Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Abacus commenced this action against ADT and Diebold to recover damages under tort and contract theories for losses incurred during a burglary of the bank. The court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint with one exception. The court concluded that Abacus had adequately stated a cause of action for breach of contract against ADT for its alleged losses other than losses allegedly sustained by its safe deposit box customers.

Plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder in a factory while cleaning a product manufactured by his employer. The product in question was a steel "wall module" made by the third party defendant. At issue was plaintiff's claim under Labor Law 240(1) against Bechtel, the purchaser of the wall module, and defendants, the third party defendant's landlords. The court held that section 240(1) did not apply to an injury suffered while cleaning a product in the course of a manufacturing process. Such injuries could hardly be uncommon; the court inferred that it had been generally and correctly understood that the statue did not apply to them. Accordingly, plaintiff's activity was not protected under section 240(1).

Plaintiff, a nontenured teacher, commenced this action against defendants asserting causes of action for prima facie tort and tortious interference with prospective contractual relations. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff was not granted tenure because of the continuous pressure and influence exerted upon school officials by defendants. At issue was whether defendants' course of conduct in instigating complaints to school authorities against plaintiff was entitled to an absolute privilege under Brandt v. Winchell that would warrant dismissal of plaintiff's cause of actions with prospective contractual rights. Assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint, the court must at this early stage of the litigation, conclude that defendants' conduct was not immunized by Brandt.

This case arose when defendants' daughter revealed to her parents that plaintiff had raped and molested her when she was 10 and 12 years old. Defendants notified plaintiff's wife about her husband's alleged actions and informed her that defendants would file a civil suit against plaintiff. Plaintiff was never charged with a crime in connection with these allegations. Plaintiff adamantly denied that he had sexual contact with defendants' daughter and responded to these charges by commencing this action for defamation. Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that even if they made the statements that were attributed to them, those utterances were not actionable because they had truthfully relayed their daughter's accusations and merely expressed their belief in her veracity. Supreme Court denied defendants' motions, finding triable issues of fact based on the conflicting testimony of the parties. The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment to defendants, concluding that the alleged statements were statements of opinion, not fact. The court held that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because they failed to establish as a matter of law that they did not defame plaintiff where, based on the conflicting recollections in this case, it was impossible to decipher exactly what was said by whom and the precise context in which the statements were made.

Plaintiffs, Michael Stolzman and Judith Rost, commenced separate actions against various defendants, including Michael and Susan Oliver, alleging claims for a violation of the Dram Shop Act, General Obligations Law 11-101, after Stolzman left the Olivers' party and backed his truck into oncoming traffic. Plaintiffs alleged that the Olivers served Stolzman an unreasonable amount of alcohol rendering him intoxicated and failed to control him while he was on their property. The court concluded that the Olivers were no longer in a position to control Stolzman when he entered his vehicle and drove away. Furthermore, the court concluded that "requiring social hosts to prevent intoxicated guests from leaving their property would inappropriately expand the concept of duty." The court also concluded that the Olivers had no duty to assist Stolzman as he pulled out of their driveway, or otherwise warn him that vehicles parked along the road to the driveway may obstruct the view when exiting. Accordingly, the Olivers' motion for summary judgment was granted.

Plaintiff, a park maintenance worker, sued several defendants, including GFC, claiming that a subcontractor's improper disposal of construction debris caused her serious and permanent injuries when, in the course of her employment in a Bronx park, she attempted to move a garbage barrel containing such waste. The court concluded that GFC failed to meet its burden as the moving party and that, in any event, assuming, for the sake of argument, that GFC had met its burden, plaintiff had set forth evidence sufficient to establish that there were genuine issues of material fact necessitating a trial. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff was entitled to a trial on the merits of her claims and the lower courts correctly denied summary judgment in favor of GFC.

Plaintiff SPCA of Upstate New York is a New York corporation and plaintiff Cathy Cloutier is its executive director. Defendant AWCA is an Ohio not-for-profit corporation and its president, defendant Jean Levitt, was a Vermont resident. Plaintiffs commenced a defamation action after Levitt generated a series of writings addressing the conditions of collies and the treatment being provided by the SPCA. These writings were posted to the AWCA website periodically. At issue was whether plaintiffs established personal jurisdiction over defendants under CPR 302(a)(1), New York's long-arm statute. The court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division where that court determined that, given New York's "narrow approach" to long-arm jurisdiction where defamation cases were concerned, defendants' contacts with the state were insufficient to support a finding of personal jurisdiction.

Plaintiff, administrator of decedent's estate, brought this negligence and wrongful death action against defendant. At issue was whether the trial court, in awarding preverdict interest, properly discounted wrongful death damages back to the date of decedent's death and awarded interest from the date of death to the date of the verdict. Applying the EPTL 5-4.3 and its predecessor statutes, the court held that prejudgment interest in a wrongful death action was part of the damages and that such interest should run from the date of death to the date of the verdict. Furthermore, it has long been a rule in New York that the damages on a wrongful death action were due on the date of the death of the plaintiff's decedent. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff sued defendants after he was injured while engaging in demolition work at an apartment building owned by defendant. Plaintiff claimed violations of Labor Law 200, 240(1), and 241. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of his section 240(1) cause of action and the denial of his cross-motion on that claim. The court concluded that it could not say as a matter of law that equipment of the kind enumerated in section 240(1) was not necessary to guard plaintiff from the risk of falling from the top of the dumpster. Consequently, defendants have not demonstrated entitlement to summary judgment. The court agreed, however, that plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment was properly denied because genuine issues of fact remained.

Exum, an employer of Elrac, served a notice of intention to arbitrate on Elrac, seeking uninsured motorist benefits. Elrace petitioned to stay the arbitration. Supreme Court granted the petition, but the Appellate Division reversed, permitting the arbitration to proceed. The court affirmed and held that a self-insured employer whose employee was involved in an automobile accident could not be liable to that employee for uninsured motorist benefits, notwithstanding the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Law.