Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Kimberly Cotton was severely injured in an accident that occurred when a pickup crossed the centerline and struck her vehicle. The pickup had been struck by a Ford Mustang driven by a man who was seeking to evade a state trooper. Cotton sued the state of Nebraska under the State Tort Claims Act, which makes the state liable for injuries to innocent third parties proximately caused by vehicular pursuit by a state-employed law enforcement officer. The district court entered judgment in favor of the state, concluding that (1) there was no vehicular pursuit under the statute, (2) Anson's actions were the sole proximate cause of the injuries to Cotton, and (3) Cotton failed to prove that the state trooper's actions were a proximate cause of the accident. Cotton appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it determined that Anson's actions were the sole proximate cause of Cotton's injuries and that the state was not liable under the State Tort Claims Act.

Appellant April Palmer, a member of Lakeside Wellness Center, was injured at Lakeside when she approached a treadmill and, unaware that the treadmill belt was running, stepped onto the treadmill and was thrown off the belt and into an elliptical training machine behind her. Palmer sued Lakeside and Precor, Inc., the manufacturer of the treadmill, for her injuries. Lakeside and Precor filed motions for summary judgment, which were granted. Palmer appealed, arguing, inter alia, that while Lakeside was not liable to Palmer for damages caused to by ordinary negligence by virtue of the waivers signed by Palmer upon joining Lakeside, Lakeside was nevertheless liable because its actions were grossly negligent or willful and wanton. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Precor was not shielded from liability as a result of the waivers; (2) as a matter of law, any negligence by Lakeside was not gross negligence or willful or wanton conduct; and (3) the record affirmatively showed that Precor did not breach any duty it owed to Palmer.

Appellant David Maycock, in his capacity as special administrator of the estate of Marty Maycock, filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death against various doctors and Alegent Health based on their treatment of Marty prior to and until his death. The district court dismissed the case against certain doctors and Alegent Health. The court of appeals affirmed these rulings. Meanwhile, at the district court, the remaining doctors moved for summary judgment on the sole basis that the claims against them were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the doctors. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, determining that there were genuine issues of material fact whether Marty was under a mental disorder at the time he was treated by the doctors and that therefore, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-213, the statute of limitations was tolled until the removal of his mental disorder. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether and on what dates the action was tolled.

In 2009, a semi-trailer truck owned by McLaughlin Freight Lines collided with cattle owned by Marvin Gentrup that had escaped from their holding pen. McLaughlin filed suit, seeking recovery for damages to its truck. McLaughlin premised its argument for recovery solely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The district court sustained Gentrup's motion for summary judgment. At issue on appeal was (1) whether the district court correctly applied the common-law principles of res ipsa loquitur, and (2) whether Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-21,274, which provides that the fact of escaped livestock, standing alone, is insufficient to raise an inference of negligence, supplants those principles. The Supreme Court held that (1) because there were genuine issues of material fact with regard to one or more elements of res ipsa loquitur, the trial court's order granting summary judgment was improper, and (2) because McLaughlin presented evidence in conjunction with the fact of escaped livestock, the statute does not bar McLaughlin's claim.

Nebraska law provides that a court may order any non-exempt property of a judgment debtor to be applied toward the satisfaction of the judgment, but the Nebraska State Patrol Retirement Act (the Act) provides that annuities or benefits âwhich any person shall be entitled to receive underâ the Act are not subject to garnishment, attachment, levy or any other process of law. The issue presented for the Supreme Courtâs review was whether a plaintiff, who won a civil judgment against a former state trooper, could essentially garnish the former trooperâs retirement benefits for satisfaction. Defendant and former trooper Billy Hobbs sexually assaulted the minor child of J.M. He was sentenced to 25-30 yearsâ imprisonment. J.M. sued Mr. Hobbs and received a $325,000 judgment against him. Though incarcerated, Mr. Hobbs still received his trooper retirement pension. J.M. filed a motion for an âorder in aid of execution,â alleging that Hobbs was a judgment debtor, and he should be asked to pay the judgment against him from the money he received from his state trooper pension. Hobbs said his money was exempt, and the district court agreed, and denied J.M.âs motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the district courtâs dismissal of J.M.âs motion.

Joseph (Joe) Mandolfo sued his brother Mario and American National Bank (ANB). At one time, Joe owned several businesses, some of which had accounts with ANB. After his brother Mario lost his job as a teacher, Joe hired Mario to work for him. Joe alleged that Mario had, with the help of ANB, wrongfully deposited checks intended for Joeâs business, into his own account. From 1995 until 2000, Joe contended that Mario embezzled about $1.2 million. The district court granted summary judgment to Joe against Mario. The court however, also granted summary judgment to ANB, concluding that a statute of limitations barred Joeâs claims against the bank. Joe appealed the grant of summary judgment to the bank. The Supreme Court concluded that Joeâs claims were governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, and as a result, were subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Joe did not discover Marioâs misappropriations until 2003. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision to dismiss Joeâs claims against the bank as untimely.