Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This action stemmed from property damage and the resulting business interruption sustained by Plaintiffs as a result of water damages that occurred following three separate roof breaches. Plaintiffs were Deborah Voss and three business entities owned and controlled by her. Plaintiffs sued CH Insurance Brokerage Services Co. (CHI), their insurance broker, arguing that a special relationship existed with CHI and that CHI had negligently secured inadequate levels of business interruption insurance for the three losses. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for CHI, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that CHI did not satisfy its initial burden of establishing the absence of a material issue of fact as to the existence of a special relationship. View "Voss v. Netherlands Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against Defendants, the construction manager and owner of a building at a construction site, after a large, flat object fell and injured his hand. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, a violation of N.Y. Lab. Law 241(6). Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s section 241(6) claim, arguing the form that injured Plaintiff’s hand was not subject to the safety requirements of Industrial Code N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 12,23-2.2(a). The Court of Appeals remitted the matter for further proceedings for a hearing on whether the object as issue was a “form” within the meaning of the Industrial Code. After a hearing, Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff’s section 241(6) claim, concluding that the form at issue did not come within the coverage of the regulation or section 241(6). The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment to Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals accepted certification and concluded that the Appellate Division’s order should be affirmed, holding that the language of N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 12,23-2.2(a) could sensibly be applied to the form that fell on Plaintiff’s hand. View "Morris v. Pavarini Constr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants, a construction company and the owner of a building, after he was injured when a heavy conduit pipe fell on his hand while he was working at the building, alleging that Defendants violated N.Y. Lab. Law 240(1). Supreme Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on liability, concluding that the conduit, being attached to the ceiling by a compression coupling that failed, was not properly secured so as to give proper protection to Plaintiff. The Appellate Division modified the order of the Supreme Court by denying Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendants’ failure to provide a protective device, i.e., a set-screw coupling rather than the purportedly inadequate compression coupling, was a proximate of his accident. The Court of Appeals accepted certification and held that the order of Supreme Court as modified by the Appellate Court was not property made, as Defendants’ failure to use a set screw couple was not a violation of section 240(1). View "Fabrizi v. 1095 Ave. of the Ams., LLC" on Justia Law

Filippo Gallina and his wife (Plaintiffs) commenced a personal injury action against Preferred Trucking Services Corp. Preferred Trucking was insured by County-Wide Insurance Company under a policy that required insureds to cooperate with Country-Wide in its investigation of a claim or defense against a lawsuit. The next year, Country-Wide disclaimed its obligation to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking based upon Preferred Trucking’s refusal to cooperate in the defense. Supreme Court subsequently awarded judgment to Plaintiffs. Thereafter, Country-Wide filed this action against Preferred Trucking and Plaintiffs seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking in the underlying action. Supreme Court concluded that Country-Wide was obligated to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking. At issue on appeal was whether Country-Wide’s disclaimer was timely as a matter of law. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that Country-Wide’s disclaimer was untimely because it came four months after Country-Wide learned of the ground for the disclaimer. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Country-Wide was not obligated to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking, as Country-Wide established as a matter of law that its delay was reasonable. View "Country-Wide Ins. Co. v. Preferred Trucking Servs. Corp. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff was being treated at a private medical facility, a nurse employed by the clinic committed an unauthorized disclosure of Plaintiff’s confidential health information. Plaintiff filed this action in federal court against Defendants, various affiliated entities that allegedly owned or otherwise controlled the clinic. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss all eight of Plaintiff’s claims. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of all but one of Plaintiff’s causes of action, reserving decision on Plaintiff’s claim of breach of fiduciary duty. In a separate opinion, the Second Circuit found the nurse’s actions were not foreseeable to Defendants nor taken within the scope of her employment. The court, however, certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding Defendants’ liability where respondeat superior liability is absent. The Court of Appeals answered that, under New York law, the common law right of action for breach of the fiduciary duty of confidentiality for the unauthorized disclosure of medical information may not run directly against medical corporations when the employee responsible for the breach acts outside the scope of her employment. View "Doe v. Guthrie Clinic, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and/or former longtime smokers of Marlboro cigarettes, filed this putative class action in federal court against Philip Morris USA, Inc. asserting, among other claims, an equitable cause of action for medical monitoring. Plaintiffs sought the creation of a court-supervised program at Philip Morris's expanse that would provide them with a type of medical monitoring that would assist in the early detection of lung cancer. The district court dismissed the medical monitoring claim, holding that although the New York Court of Appeals would likely recognize the medical monitoring claim, Plaintiffs failed to plead that Philip Morris's allegedly tortious conduct was the reason Plaintiffs needed to secure a monitoring program. