Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The two minor daughters (Daughters) of Parents were injured in a park in Omaha City when their plastic sled collided with a tree. Parents brought an action against the City to recover medical expenses and loss of services based on Daughters' injuries. Daughters also brought an action, by and through their parents, against the City for injuries incurred in the accident. Both actions were brought under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act. The district court found the accident and resulting injuries were proximately caused by the City and awarded damages in both actions. On appeal, the City argued that the district court erred in its assessment of both liability and damages. In her cross-appeal, one of the daughters contended that the damage cap set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. 13-926, as applied in this case, violated her right to due process. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in Daughters' action and affirmed as modified the judgment in Parents' action, reducing the total award payable to Parents jointly.

Appellant David Pittman brought a negligence action against Western Engineering Company and Evert Falkena (collectively, Appellees) after David's wife, Robin Pittman, died in a work-related accident while working for Western on a road construction crew. David's sole theory of liability was bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees and dismissed David's claim with prejudice, determining that the action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) David's negligence action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act because David accepted payment releasing Western, thus barring his action against Western by operation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-148; and (2) this employer immunity extends to Falkena, a fellow employee of Robin, under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-111.

Jamin Stoddard and Brian Shipley were injured in a collision with a train owned by the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF) at a grade crossing in Cass County. Stoddard's guardians and Shipley brought actions against the Nebraska Department of Roads (NDOR) and Cass County under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA) and the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), alleging that the governmental entities negligently designed the grade crossing and negligently failed to install various warning devices. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the State and the County. At issue on appeal was whether the negligence claims fell within the discretionary function exceptions to the limited waiver of sovereign immunity under the PSTCA and the STCA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that all of the claims which were the subject of these appeals fell within the discretionary function exceptions of the PSTCA and the STCA.

Roger McCannon died in an accident while working for Appellee T.O. Hass Tire Company. Christy Spitz, with whom McCannon lived for several years, sought workers' compensation death benefits. The trial judge dismissed Spitz' claim that she was McCannon's surviving spouse after applying Colorado law to find that Spitz was not McCannon's common-law wife. The review panel affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the trial court was not clearly wrong in finding that the vast majority of objective evidence showed that Spitz and McCannon did not intend to create a common-law marriage and did not conduct their affairs as though a common-law marriage existed.

Appellant William Sellers injured his left knee in the course of his employment with Reefer Systems and sought workers' compensation benefits. The Nebraska workers' compensation court determined that Sellers was entitled to future medical care for the knee injury. A review panel of that court affirmed the award but modified it to exclude knee replacement surgery at present, as the evidence as of the date of trial did not support such a finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the modification did not limit Sellers' ability to claim workers' compensation benefits relating to any future knee replacement surgery, and thus, the compensation court review panel did not err in affirming the award as modified.

This case arose from the settlement of a personal injury lawsuit filed by Edward Smalley, who was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident. Although Smalley qualified for Medicaid as a result of the accident, the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Nebraska's Medicaid administrator, refused to pay Smalley's outstanding medical bills prior to the disposition of his third-party liability claims. To facilitate a settlement of those claims, Smalley's attorney agreed that if DHHS paid the medical bills at the discounted Medicaid rate, Smalley would reimburse DHHS dollar-for-dollar out of the settlement proceeds. After DHHS paid the bills as agreed, Smalley objected to full reimbursement as contrary to federal law. The district court determined that under federal law, DHHS was entitled to reimbursement of only a portion of the Medicaid payments it had made. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that DHHS was entitled to full reimbursement.

Adam Martensen filed a negligence action against Rejda Brothers, alleging that he was injured in an accident when he was working in a pasture on a ranch owned and operated by Rejda and that Rejda, as his employer, was negligent when it failed to make a timely effort to search for, discover, and rescue him. The court entered judgment in favor of Martensen and awarded damages of $750,000, plus taxable court costs and prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court (1) held that the district court did not err when it concluded Rejda owed a duty to Martensen; (2) found no prejudicial evidentiary rulings; (3) determined that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence; (4) affirmed the award based on the jury verdict and the award of taxable costs; and (5) reversed the amount of prejudgment interest awarded, concluding that the district court erred in its reading of Neb. Rev. Stat. 45-103.02(1). Remanded for a recalculation of prejudgment interest.

The Lesiaks were farmers who suffered a reduced corn yield, allegedly due to the overapplication of herbicide to their crops by Central Valley Ag Cooperative, Inc. (CVA). The Lesiaks filed this action against CVA, asserting multiple theories of recovery, including negligence, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of implied warranty of services. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CVA on the implied warranty of services and negligence claims. Following the Lesiaks' presentation of their case, the district court granted CVA's motion for a directed verdict on the Lesiaks' remaining claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of CVA as there was evidence in the record which would allow a jury to find the overapplication of the herbicide damaged the Lesiaks' fields and also to reasonably estimate the extent of the damage; and (2) the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Lesiaks' negligence claim, as it was not barred by the economic loss doctrine.

On March 21, 2006, Julie Lovelace was injured in the course of her employment with the City of Lincoln. Lovelace continued to work after her injury up until June 22, 2006, the date of the surgery on her knee. Lovelace returned to work on October 2, 2006 until November 6, 2007, when she was again injured. Lovelace had another surgery on her left knee on December 19, 2007. Lovelace did not return to work, and the City subsequently terminated her employment. Lovelace sought payments for temporary total disability. The workers' compensation court found Lovelace had been temporarily totally disabled from June 22, 2006 through October 1, 2006, and again from December 19, 2007 through August 19, 2009, and thereafter became permanently and totally disabled. A three-judge panel of the compensation court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Lovelace was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits for the period of time after she was injured and while she was working between October 2, 2006 and December 18, 2007; and (2) Lovelace was entitled to permanent total disability payments from December 19, 2007 onward.

Jan Ginapp, a registered nurse, was injured on the job in a violent assault committed by a patient who had been admitted to the hospital after he was taken into emergency protective custody by the City of Bellevue police department. Ginapp sued Bellevue, alleging that her injuries resulted from the police department's negligence. The district court entered judgment for Ginapp against Bellevue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that the patient was in Bellevue's custody at the time of the assault and that Bellevue law enforcement acted unreasonably in transporting the patient to the hospital and permitting him to be admitted; and (2) therefore, the court erred in finding that Bellevue was liable for Ginapp's injuries.