Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs in the underlying action asserted product liability claims against Appellants, manufacturers of an anethestic drug that may have exposed patients to serious diseases. Before the beginning of the trial, Appellants filed a motion to change venue from Clark County to Washoe County, arguing that the adverse pretrial publicity reasonably prevented Appellants from receiving a fair trial in Clark County. The district court concluded that a change of venue was not warranted at that time and reserved ruling on the motion until after an attempt to select a jury had been made. After the jury was empaneled, Appellants renewed their motion for a change of venue, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court must apply a multifactor test to determine whether there is a reason to believe that the party seeking a change of venue will not receive a fair trial in the community where the case originated; and (2) because Appellants did not demonstrate that the circumstances in this case presented a reasonable belief that a fair trial could not be had in Clark County, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellants' motion for a change of venue.

Appellant Joseph Francis incurred a $2 million debt at Wynn Las Vegas, a casino. When unable to collect on the debt, Wynn sued Francis for, among other things, breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. When Wynn deposed Francis during discovery, Wynn invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to nearly every question. Wynn eventually filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted after refusing to permit Francis to withdraw his invocation and denying his request to reopen discovery. At issue on appeal was how, in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, the district court should proceed in order to prevent the opposing party from being unfairly disadvantaged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his privilege, the district court should balance the interests of the invoking party and the opposing party's right to fair treatment; and (2) after reviewing the particular considerations in the instant case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Appellant to withdraw his invocation or in denying his request to reopen discovery.

This matter arose out of a multi-vehicle traffic accident, which led to a dispute over who was at fault for the accident. At trial, Phillip Emerson, the attorney of one of the defendants, made a series of statements to the jury that the Supreme Court later deemed improper and amounted to impermissible jury nullification. On remand, the matter was ultimately dismissed with prejudice. Afterwards, the district court granted the plaintiff's motion for sanctions and imposed sanctions on Emerson, personally. Emerson subsequently filed a petition for writ relief, requesting that the Supreme Court issue a writ directing the district court to vacate its order imposing sanctions. The Court denied writ relief, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction to impose sanctions because a district court retains jurisdiction after a case is dismissed to consider sanctions for attorney misconduct that occurred prior to the dismissal; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing as a sanction attorney fees and costs incurred in the original trial.

Mallory Warburton was working for the City of North Las Vegas when she was involved in a car accident and suffered numerous injuries. The City started paying workers' compensation benefits to Warburton at a rate of $10 an hour. At the time of the accident, Warburton was expected to make $12 an hour because of a promotion to manager of one of the City's pools. After an administrative appeal, a hearing officer instructed the City to redetermine Warburton's benefits using the $12-an-hour rate of pay for a pool manager. An appeals officer reversed, concluding Warburton's benefits should be based on the $10-an-hour rate of pay she was actually receiving at the time of the accident. The district court reversed the appeals officer's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals officer's conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence and that substantial evidence supported the district court's determination that (1) Warburton's primary job at the time of the accident was that of pool manager, and (2) Warburton's workers' compensation benefits must be determined using an average monthly wage calculation at the $12-an-hour rate of pay.

These two consolidated appeals arose from the same underlying district court action in which the district court issued a final judgment against Appellants in consolidated civil cases alleging various tort, contract, and declaratory relief claims. Appellants filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment and paid the requisite filing fee. That appeal was docketed in the Supreme Court as docket number 55200. Docket number 55981 was an appeal from a subsequent award of attorney fees entered in the same district court case. Because the notice of appeal was not accompanied by the requisite filing fee, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Docket number 56473 was an appeal from a subsequent order denying a motion to set aside the judgment entered in the same district court case underlying the previous two appeals. The Supreme Court dismissed that appeal for failure to pay the filing fee. Appellants submitted the instant motions for reconsideration in docket numbers 55981 and 56473, asking the Court to permit them to pay the fees necessary to reinstate the appeals. The Supreme Court denied the motions, stating that due to limited judicial resources, failure to pay the requisite fee in a timely matter will result in dismissal.