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals as to whether an independent cause of action for medical monitoring exists in New York. The Court answered by holding that, under New York law, a current or former longtime heavy smoker who has not been diagnosed with a smoking-related disease, and who is not under investigation by a physician for such a suspected disease, may not pursue an independent equitable cause of action for medical monitoring for such a disease. View "Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured during the course of his employment when he was struck by a sheet of plywood that fell from a building under construction. Plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits for his injuries and then filed this personal injury action. Thereafter, the insurance carrier for Plaintiff's employer filed a motion to discontinue Plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits. An administrative law judge found Plaintiff had no further causally-related disability and that he had no further need for treatment. The Workers' Compensation Board Panel (Board) affirmed. Subsequently, in this negligence action, Defendants moved for an order estopping Plaintiff from relitigating the issue of causally-related disability. Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the determination of the Board was one of ultimate fact and thus did not preclude Plaintiff from litigating the issue of his ongoing disability. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendants failed to establish that the issue decided in the workers' compensation proceeding was identical to that presented in this negligence action. View "Auqui v. Seven Thirty One Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when a van operated by Dennis Feliciano and owned by Paragon Cable Manhattan rear-ended the car in which Plaintiff was a passenger. Plaintiff filed this suit against Feliciano and Paragon Cable (collectively, Defendants), alleging that Defendants' negligence caused her to suffer nasal and vertebra fractures. A jury returned a verdict in Defendants' favor. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the trial court erred in failing to give a "missing witness" charge, which instructs a jury that it may draw an adverse inference based on the failure of a party to call a witness who would normally be expected to support that party's version of events. As a precondition for the charge, the witness is expected to give noncumulative testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) when a missing witness charge is requested in a civil case, the uncalled witness's testimony may be considered cumulative only when it is cumulative of testimony or other evidence favoring the party controlling the witness; and (2) Supreme Court erred in denying Plaintiff's request for a missing witness charge, and the error was not harmless. View "Devito v. Feliciano" on Justia Law

On January 14, 2010, Plaintiff received a $4.4 million judgment against The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey ("Port Authority"). The Nash judgment became final as of July 13, 2011 due to the Port Authority's failure to appeal. The Court of Appeals subsequently issued Matter of World Trade Center Bombing Litig. ("Ruiz"), which held that the Port Authority was insulated from tortious liability for injuries sustained in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. The Port Authority moved to vacate the Nash judgment pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5105. Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to vacate her judgment because the judgment in her case was final and beyond the scope of review. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Nash's judgment became final when the Port Authority failed to appeal within the requisite time period; and (2) Supreme Court erred in concluding that (i) the Court of Appeals' decision in Ruiz divested Supreme Court of its authority to review the equities with respect to the parties in determining whether the vacate the judgment, and (ii) Ruiz mandated that the court must grant a section 5015(a) motion by rote. Remitted. View "Nash v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the owner of an apartment building, complained when Armory Plaza, the owner of the lot next to Plaintiff's building, began excavating the lot to make way for a new building. The excavation purportedly caused cracks in the walls and foundations of Plaintiff's building. After Plaintiff's insurer (Defendant) rejected Plaintiff's claims under its policy, Plaintiff brought suit. The U.S. district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, holding that the alleged conduct of Armory and its contractors was not "vandalism" within the meaning of the policy. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals, which answered by holding (1) for purposes of construing a property insurance policy covering acts of vandalism, malicious damage may be found to result from an act not directed specifically at the covered property; and (2) the state of mind required to find malicious damage is a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct in question may be called willful or wanton. View "Georgitsi Realty, LLC v. Penn-Star Ins. Co." on Justia Law