Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants were two owners of an apartment in a condominium (the Tomchinskys) and a company the Tomchinskys hired to renovate their unit (Company). Additional defendants were the condominium, its board of managers, and the Trump Corporation (collectively, the condominium defendants). Plaintiff, an employee of Company, was allegedly injured while working in the Tomchinskys' apartment. Plaintiff sued Defendants, claiming common-law negligence and violations of N.Y. Labor Law. Several parties moved for summary judgment, including Plaintiff, who cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on his cause of action alleging a violation of N.Y. Labor Law 241 (6). Supreme Court denied the motions and cross motions for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed in part, granting the condominium defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims asserted against them. Plaintiff appealed the denial of his cross motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division did not err in affirming Supreme Court's denial of Plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability under the Labor Law. View "Guryev v. Tomchinsky" on Justia Law

Twenty passengers of the Ethan Allen, a public vessel operating as a tour boat, were killed and several others were injured when the boat capsized and sank. Claimants, individuals who were injured and the personal representatives of those who died due to the accident, commenced this action against the State alleging that it had been negligent in certifying an unsafe passenger capacity and in failing to require a new stability assessment after the vessel had been modified. The Court of Claims denied Claimants' motion to dismiss the State's affirmative defense of immunity and denied the State's cross-motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed as modified, finding that the inspections were a governmental function but that the State had failed to demonstrate its inspectors had in fact exercised any discretion in certifying the vessel's passenger capacity. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding (1) the inspections at issue here were consistent with those deemed governmental functions; (2) statutory obligations did not create a special duty of care owed by the State to Claimants; and (3) because the State owed no special duty to Claimants, the claim that the State's inspectors failed to certify safe passenger capacity on the vessel must be dismissed. View "Metz v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and Defendant formed and managed a limited liability company for the purpose of entering into a long-term lease on a building in Manhattan. Later, Defendant took sole possession of the property and bought Plaintiffs' membership interests in the LLC. Defendant subsequently assigned the lease to a subsidiary of a development company. Believing that Defendant surreptitiously negotiated the sale with the development company before he bought their interests in the LLC, Plaintiffs commenced this action against Defendant, claiming that, by failing to disclose the negotiations with the development company, Defendant breached his fiduciary duty to them. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. A divided Appellate Division modified Supreme Court's order, allowing four of Plaintiffs' claims to proceed - breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, unjust enrichment, and fraud and misrepresentation. The Court of Appeals reversed ad dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety, relying on its recent decision in Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. America Movil, S.A.B. de C.V. View "Pappas v. Tzolis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were several dozen national and international citizens who resided in Israel and were injured in rocket attacks allegedly launched by Hizballah during the Second Lebanon War. Plaintiffs brought suit against the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB), a defunct bank headquartered in Beirut, claiming that LCB assisted Hizballah in committing the illegal attacks. The lawsuit was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs asserted personal jurisdiction over LCB under New York's long-arm statute. The district court granted LCB's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals accepted questions of law from the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals and answered (1) a foreign bank's maintenance of a correspondent bank account at a financial institution in New York and use of that account to effect dozens of wire transfers on behalf of a foreign client constitutes a "transaction" of business in New York within the meaning of the long-arm statute; and (2) Plaintiffs' claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Alien Tort Statute, or for negligence or breach of statutory duty in violation of Israeli law arose from LCB's transaction of business in New York within the meaning of the long-arm statute. View "Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether an action for negligence and breach of contract lies against an insurance broker for failure to procure adequate insurance coverage where the insured receive the policy without complaint. Plaintiff commenced this action against its broker for negligence and breach of contract in connection with Defendant's procurement of insufficient insurance. Supreme Court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that issues of fact existed as to Plaintiff's request for specific coverage. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that Plaintiff's failure to read and understand the policy precluded recovery in this action. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) because there were issues of fact as to whether Plaintiff requested specific coverage for its employees and whether Defendant failed to secure a policy as requested, summary judgment was inappropriate in this matter; and (2) Plaintiff's failure to read and understand the policy should not be an absolute bar to recovery under the circumstances of this case. View "Am. Bldg. Supply Corp. v. Petrocelli Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff broke her hip when she tripped and fell while rollerblading in her residential neighborhood in the Town of Amherst. Plaintiff and her husband brought a negligence action against the Town. Supreme court granted summary judgment for Defendants, holding that Plaintiff assumed the risk of her injuries. A divided appellate court reversed and reinstated the complaint, concluding that the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk did not apply to Plaintiff's activity and that a triable issue of fact existed on the question of proximate cause. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) assumption of the risk did not apply to the fact pattern in this appeal; and (2) Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of proximate causation. View "Custodi v. Town of Amherst" on Justia Law

This case arose when a tower crane operated by Joy collapsed during construction of a high-rise condominium, killing seven people and injuring dozens, damaging several buildings and destroying one. At issue was the dispute in coverage under the excess policy for "additional insureds" within the meaning of the comprehensive general liability (CGL) policy. The court concluded that there were material issues of fact in this case as to whether the high-rise building under construction was residential or mixed-use; Admiral's other claims related to Joy's alleged misrepresentations in its underwriting submission were properly interposed against Reliance and the owners/developers as well as Joy; the LLC exclusion did not foreclose coverage of those owners/developers that were limited liability companies; and defendants' remaining arguments were without merit. Accordingly, the court held that the order of the Supreme Court, as modified by the Appellate Division, was not properly made.

Plaintiff brought suit against Clarkson University and his head coach to recover damages sustained from being hit in the jaw by a fastball. At issue was whether a college baseball pitcher assumed the risk of injury associated with his participation in indoor practice. The court concluded that plaintiff assumed the inherent risk of being hit by a line drive and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.

Plaintiff, an employee of the New York City Fire Department, applied for and received workers' compensation benefits from the city. Plaintiff subsequently commenced this action against the city and its Parks and Recreation Department, alleging both common law negligence and a cause of action under General Municipal Law 205-a. The city moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, arguing that plaintiff's receipt of workers' compensation benefits barred his lawsuit. The court concluded that it was not the intent of the Legislature to allow recipients of workers' compensation benefits to sue their employers in tort under section 205-a. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

In a workers' compensation action, the court was asked to determine whether the future medical benefits that a compensation carrier had been relieved of paying due to a claimant's successful prosecution of a third-party action were "so speculative that it would be improper to estimate and assess litigation costs against [that] benefit to the carrier." The court concluded that they were, and held that the carrier need only pay its equitable share of attorneys' fees and costs incurred by a claimant once the claimant incurred and paid each medical expense. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.