Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals of the State of New York held that the plaintiff, a certified diesel technician, was not engaged in an activity protected by Labor Law § 240 (1) when he was injured while repairing a trailer. The plaintiff was working beneath a lifted trailer, fixing a faulty air brake system, when the trailer fell on him. He sued on the grounds that the defendant failed to provide him with adequate safety devices, as required by Labor Law § 240 (1). The court found that the statute was not intended to cover ordinary vehicle repair. The court reasoned that, while the statute protects workers from elevation-related risks in industries like construction, it does not cover every instance where a worker is injured as a result of an elevation differential. The court also noted that extending the statute's coverage to ordinary vehicle repair could lead to an overly broad interpretation that would place undue liability on car owners for injuries sustained by mechanics. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of the section 240 (1) cause of action against the defendant. View "Stoneham v Joseph Barsuk, Inc." on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual developed a mass under his armpit and was referred to a surgeon who had a contract with the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS). The surgeon performed a biopsy, which was then sent to the pathology department at the Cortland Regional Medical Center (CRMC) for examination. Dr. Jun Wang, the Medical Director of CRMC's pathology department and a member of Cortland Pathology, examined the specimen and determined that the mass was benign. A year later, the patient was diagnosed with Hodgkin's lymphoma.The patient initiated a medical malpractice lawsuit against CRMC and others, alleging that they misdiagnosed his condition and failed to promptly diagnose or refer him for treatment. Dr. Wang sought defense and indemnification from the State, claiming that he was entitled to coverage under Public Officers Law § 17 and Correction Law § 24-a because his actions arose from treating an incarcerated individual at the request of DOCCS. The Attorney General rejected Dr. Wang's request, stating that he treated the patient through his employment arrangement with CRMC, not directly at the request of the State, and thus the State had no obligation to provide defense or indemnification.The New York Court of Appeals held that the State is not obligated to indemnify or defend Dr. Wang in a medical malpractice lawsuit. The court ruled that under the Correction Law § 24-a, the State's obligation to defend and indemnify only applies when there has been an explicit request by DOCCS for the services of a specific provider—an arrangement or understanding made in advance between DOCCS and the healthcare professional. In this case, no such express request or direct agreement existed between DOCCS and Dr. Wang, therefore, the State had no obligation to defend or indemnify him. The court also stated that the Attorney General's interpretation of the statute was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Hence, the court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "In re Wang v James" on Justia Law

In this defamation suit involving a music producer and the singer and songwriter known as "Kesha" the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the appellate division reversing Supreme Court's decision granting Defendant's motion for a ruling that 2020 amendments to the anti-SLAPP statute applied to this action and then granting Defendant leave to file a counterclaim, holding that the appellate division's orders were not properly made.Plaintiff, the producer, brought this action alleging that statements made by Defendant with respect to an alleged sexual assault were defamatory. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment, Defendant arguing that Plaintiff was a public figure and that some of her alleged defamatory statements were privileged. Supreme Court granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiff. While Defendant's appeal was pending, the Legislature amended the anti-SLAPP statute. Defendant then moved in Supreme Court for a ruling that the amendments applied to this action and for leave to assert counterclaims as permitted by the amended statute. The court concluded that the amendments applied retroactively. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure, requiring proof that the allegedly defamatory statements were made with actual malice; and (2) the strong presumption against retroactive legislation was not overcome with respect to the amendments to the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Gottwald v. Sebert" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the negligence claims brought in this case involving two separate murders on property owned by the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) should advance to a jury trial.Bridget Crushshon and Tayshana Murphy were killed by intruders on the premises of two different public house complexes, owned and operated by the NYCHA, where the victims lived. In two separate cases, Plaintiffs filed negligence lawsuits against NYCHA, asserting that NYCHA had a duty to provide a locking exterior doors to their buildings. While admitting that it had a duty to provide a locking exterior door, NYCHA moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not a proximate cause of the deaths because the murderers had "targeted" their victims rather than commit crimes of opportunity. The Second Department denied summary judgment in one case, and the First Department granted summary judgment in the other case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Second Department's denial of summary judgment and reversed the First Department's grant of summary judgment to NYCHA in the two cases, holding that the fact that an attack was "targeted" does not sever the causal chain between a landlord's negligence and a plaintiff's injuries as a matter of law. View "Scurry v. New York City Housing Authority" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases in which both plaintiffs sought to recover for injuries sustained during organized sports practices for high school athletic teams and appealed from orders granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment, the Court of Appeals