Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, current and/or former longtime smokers of Marlboro cigarettes, filed this putative class action in federal court against Philip Morris USA, Inc. asserting, among other claims, an equitable cause of action for medical monitoring. Plaintiffs sought the creation of a court-supervised program at Philip Morris's expanse that would provide them with a type of medical monitoring that would assist in the early detection of lung cancer. The district court dismissed the medical monitoring claim, holding that although the New York Court of Appeals would likely recognize the medical monitoring claim, Plaintiffs failed to plead that Philip Morris's allegedly tortious conduct was the reason Plaintiffs needed to secure a monitoring program. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals as to whether an independent cause of action for medical monitoring exists in New York. The Court answered by holding that, under New York law, a current or former longtime heavy smoker who has not been diagnosed with a smoking-related disease, and who is not under investigation by a physician for such a suspected disease, may not pursue an independent equitable cause of action for medical monitoring for such a disease. View "Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured during the course of his employment when he was struck by a sheet of plywood that fell from a building under construction. Plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits for his injuries and then filed this personal injury action. Thereafter, the insurance carrier for Plaintiff's employer filed a motion to discontinue Plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits. An administrative law judge found Plaintiff had no further causally-related disability and that he had no further need for treatment. The Workers' Compensation Board Panel (Board) affirmed. Subsequently, in this negligence action, Defendants moved for an order estopping Plaintiff from relitigating the issue of causally-related disability. Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the determination of the Board was one of ultimate fact and thus did not preclude Plaintiff from litigating the issue of his ongoing disability. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendants failed to establish that the issue decided in the workers' compensation proceeding was identical to that presented in this negligence action. View "Auqui v. Seven Thirty One Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when a van operated by Dennis Feliciano and owned by Paragon Cable Manhattan rear-ended the car in which Plaintiff was a passenger. Plaintiff filed this suit against Feliciano and Paragon Cable (collectively, Defendants), alleging that Defendants' negligence caused her to suffer nasal and vertebra fractures. A jury returned a verdict in Defendants' favor. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the trial court erred in failing to give a "missing witness" charge, which instructs a jury that it may draw an adverse inference based on the failure of a party to call a witness who would normally be expected to support that party's version of events. As a precondition for the charge, the witness is expected to give noncumulative testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) when a missing witness charge is requested in a civil case, the uncalled witness's testimony may be considered cumulative only when it is cumulative of testimony or other evidence favoring the party controlling the witness; and (2) Supreme Court erred in denying Plaintiff's request for a missing witness charge, and the error was not harmless. View "Devito v. Feliciano" on Justia Law

On January 14, 2010, Plaintiff received a $4.4 million judgment against The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey ("Port Authority"). The Nash judgment became final as of July 13, 2011 due to the Port Authority's failure to appeal. The Court of Appeals subsequently issued Matter of World Trade Center Bombing Litig. ("Ruiz"), which held that the Port Authority was insulated from tortious liability for injuries sustained in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. The Port Authority moved to vacate the Nash judgment pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5105. Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to vacate her judgment because the judgment in her case was final and beyond the scope of review. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Nash's judgment became final when the Port Authority failed to appeal within the requisite time period; and (2) Supreme Court erred in concluding that (i) the Court of Appeals' decision in Ruiz divested Supreme Court of its authority to review the equities with respect to the parties in determining whether the vacate the judgment, and (ii) Ruiz mandated that the court must grant a section 5015(a) motion by rote. Remitted. View "Nash v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the owner of an apartment building, complained when Armory Plaza, the owner of the lot next to Plaintiff's building, began excavating the lot to make way for a new building. The excavation purportedly caused cracks in the walls and foundations of Plaintiff's building. After Plaintiff's insurer (Defendant) rejected Plaintiff's claims under its policy, Plaintiff brought suit. The U.S. district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, holding that the alleged conduct of Armory and its contractors was not "vandalism" within the meaning of the policy. