Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Before Appellee began work as a certified nurse aid at Hospital, she failed to disclose on a preemployment questionnaire a work-related injury she received in 2001. In 2008, while working at Hospital, Appellee injured her back. Appellee subsequently petitioned for workers' compensation benefits. The trial judge dismissed the petition, concluding (1) Appellee had willfully misrepresented her work-related injury history when she failed to disclose information about her previous injury; and (2) the hospital could deny benefits because of Appellee's misrepresentation pursuant to Hilt Trucks Lines, Inc. v. Jones. The Workers' Compensation Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the trial judge erred in finding a causal connection between Appellee's misrepresentation and her 2008 injury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court's decision in Hilt Truck Lines, Inc. was clearly erroneous, and it was therefore overruled. Remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Appellee was entitled to benefits without regard to Hospital's misrepresentation defense.

Krista Rosencrans was severely injured when a train collided with a motor vehicle in which she was a passenger. Rosencrans and her mother (collectively, Appellants) brought a negligence action against Union Pacific and the operator of the motor vehicle. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific, determining, among other things, that the claims that the train crew failed to maintain a proper lookout and failed to slow or stop the train to avoid a specific hazard were excessive speed claims and thus preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in finding that Appellants' state law negligence claim based on failure to slow the train was preempted where Appellants' claim based on Union Pacific's alleged failure to exercise ordinary care once it appeared that a collision would probably occur was not necessarily speed based and thus preempted. Remanded.

John and Betty Vlasin leased the oil and gas rights to their land to Ranch Oil Company. Ranch Oil operated on one-half of the land in the lease and Byron Hummon operated on the other half. After the primary term of the lease expired and the wells stopped producing oil, the Vlasins entered into a new lease agreement with Hummon which encompassed the entirety of their land. Thereafter, Ranch Oil took action to revive one of its dormant wells, relying on a savings provision of the lease, which stated that the lease shall not terminate if the lessee commences operations for drilling a well within sixty days from such cessation. Plaintiffs, the Vlasins and Hummon, brought suit against Ranch Oil for declaratory judgment, trespass, and conversion. The court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs but awarded only nominal damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding (1) Ranch Oil's activities on the Vlasins land did not operate so as to extend Ranch Oil's interest in the lease, and (2) Plaintiffs failed to prove they were entitled to damages under trespass and conversion claims, and the Vlasins were entitled only to nominal damages.

Employee of Union Pacific Railroad Company brought an action against Union Pacific, claiming that Union Pacific's negligence resulted in toxic fume exposures that led to health problems for Employee. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Union Pacific, finding that under McNeel v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., Employee had not presented sufficient evidence of causation because he had not identified a specific toxin to which he was exposed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because although McNeel was applicable to Employee's case, Employee presented sufficient evidence of a toxic exposure to present a genuine issue of material fact. Remanded.

Ronald Bacon was injured while working at a construction site. Bacon sued the general contractor, the general contractor's commercial liability insurer, the subcontractor, and the parent company of the subcontractor. Bacon settled with the insurer, which together with the general contractor's separate liability insurer, made payments to Bacon pursuant to the settlement agreement. After Bacon settled with the subcontractor's parent company, the general contractor's two insurers filed a breach of contract action because Bacon received the proceeds of his second settlement but refused to make payment to the insurers under the terms of the first settlement agreement. The district court granted summary judgment for the insurers, finding Bacon, his lawyer, and the lawyer's law firm liable in the amount of $437,500. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's finding that lawyer and law firm were personally liable on the contract, holding that an attorney and/or law firm is not liable on a contract negotiated on behalf of a client when the contract provides that both the client and the attorney "agree to and will pay" a certain sum of money and the attorney signs the contract under the legend "Agreed to in Form & Substance". The Court otherwise affirmed.

Appellant Thomas Pearson was struck by a forklift and was later determined to have been injured in the course of his employment with Archer-Daniels-Midland Milling Company (ADM). The workers' compensation court entered an award granting Pearson, among other benefits, certain future medical expenses. Pearson subsequently had a total knee replacement and sought reimbursement from ADM for those expenses as well as for expenses relating to a back injury. After ADM declined to pay the expenses, Pearson filed a motion to compel payment. A further award was entered (1) denying Pearson's motion with respect to the knee replacement but ordering ADM to pay expenses relating to the treatment of the back injury, and (2) applying the workers' compensation court's fee schedule to payments for the back injury, which had previously been paid by Pearson's health insurer. The workers' compensation court review panel affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court incorrectly found that the original order denied knee replacement, and (2) the trial court did not err in applying the fee schedule to any reimbursement to a third party. Remanded.

Jesse Britton was shot by a city police officer and a conservation officer with the state game and parks commission after Jesse failed to comply with the officers' commands to drop his gun. Jesse died. Pat Britton, as personal representative of Jesse's estate, filed an action against the City of Crawford under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) on common-law negligence claims. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss, determining that the claim was barred by an intentional torts exception to the PSTCA providing that the PSTCA shall not apply to any claim arising out of a battery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the alleged negligence was inextricably linked to a battery, Britton's suit was barred by the PSTCA.

In this medical malpractice case, Husband alleged that Defendants, several physicians, a hospital and others, caused his Wife's death by negligently failing to administer an expensive drug to treat her hypertension. Because the drug needed to be administered indefinitely and could cause deadly symptoms if its administration was interrupted, Wife's treating physicians decided not to administer the drug until Wife's insurer approved it or another source of payment could be found. Wife died before either happened. The jury returned a general verdict for Defendant. Husband then filed a motion for a new trial, which the court granted based on its conclusion that Defendants' expert testimony was inconsistent with the standard of care. At issue on appeal was whether under the circumstances of this case, an expert medical witness is permitted to opine that under the customary standard of care, a physician should consider the health risks to a patient who may be unable to pay for continued treatment. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting a new trial, holding that such testimony is admissible and that, as a matter of law, it could not be said that Defendants' decisions in this case violated the standard of care.

Thirteen-year-old Efrain Ramos-Domingo was killed by a Union Pacific Railroad Company train. Two days later, Efrain's mother, Manuela Gonzalez signed a document releasing Union Pacific from liability for Efrain's death in exchange for $15,000. Manuela later filed a complaint in district court for wrongful death and breach of fiduciary duty. Union Pacific filed a motion to dismiss Manuela's complaint, arguing that the release barred Manuela's claims. The district court sustained the motion to dismiss with respect to the wrongful death claim but overruled the motion with respect to the fiduciary duty claim. The district court then granted Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment on the remaining claim, finding that there was no fiduciary duty owed by Union Pacific to Manuela. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in dismissing Manuela's wrongful death claim because Manuela alleged facts that, if proved, could demonstrate that the release was void on the basis of its failure to represent a binding mutual understanding of the parties or was voidable as the product of fraud, overreaching or duress; and (2) the district court correctly concluded that Union Pacific owed no fiduciary duty to Manuela. Remanded.

Joni Mueller, an employee of the Lincoln Public Schools (LPS), sought workers' compensation benefits after she suffered a whole body injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. At issue was how to calculate Mueller's average weekly wage for workers' compensation purposes. As a school employee, Mueller worked only during the school year and did not work during summer vacation, but her salary was spread out so that she was paid every month of the year, including the summer months. The trial court determined the the basis of calculation should be what Mueller earned during the six months before her injury, not necessarily what she was paid, and awarded Mueller temporary and permanent disability benefits based upon its determinations. The review panel of the Workers' Compensation Court affirmed the award. On appeal, the reversed, holding that the trial court erred in not calculating Mueller's average weekly wage based upon her actual weekly income. Remanded.