Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was injured when he lost control of his motorcycle on Lark Street in Albany, allegedly due to a road defect the City knew about but failed to repair. The case centers on whether reports submitted through the City's online system, SeeClickFix (SCF), constituted "written notice" of the defect and if those reports were "actually given" to the designated official.The Supreme Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, holding that SCF reports might constitute prior written notice but that factual issues precluded summary judgment. These issues included whether the complaints were based on verbal or written communications, whether the defects described were related to the accident, and whether the City's actions created or exacerbated the defect. The court also rejected the City's claim of governmental immunity.The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, agreeing that SCF complaints could be considered written notice and rejecting the City's immunity argument. The Appellate Division granted the City leave to appeal and certified the question of whether it erred in affirming the denial of the City's motion.The New York Court of Appeals held that SCF reports could constitute written notice and that the City's implementation of SCF meant the reports were "actually given" to the Commissioner of General Services. The court also found that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on whether the City's negligence created a dangerous condition and rejected the City's claim of governmental immunity, as the repair of the road was a proprietary function. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's order and answered the certified question in the negative. View "Calabrese v City of Albany" on Justia Law

On February 9, 2017, a bus owned and operated by New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJT) allegedly struck and injured Jeffrey Colt in Manhattan. Colt and his wife, Betsy Tsai, filed a lawsuit on September 18, 2017, claiming negligence, negligent hiring, and loss of consortium. NJT and its employee, Ana Hernandez, who was driving the bus, denied many of the allegations and asserted various defenses, including a lack of jurisdiction and immunity from suit. In 2020, NJT moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it was protected by sovereign immunity as an arm of the State of New Jersey.The Supreme Court of New York County denied NJT's motion, ruling that NJT had waived its right to assert sovereign immunity by waiting three years to raise the defense. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision but on different grounds, concluding that NJT was an arm of the State of New Jersey and entitled to sovereign immunity. However, it held that dismissing the case would be unjust since the plaintiffs could not sue in New Jersey due to venue rules.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division's order but on different grounds. The Court of Appeals held that NJT is not entitled to invoke sovereign immunity in New York courts. The court considered factors such as how New Jersey defines NJT and its functions, the state's power to direct NJT's conduct, and the effect of a judgment against NJT on the state's dignity. The court concluded that allowing the suit to proceed would not offend New Jersey's sovereign dignity because NJT operates with significant independence and New Jersey would not be liable for a judgment against NJT. Therefore, NJT and the other defendants could not claim sovereign immunity. View "Colt v. New Jersey Tr. Corp." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, the decedent's son and Administrator of her estate, filed a negligence, medical malpractice, and wrongful death lawsuit in the Supreme Court, New York County, against Dewitt Rehabilitation and Nursing Center and other defendants. The decedent was a resident at Dewitt in February and March 2019. Dewitt moved to transfer the venue to Nassau County based on a forum selection clause in two electronically signed admission agreements. Dewitt supported its motion with the agreements and an affidavit from its director of admissions, Francesca Trimarchi. The plaintiff contested the authenticity of the agreements, claiming the signatures were forged and provided an exemplar of the decedent's handwritten signature for comparison.The Supreme Court granted Dewitt's motion, finding that Dewitt met its initial burden to show the forum selection clause was applicable and enforceable, and that the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the alleged forgery. The case was ordered to be transferred to Supreme Court, Nassau County. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Dewitt failed to adequately authenticate the admission agreements as Trimarchi did not witness the signing, and thus the forum selection clause was unenforceable. The dissent argued that the burden should be on the plaintiff to prove the clause should not be enforced.The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the Appellate Division's decision, reinstating the Supreme Court's order. The court held that Dewitt met its burden of establishing the authenticity of the agreements through circumstantial evidence, including Trimarchi's affidavit and the agreements themselves. The plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the authenticity of the signatures. The court also clarified that CPLR 4539(b) was inapplicable as the documents were originally created in electronic form. The certified question was answered in the negative. View "Knight v New York & Presbyt. Hosp." on Justia Law