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals, which answered by holding (1) for purposes of construing a property insurance policy covering acts of vandalism, malicious damage may be found to result from an act not directed specifically at the covered property; and (2) the state of mind required to find malicious damage is a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct in question may be called willful or wanton. View "Georgitsi Realty, LLC v. Penn-Star Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of a commercial cleaning company, was injured after falling from a ladder while providing janitorial services for a retail store. Plaintiff was dusting a display shelf when he fell. Plaintiff brought an action under N.Y. Lab. Law 240(1) against the retail store and the building owner. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the statute did not apply to workers employed on a daily basis to conduct routine commercial cleaning, such as the dusting, sweeping, mopping, and general tidying that Plaintiff was engaged in at the time of his injury. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was not engaged in an activity that fell within the purview of Labor Law 240(1) at the time of his injury. View "Soto v. J. Crew Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent was convicted of second degree forgery and sentenced to a term of probation. One of the conditions of Respondent's probation was a requirement that he submit to random drug testing. Appellant, a drug testing laboratory, was engaged by the County to conduct the testing. After Appellant detected the presence of THC in Respondent's fluid sample, Respondent's probation was revoked. Respondent subsequently commenced this action alleging that Appellant had issued the report reflecting the positive test result both negligently and as part of a policy of deliberate indifference to his rights. Supreme Court granted Appellant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the complaint stated a cause of action against Appellant for the negligent testing of Respondent's biological specimen notwithstanding the absence of a contractual relationship between the parties. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant owed a duty to Respondent under these circumstances. View "Landon v. Kroll Lab. Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants, a medical doctor and his practice, for medical malpractice after the doctor failed to remove a localization guide wire during a biopsy of part of Plaintiff's lung. After a second operation two months after the first procedure, the doctor removed the wire. The trial court granted a directed verdict in Defendants' favor and dismissed Plaintiffs' amended complaint based on Plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate a prima facie case of medical malpractice. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the amended complaint was properly dismissed where Plaintiff failed to establish that the doctor's judgment deviated from accepted community standards of practice and that such deviation was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury; and (2) to the extent that Plaintiff argued that res ipsa loquitur applied in this case, Plaintiff failed to establish the elements of res ipsa. View "James v. Wormuth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was severely intoxicated, arrived at the emergency room of a hospital, where he sought admission to Defendant's detoxification facility. Defendant was accepted to the program, and, four hours after his arrival, was waiting to be transported to the facility when he left the grounds unescorted. An emergency room doctor notified hospital security but did not call the police. Plaintiff was subsequently hit by a car. Plaintiff's estate sued the hospital, the doctor, and the doctor's professional corporation (together, Defendants) for negligence and medical malpractice. Supreme Court denied Defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Defendants lacked authority to confine Plaintiff upon his departure from the hospital. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendants did not have a duty to prevent Plaintiff from leaving the hospital. View "Kowalski v. St. Francis Hosp. & Health Ctrs. " on Justia Law

Twelve-year-old Tiffany had a seizure followed by cardiac arrest. Two emergency medical technicians (EMTs) employed by New York City arrived in response to Tiffany's mother's 911 call and began performing CPR on Tiffany until paramedics from a private hospital arrived in an advanced life support ambulance. Tiffany suffered serious brain damages from the ordeal. Tiffany and her mother filed this negligence action against the City and its emergency medical services. Under State law, when a municipality provides ambulance service by emergency medical technicians in response to a 911 call, it performs a governmental function and cannot be held liable unless it owed a special duty to the injured party. Supreme Court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the City did not owe Plaintiffs a special duty or that the municipal defendants were the proximate cause of the harm. The Appellate Division reversed, determining that Plaintiffs raised triable issues of fact as to whether the City assumed a special duty to Plaintiffs and whether it proximately caused their injuries. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs adequately established questions of fact on the applicability of the special duty doctrine. View "Applewhite v. Accuhealth, Inc. " on Justia Law