maintained a "Road Closed" warning sign at the entrance to the road. The district court found the County liable for negligence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred when it based its negligence determination in favor of Appellees on its erroneous determination that the County breached its duty to maintain the road, as the central issue in this case was whether the County had met its obligations relative to the warning sign it had chosen to erect. Remanded with directions to find whether the County had actual or constructive notice that its warning sign was down on the date of the accident and whether the County had reasonable time to correct the problem. View "Blaser v. County of Madison" on Justia Law

Prime Realty, Inc. (Prime) acted as general partner for two limited partnerships (collectively, the Partnerships). Without the Partnerships' limited partners' knowledge, Prime took out two loans from a bank (the Bank) and, by deed of trust, secured the loans with Partnerships' property. The Bank ultimately sold the collateral and applied the proceeds to the loans. The Partnerships sued the Bank for conversion, alleging that the loans were for a nonpartnership purposes and, as such, Prime lacked authority to offer the Partnerships' property as collateral without the limited partners' consent under the Partnership agreements. The district court concluded that the Bank had converted the Partnerships' property and awarded the Partnerships damages and prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Partnerships' complaint was timely; (2) the Bank converted the Partnerships' property; (3) the district court improperly awarded damages in the full amount of the proceeds applied to the loans because a portion of the first loan served a Partnership purpose; and (4) prejudgment interest was proper only in the amount the Bank applied to the second loan. View "Brook Valley Ltd. P'ship v. Mut. of Omaha Bank" on Justia Law

Law Firm represented Employee in a workers' compensation action against Employee's Employer. After a trial, Employee was awarded compensation, including medical expenses incurred by Employee with Medical Clinic. Employer paid sums owed to Medical Clinic pursuant to the award. Law Firm subsequently filed a complaint against Medical Clinic, seeking attorney fees under the common fund doctrine. Following a hearing, the district court dismissed Law Firm's complaint, concluding that Law Firm was not permitted to recover attorney fees from Medical Clinic under the doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain language of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-125(2)(a) prohibits the charging of attorney fees against medical providers in workers' compensation court; and (2) the common fund doctrine may not be applied in this case to allow Law Firm a fee from Medical Clinic from the district court when it would not be entitled to such a fee from the workers' compensation court. View "Walentine, O'Toole, McQuillan & Gordon, LLP v. Midwest Neurosurgery, PC" on Justia Law

While employed as a nurse, Appellant was attacked by a psychiatric patient at her place of employment. Appellant filed a workers' compensation case against Employer. The trial court found that Appellant suffered a compensable injury and that the incident caused an aggravation of a non-work-related condition. The trial court found medical treatment, including surgery, was necessary and reasonable. However, the court denied all compensation fro treatment and bills from medical providers other than one particular doctor, concluding that Appellant failed to produce evidence of a "chain of referral" for the medical providers and that some of the treatment Appellant received was not related to the incident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in requiring chain-of-referral proof for all medical treatment Appellant received, as Employer denied compensability for Appellant's injury, and Appellant was thereby entitled to choose her treating physicians and avoid the chain of referral. View "Clark v. Alegent Health Neb." on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation case, Employee, an illegal alien, was injured in an accident during the course of his employment with Employer. Employer's insurance carrier subsequently informed Employer that it would terminate payments for Employee's temporary partial disability benefits and start paying permanent partial disability benefits. Employer then determined that Employee did not have proper immigration documents and discharged Employee. A judge found that Employee had sustained a permanent total disability (PTD) and awarded Employee benefits for permanent loss of earning power. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act covers illegal aliens under a contract of hire with a covered employer in Nebraska; (2) the Act does not preclude an award of PTD benefits for illegal aliens; and (3) the trial judge was not clearly wrong in finding that Employee's injury resulted in pain that interfered with his ability to perform the work he had previously performed. View "Moyera v. Quality Pork Int'l " on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a passenger in a car that a law enforcement officer was pursuing when the driver lost control of the car, and the car flipped over. Plaintiff sued County for injuries he sustained during the vehicular pursuit pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 13-911, which authorizes compensation for damages to an "innocent third party" who is injured by such a pursuit. The district court held in favor of Plaintiff and awarded damages to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court did not err in (1) the majority of its evidentiary rulings, and although the court erred in admitting hearsay testimony, the error was harmless; (2) finding that Plaintiff was an "innocent third party"; and (3) calculating County's liability under the relevant statutes. View "Werner v. County of Platte" on Justia Law

Plaintiff corporation and two of its officers brought suit against Defendant, a brokerage firm, to recover damages that allegedly resulted when the president of the corporation independently engaged the brokerage firm's services to locate and lease new office space while the corporation was still liable under a previous lease, which it later breached. Plaintiff sued under theories of inducement, tortious interference, and negligence. The district court concluded that the brokerage company was not liable to Plaintiff for assisting the president to enter into a new lease while knowing that the corporation remained liable under a previous lease. The Supreme Court affirmed, either not reaching Appellants' assignments of error or finding them to be without merit. View "Pro. Mgmt. Midwest, Inc. v. Lund Co." on Justia Law

Employee was severely injured while working for Employer. Employer and its Insurer began paying lifetime workers' compensation benefits. Employee brought a separate negligence action against Employer's parent company (Ridgetop) and joined Employer and Insurer for workers' compensation subrogation purposes. Employee reached a settlement agreement with Ridgetop, after which the trial court granted Employer and Insurer's motion, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-118, for a future credit in the amount of Employee's settlement with Ridgetop against its continuing workers' compensation obligations. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order granting the future credit, holding (1) the trial court did not err in granting the motion for credit against the settlement proceeds Employee received from Employer; (2) Insurer did not waive its right to a future credit through a waiver clause in the policy or statements during settlement negotiations; but (3) the trial court erred in granting the credit for the entire amount of the settlement. Remanded for the limited purpose of deducting $437,500 - the amount paid to Insurer and an indemnity company - out of the settlement and for determining the amount of attorney fees to additionally be deducted from the amount of the credit. View "Bacon v. DBI/SALA" on Justia Law

This was an appeal after summary judgment in a medical malpractice action. A kidney donor brought suit after his donated kidney was rendered useless by allegedly negligent medical treatment provided to the donee. At issue was whether a duty of care is owed to a kidney donor by the physicians providing posttransplant treatment to the donee. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the physicians. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in this instance, a physician does not owe a duty of care to a kidney donor during the posttransplant treatment and care of the donee, and therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants. View "Olson v. Wrenshall" on Justia Law

Bradley Green, a paraplegic, sued Box Butte General Hospital after he fell and injured his left shoulder while admitted as a patient. The hospital allowed Green to have his shower chair brought from home and to attempt an unassisted transfer from his wheelchair to the shower chair. Green alleged the hospital was negligent and that it had failed to exercise a degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised by hospitals in the area or similarly situated areas. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Green on liability and proximate cause and ultimately found damages of $3,733,022, which it capped at $1 million. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment, as Green failed to establish each element of his cause of action as a matter of law.