In July 2020, the plaintiff used Uber's app to request a ride. Upon being dropped off in the middle of a roadway, she was struck by another vehicle and sustained injuries. She filed a personal injury lawsuit against Uber in November 2020, serving the complaint via the New York Secretary of State. Uber did not respond within the required 30 days, allegedly due to mail processing delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.In January 2021, Uber updated its terms of use, including an arbitration agreement, and notified users via email. The plaintiff received and opened this email. When she next logged into the Uber app, she was presented with a pop-up screen requiring her to agree to the updated terms to continue using the service. She checked a box and clicked "Confirm," thereby agreeing to the terms, which included a clause delegating the authority to resolve disputes about the agreement's applicability and enforceability to an arbitrator.The plaintiff moved for a default judgment in March 2021, and Uber responded by asserting that she had agreed to arbitrate her claims. Uber then sent a Notice of Intent to Arbitrate. The plaintiff moved to stay Uber's arbitration demand, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and violated ethical rules. Uber cross-moved to compel arbitration.The Supreme Court granted Uber's motion to compel arbitration, finding that the plaintiff was on inquiry notice of the arbitration agreement and had assented to it. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that the plaintiff's challenges to the agreement's validity must be decided by an arbitrator due to the delegation provision.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the clickwrap process used by Uber resulted in a valid agreement to arbitrate. The court also held that the delegation provision was valid and that the plaintiff's challenges to the arbitration agreement's enforceability should be resolved by an arbitrator. The court found no abuse of discretion in the lower court's decision not to sanction Uber for the alleged ethical violation. View "Wu v. Uber Tech., Inc." on Justia Law

On a snowy day in December 2018, the Superintendent of Highways for the Town of Carmel, Michael J. Simone, drove into an intersection without the right of way and collided with Ana Orellana's vehicle. Simone had been inspecting road conditions during a snowstorm and had directed his team to salt the roads. After completing his inspection, he was returning to his office when the accident occurred. Simone testified that he was not in a rush, did not consider the situation an emergency, and had no intention of conducting further inspections en route.The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that Simone's conduct was protected under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b), which exempts municipal employees from liability for ordinary negligence when "actually engaged in work on a highway." The court denied the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment as academic. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that Simone was not "actually engaged in work on a highway" at the time of the accident, as he had completed his inspection and was merely returning to his office. Therefore, the protections of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) did not apply. The Court granted the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Orellana v Town of Carmel" on Justia Law

The case revolves around an incident that occurred on June 30, 2017, when Henry Bello, a former employee of Bronx-Lebanon Hospital (BLH), entered the hospital armed with a rifle and opened fire, killing one doctor and wounding five members of the medical staff, including Justin Timperio, a first-year resident. Bello and Timperio were strangers prior to the shooting; they never worked at BLH at the same time and had no other prior contact. Following the incident, BLH notified the Workers' Compensation Board (WCB) of Timperio's injuries. Timperio also filed a negligence action in federal court against BLH and the store that sold Bello the rifle.The Workers' Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ) determined that Timperio's injuries were compensable under the Workers' Compensation Law (WCL). Timperio appealed to the WCB, which affirmed the decision. However, the Appellate Division reversed the decision, holding that the lack of record evidence establishing any employment-related animus was sufficient to rebut the presumption in WCL § 21 (1) and concluded that the claim was therefore not compensable.The New York Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division. The court clarified the operation of the rebuttable presumption set forth in Workers' Compensation Law § 21 (1), which provides that when an injury arises in the course of a worker's employment, it is presumed to arise out of that worker's employment and therefore is compensable, absent substantial evidence to the contrary. The court held that in cases involving assaults that occur at work, a lack of evidence as to the motivation for the assault does not rebut that presumption. The court concluded that the presumption applied and was unrebutted in this case, and the Appellate Division's contrary conclusion was error. Therefore, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board was reinstated. View "In re Timperio v Bronx-Lebanon Hospital" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Srecko Bazdaric, was injured while painting an escalator during a renovation project. The escalator was covered with a plastic sheet, which Bazdaric slipped on, sustaining injuries that left him unable to work. He and his wife sued the owners of the premises and the general contractor, alleging violations of Labor Law § 241 (6), which requires employers to provide safe working conditions. The Court of Appeals of New York held that the plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment as to liability on their Labor Law § 241 (6) claim. The court found that the plastic covering was a slipping hazard that the defendants failed to remove, in violation of Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d), making the defendants liable under Labor Law § 241 (6). The court also found that the plastic covering was not integral to the paint job but was a nonessential and inherently slippery plastic that caused Bazdaric's injuries. The court reversed the lower court's conclusion to the contrary. View "Bazdaric v Almah Partners LLC" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the tragic drowning of a 14-year-old boy at a dam on Buffalo Creek in Erie County. The victim's mother brought a negligence and wrongful death lawsuit against the Joint Board of Directors of Erie-Wyoming County Soil Conservation District (the Joint Board), alleging that they owned the dam and were responsible for its maintenance and safety. The dam was initially constructed as part of a federal project under the Flood Control Act of 1944, after which the Joint Board was created as the local "sponsor" of the project. Two agreements between the Joint Board and the National Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) in 1959 and 1984 stipulated that the Joint Board had ongoing duties to inspect and maintain the dams. The case proceeded to a jury trial on the singular question of whether the Joint Board owned the dams at the time of the accident. Both the plaintiff and the Joint Board moved for directed verdicts. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion, concluding that the Joint Board owned the dams. However, the Appellate Division reversed this decision and granted the Joint Board's motion for a directed verdict, ruling that the dams were fixtures that ran with the land and could not have been owned by the Joint Board since the NRCS did not own the underlying land. The Court of Appeals disagreed with both lower courts, stating that neither the plaintiff nor the Joint Board should have been granted a directed verdict as the evidence was not conclusive enough to establish ownership of the dams as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals ordered that the case be remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings, and affirmed the dismissal of claims against other parties, including the Districts, County, and Town. View "Suzanne P. v Joint Bd. of Directors of Erie-Wyoming County Soil Conservation Dist." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals of the State of New York held that the plaintiff, a certified diesel technician, was not engaged in an activity protected by Labor Law § 240 (1) when he was injured while repairing a trailer. The plaintiff was working beneath a lifted trailer, fixing a faulty air brake system, when the trailer fell on him. He sued on the grounds that the defendant failed to provide him with adequate safety devices, as required by Labor Law § 240 (1). The court found that the statute was not intended to cover ordinary vehicle repair. The court reasoned that, while the statute protects workers from elevation-related risks in industries like construction, it does not cover every instance where a worker is injured as a result of an elevation differential. The court also noted that extending the statute's coverage to ordinary vehicle repair could lead to an overly broad interpretation that would place undue liability on car owners for injuries sustained by mechanics. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of the section 240 (1) cause of action against the defendant. View "Stoneham v Joseph Barsuk, Inc." on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual developed a mass under his armpit and was referred to a surgeon who had a contract with the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS). The surgeon performed a biopsy, which was then sent to the pathology department at the Cortland Regional Medical Center (CRMC) for examination. Dr. Jun Wang, the Medical Director of CRMC's pathology department and a member of Cortland Pathology, examined the specimen and determined that the mass was benign. A year later, the patient was diagnosed with Hodgkin's lymphoma.The patient initiated a medical malpractice lawsuit against CRMC and others, alleging that they misdiagnosed his condition and failed to promptly diagnose or refer him for treatment. Dr. Wang sought defense and indemnification from the State, claiming that he was entitled to coverage under Public Officers Law § 17 and Correction Law § 24-a because his actions arose from treating an incarcerated individual at the request of DOCCS. The Attorney General rejected Dr. Wang's request, stating that he treated the patient through his employment arrangement with CRMC, not directly at the request of the State, and thus the State had no obligation to provide defense or indemnification.The New York Court of Appeals held that the State is not obligated to indemnify or defend Dr. Wang in a medical malpractice lawsuit. The court ruled that under the Correction Law § 24-a, the State's obligation to defend and indemnify only applies when there has been an explicit request by DOCCS for the services of a specific provider—an arrangement or understanding made in advance between DOCCS and the healthcare professional. In this case, no such express request or direct agreement existed between DOCCS and Dr. Wang, therefore, the State had no obligation to defend or indemnify him. The court also stated that the Attorney General's interpretation of the statute was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Hence, the court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "In re Wang v James" on Justia Law