Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an employee of a commercial cleaning company, was injured after falling from a ladder while providing janitorial services for a retail store. Plaintiff was dusting a display shelf when he fell. Plaintiff brought an action under N.Y. Lab. Law 240(1) against the retail store and the building owner. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the statute did not apply to workers employed on a daily basis to conduct routine commercial cleaning, such as the dusting, sweeping, mopping, and general tidying that Plaintiff was engaged in at the time of his injury. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was not engaged in an activity that fell within the purview of Labor Law 240(1) at the time of his injury. View "Soto v. J. Crew Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent was convicted of second degree forgery and sentenced to a term of probation. One of the conditions of Respondent's probation was a requirement that he submit to random drug testing. Appellant, a drug testing laboratory, was engaged by the County to conduct the testing. After Appellant detected the presence of THC in Respondent's fluid sample, Respondent's probation was revoked. Respondent subsequently commenced this action alleging that Appellant had issued the report reflecting the positive test result both negligently and as part of a policy of deliberate indifference to his rights. Supreme Court granted Appellant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the complaint stated a cause of action against Appellant for the negligent testing of Respondent's biological specimen notwithstanding the absence of a contractual relationship between the parties. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant owed a duty to Respondent under these circumstances. View "Landon v. Kroll Lab. Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants, a medical doctor and his practice, for medical malpractice after the doctor failed to remove a localization guide wire during a biopsy of part of Plaintiff's lung. After a second operation two months after the first procedure, the doctor removed the wire. The trial court granted a directed verdict in Defendants' favor and dismissed Plaintiffs' amended complaint based on Plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate a prima facie case of medical malpractice. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the amended complaint was properly dismissed where Plaintiff failed to establish that the doctor's judgment deviated from accepted community standards of practice and that such deviation was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury; and (2) to the extent that Plaintiff argued that res ipsa loquitur applied in this case, Plaintiff failed to establish the elements of res ipsa. View "James v. Wormuth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was severely intoxicated, arrived at the emergency room of a hospital, where he sought admission to Defendant's detoxification facility. Defendant was accepted to the program, and, four hours after his arrival, was waiting to be transported to the facility when he left the grounds unescorted. An emergency room doctor notified hospital security but did not call the police. Plaintiff was subsequently hit by a car. Plaintiff's estate sued the hospital, the doctor, and the doctor's professional corporation (together, Defendants) for negligence and medical malpractice. Supreme Court denied Defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Defendants lacked authority to confine Plaintiff upon his departure from the hospital. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendants did not have a duty to prevent Plaintiff from leaving the hospital. View "Kowalski v. St. Francis Hosp. & Health Ctrs. " on Justia Law

Twelve-year-old Tiffany had a seizure followed by cardiac arrest. Two emergency medical technicians (EMTs) employed by New York City arrived in response to Tiffany's mother's 911 call and began performing CPR on Tiffany until paramedics from a private hospital arrived in an advanced life support ambulance. Tiffany suffered serious brain damages from the ordeal. Tiffany and her mother filed this negligence action against the City and its emergency medical services. Under State law, when a municipality provides ambulance service by emergency medical technicians in response to a 911 call, it performs a governmental function and cannot be held liable unless it owed a special duty to the injured party. Supreme Court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the City did not owe Plaintiffs a special duty or that the municipal defendants were the proximate cause of the harm. The Appellate Division reversed, determining that Plaintiffs raised triable issues of fact as to whether the City assumed a special duty to Plaintiffs and whether it proximately caused their injuries. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs adequately established questions of fact on the applicability of the special duty doctrine. View "Applewhite v. Accuhealth, Inc. " on Justia Law