addressed the primary assumption of risk doctrine and held that material questions of fact remained in one case.The two cases considered by the Supreme Court provided an opportunity to apply the principles of the primary assumption of the risk doctrine in the context of organized practice drills for high school athletic teams. The Court rejected the dissent's suggestion to abandon the doctrine and held (1) in the first case, the primary assumption of the risk doctrine applied, and therefore, summary judgment was properly granted; and (2) in the second case, material issues of fact remained to be resolved by a jury. View "Grady v. Chenango Valley Central School District" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law 205-b does not authorize a claim against a fire district for the negligence of a volunteer firefighter when the firefighter's actions are otherwise privileged and subject to a heightened recklessness standard under N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law 1104.Plaintiff brought a personal injury action against the Commack Fire District after her vehicle collided with a fire truck owned by the district and operated by a volunteer firefighter. The trial court granted summary judgment to the firefighter on the grounds that Plaintiff had failed to establish that the firefighter acted with reckless disregard but concluded that the District was not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's vicarious liability claim. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that when a volunteer firefighter's actions satisfy the conditions set forth in N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law 1104(e) and are thus privileged, there is no breach of duty or negligence that can be imputed to a fire district under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law 205-b. View "Anderson v. Commack Fire District" on Justia Law

In this personal injury action, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal brought by defendant New Jersey Transit Corporation and driver Renaud Pierrelouis (collectively, NJT), holding that NJT failed to preserve its interstate sovereign immunity defense by raising it before the trial court, and no exception to the general reservation rule applied.Plaintiff was injured while riding on a bus that collided with another vehicle. Plaintiff brought this action seeking damages. A jury found in favor of Plaintiff. Thereafter, NJT moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial on damages. Supreme Court denied the motion. NJT appealed, arguing for the first time that dismissal was required under the doctrine of interstate sovereign immunity. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals dismissed NJT's ensuing appeal, holding that because NJT's sovereign immunity argument was unpreserved and did not qualify for any exception to the preservation requirement, an appeal as of right did not lie under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601(b)(1). View "Henry v. New Jersey Transit Corp." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals declined to expand the Court of Appeals' special duty doctrine to the facts in this case in which the victim's mother and brother, now serving prison terms, sexually assaulted, abused, and murdered her in her home, holding that "government employees took no action that could have induced justifiable reliance."The public administrator of the victim's estate brought these actions against the County of Erie and the Erie County Sheriff alleging, inter alia, that caseworkers from Child Protective Services and Adult Protective Services and Sheriff's deputies were negligent in the performance of their duties, leading the victim's death. Supreme Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed the order denying Defendants' motion and granted summary judgment to Defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) this Court declines to amend the common law special duty rule in this case; and (2) therefore, the orders of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. View "Maldovan v. County of Erie" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the appellate division and reinstated the original award for workers' compensation benefits in this case to the decedent's minor son, holding that N.Y. Work. Comp. Law (WCL) 15(3)(w) does not provide for any unaccrued portion of a nonschedule award to remain payable following an injured employee's death.After he sustained an injury in a work-related accident Eric Watson was classified as having a nonscheduled permanent partial disability and received a weekly award for 350 weeks. After 311 weeks Watson died due to unrelated causes. Claimant, Watson's son, sought accrued unpaid amounts of Watson's award, including benefits for the weeks remaining before Watson's award was expected to reach the statutory durational cap. A workers' compensation law judge award unpaid amounts for the 311 weeks precedent Watson's death but denied Claimant the award for the remaining weeks. The Workers' compensation Board affirmed. The appellate division modified the award by ruling that Claimant was entitled to an additional posthumous award for the remaining cap weeks. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that WCL 15(3)(w) does not provide for any unaccrued portion of a nonscheduled award to remain payable following an injured employee's death. View "Green v. Dutchess County BOCES" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court awarding damages in favor of Plaintiff alleging that a commercial talcum powder that his deceased wife used daily for a period of more than ten years during the 1960s and early 1970s proximately caused his wife's illness, holding that Plaintiff's proof of causation was insufficient as a matter of law.In 2016, the decedent passed away. Plaintiff, her husband, sued Defendant, alleging that Defendant supplied another company with talc contaminated with asbestos that was then used in a commercial talcum powder. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff's favor. The appellate division modified the judgment in connection with the damages awarded but otherwise affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff's proof failed as a matter of law to meet the test for proving causation in toxic tort cases. View "Nemeth v. Brenntag North America" on Justia Law