At issue in this extraordinary writ proceeding was whether Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.259(1) compels dismissal where the initial pleading in an action alleging nonresidential construction malpractice was served without filing the attorney affidavit and expert report required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.258(1) and (3). The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that a defective pleading served in violation of section 11.258 is void ab initio and of no legal effect and, thus, cannot be cured by amendment. The Court held that because the initial pleadings served by certain real parties in interest in this case did not include the attorney affidavit and expert report as required by section 11.258, those pleadings were void ab initio, and the district court did not have discretionary authority to allow the parties to amend their pleadings to cure their failure to comply with section 11.258.

Kelly Encoe alleged that he was struck by a taxicab owned by petitioner Yellow Cab of Reno and driven by Timothy Willis. In his amended complaint, Encoe asserted that Yellow Cab was liable for Encoe's injuries under a respondeat superior theory. Yellow Cab moved for summary judgment, arguing that Nev. Rev. Stat. 706.473 authorized it to lease the taxicab to Willis as an independent contractor, and because Willis was an independent contractor, Yellow Cab could not be held liable for the incident. The district court denied Yellow Cab's motion, determining that the nature of the relationship between Yellow Cab and Willis was a question of fact for the jury, without addressing Section 706.473's potentially dispositive application. The Supreme Court denied Yellow Cab's petition for a writ of mandamus but granted Yellow Cab's petition for a rehearing because it overlooked a material question of law regarding the application of Section 706.473. The Court ultimately denied the writ due to policy but noted that the district court may wish to reconsider its reasoning for denying summary judgment because it did not render a thorough resolution of the issues before it on summary judgment.

Respondent Andrea McNulty filed a complaint in a district court located in Washoe County, alleging tort claims against appellant Ben Roethlisberger and eight other defendants. The events on which the allegations were based occurred in Douglas County. Roethlisberger was a resident of Pennsylvania. Roethlisberger filed a motion to change venue to Douglas County, arguing that venue was improper in Washoe County because no defendant resided there. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Roethlisberger asserted that (1) because a codefendant actually resided in Douglas County, and because no other defendant resided in Washoe County, venue was improper there, and (2) the district court abused its discretion in concluding that convenience and the ends of justice did not require removal to Douglas County. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as venue was not improper as to appellant, he lacked standing to challenge venue based on his codefendant's place of residence; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to change the place of trial.

Pedro Gallegos was injured by David Gonzalez in a car accident. At the time of the accident, Gonzalez was driving a car rented from respondent Malco Enterprises, for which he purchased a liability insurance policy issued by respondent First American and managed by respondent Knight Management. Gallegos obtained a default judgment against Gonzalez. After Gallegos was unable to collect on the judgment, he sought a judicial assignment of Gonzalez's unasserted claims against respondents, which was granted. Gallegos brought the assigned claims, which related to Gonzalez's insurance policy with respondents, in a separate district court action. Respondents moved for summary judgment on the basis that the previous district court could not assign the right of action in a proceeding supplementary to the execution of the judgment, and thus, Gallegos lacked standing to bring Gonzalez's claims. The district court granted the respondents' motion for summary judgment, vacating the earlier assignment order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) rights of action held by a judgment debtor are subject to execution toward satisfaction of a judgment and may be judicially assigned; and (2) Gallegos properly asserted a right of action assigned to him by another district court. Remanded.

In 2010, Brian M. Walsh filed a complaint against, among others, petitioner Benjamin A. Lund. Petitioner added counterclaims of his own against Walsh and several additional counterclaim defendants. The district court dismissed the counterclaims against the new parties. Lund then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court. At issue was whether a defendant could, under Nev. R. Civ. P. 13(h), bring a counterclaim that adds new parties to the action. Under that rule, if there is at least one original party included in the counterclaim, a defendant may add new parties to the action through a counterclaim if the nonparty meets the joinder requirements under Nev. R. Civ. P. 19 or 20. The Court held the district court failed to apply the proper Rule 13(h) analysis and directed the district court to vacate its order dismissing the counterclaims and to reconsider the decision in light of its opinion. Because the petitioner failed to fully develop his petition for extraordinary relief by necessarily addressing Nev. R. Civ. P. 19 or 20, the Court rejected petitionerâs request that it order the dismissed counterclaims reinstated.