A minor plaintiff commenced a civil action against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn and one of its priests alleging sexual molestation by the priest. The Diocese settled the action for $2 million and additional consideration. At issue on appeal was a dispute between the Diocese and one of its insurance carriers (National Union) regarding the Diocese's demand for reimbursement for the settlement. The Diocese sought a declaratory judgment that National Union was required to indemnify the Diocese for the settlement and certain defense costs and fees. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for the Diocese. At issue on appeal was whether the incidents of sexual abuse constituted a single occurrence or multiple occurrences that spanned several years and several policy periods. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the alleged acts of sexual abuse constituted multiple occurrences and that the settlement amount should be allocated on a pro rata basis over the seven policy periods. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the incidents of sexual abuse constituted multiple occurrences and that any potential liability should be apportioned among the several insurance policies, pro rata. View "Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when the van she was driving hit a cow on a public road. Plaintiff brought a personal injury action against the owner of the property where the cow was kept and the two men who may have owned the cow. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for two of the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed as to those defendants and also granted summary judgment as to the third defendant, concluding that, pursuant to Bard v. Jahnke, injuries inflicted by domestic animals "may only proceed under strict liability based on the owner's knowledge of the animal's vicious propensities, not on theories of common-law negligence." The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the rule of Bard does not bar a suit for negligence when a farm animal has been allowed to stray from the property where it is kept. View "Hastings v. Sauve" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant were adjoining landowners. Defendant sought to develop a residential subdivision on his land. The Town approved a plan that required water from the west side of the development to flow into a storm sewer and then into a ditch that was located on Plaintiff's property. Defendant used the ditch without Plaintiff's permission. Because the ditch did not have the capacity to contain the water Defendant diverted, Defendant installed two drainage pipes and routed the water onto Plaintiff's land without Plaintiff's permission, resulting in more than thirty acres of flooded wetland. Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant and the Town, alleging trespass and nuisance and seeking damages for the alleged intentional diversion of water onto his property. The trial court returned a verdict for Plaintiff for compensatory damages and awarded punitive damages against Defendant. The appellate division affirmed the punitive damages award. The Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the part of the judgment awarding punitive damages, holding that Defendant's behavior did not rise to the level of purposefully causing injury or of moral turpitude. View "Marinaccio v. Town of Clarence" on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff's father (Decedent) collapsed and at a health club owned and operated by Bally Total Fitness of Greater New York, Inc. (Bally). Ambulance personnel administered shocks to Decedent with an automatic external defibrillator (AED), but he never revived. Plaintiff, as executor of Decedent's estate, brought a wrongful death suit against Bally, alleging that Bally employees negligently failed to use an available AED, or failed to use it within sufficient time, to save Decedent's life. Bally primarily argued that it was immune from liability under the State's Good Samaritan Law. Supreme Court denied Bally's motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding (1) N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 627-a imposes an affirmative duty of care upon health clubs so as to give rise to a cognizable cause of action in negligence for failure to operate an available AED; and (2) the complaint stated a cause of action based upon common law negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) section 627-a does not create an affirmative duty for health clubs to use the AEDs they are required to have available; but (2) Plaintiff pleaded a viable cause of action at common law. View "Miglino v. Bally Total Fitness of Greater N.Y., Inc." on Justia Law

After falling on the street and injuring her leg, Plaintiff commenced this negligence action against Communications Specialists, Inc. (CSI) for creating a hazardous condition in the road by failing to properly pave over a trench CSI cut to install high-speed fiber-optic cable underneath the street. To rebut Plaintiff's testimony that a dip in the trench caused her to fall, CSI subpoenaed a physician who treated Plaintiff shortly after the accident and declared that Plaintiff "tripped over a dog." CSI paid the doctor $10,000 for appearing at trial. Plaintiff's counsel asked the court to charge the jury that, pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8001, the doctor was entitled to a witness fee of $15 per day. The court gave the jury a general bias charge but made no specific reference to the payment the doctor received for appearing at trial. The jury found that CSI was negligent but that such negligence was not a substantial factor in bringing about the accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court should have issued a bias charge specifically tailored to address the payment CSI made to the doctor; but (2) the court's failure to issue such an instruction in this case was harmless. View "Caldwell v. Cablevision Sys. Corp." on Justia Law