Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In these consolidated cases in which both plaintiffs sought to recover for injuries sustained during organized sports practices for high school athletic teams and appealed from orders granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment, the Court of Appeals addressed the primary assumption of risk doctrine and held that material questions of fact remained in one case.The two cases considered by the Supreme Court provided an opportunity to apply the principles of the primary assumption of the risk doctrine in the context of organized practice drills for high school athletic teams. The Court rejected the dissent's suggestion to abandon the doctrine and held (1) in the first case, the primary assumption of the risk doctrine applied, and therefore, summary judgment was properly granted; and (2) in the second case, material issues of fact remained to be resolved by a jury. View "Grady v. Chenango Valley Central School District" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law 205-b does not authorize a claim against a fire district for the negligence of a volunteer firefighter when the firefighter's actions are otherwise privileged and subject to a heightened recklessness standard under N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law 1104.Plaintiff brought a personal injury action against the Commack Fire District after her vehicle collided with a fire truck owned by the district and operated by a volunteer firefighter. The trial court granted summary judgment to the firefighter on the grounds that Plaintiff had failed to establish that the firefighter acted with reckless disregard but concluded that the District was not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's vicarious liability claim. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that when a volunteer firefighter's actions satisfy the conditions set forth in N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law 1104(e) and are thus privileged, there is no breach of duty or negligence that can be imputed to a fire district under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law 205-b. View "Anderson v. Commack Fire District" on Justia Law

In this personal injury action, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal brought by defendant New Jersey Transit Corporation and driver Renaud Pierrelouis (collectively, NJT), holding that NJT failed to preserve its interstate sovereign immunity defense by raising it before the trial court, and no exception to the general reservation rule applied.Plaintiff was injured while riding on a bus that collided with another vehicle. Plaintiff brought this action seeking damages. A jury found in favor of Plaintiff. Thereafter, NJT moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial on damages. Supreme Court denied the motion. NJT appealed, arguing for the first time that dismissal was required under the doctrine of interstate sovereign immunity. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals dismissed NJT's ensuing appeal, holding that because NJT's sovereign immunity argument was unpreserved and did not qualify for any exception to the preservation requirement, an appeal as of right did not lie under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601(b)(1). View "Henry v. New Jersey Transit Corp." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals declined to expand the Court of Appeals' special duty doctrine to the facts in this case in which the victim's mother and brother, now serving prison terms, sexually assaulted, abused, and murdered her in her home, holding that "government employees took no action that could have induced justifiable reliance."The public administrator of the victim's estate brought these actions against the County of Erie and the Erie County Sheriff alleging, inter alia, that caseworkers from Child Protective Services and Adult Protective Services and Sheriff's deputies were negligent in the performance of their duties, leading the victim's death. Supreme Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed the order denying Defendants' motion and granted summary judgment to Defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) this Court declines to amend the common law special duty rule in this case; and (2) therefore, the orders of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. View "Maldovan v. County of Erie" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the appellate division and reinstated the original award for workers' compensation benefits in this case to the decedent's minor son, holding that N.Y. Work. Comp. Law (WCL) 15(3)(w) does not provide for any unaccrued portion of a nonschedule award to remain payable following an injured employee's death.After he sustained an injury in a work-related accident Eric Watson was classified as having a nonscheduled permanent partial disability and received a weekly award for 350 weeks. After 311 weeks Watson died due to unrelated causes. Claimant, Watson's son, sought accrued unpaid amounts of Watson's award, including benefits for the weeks remaining before Watson's award was expected to reach the statutory durational cap. A workers' compensation law judge award unpaid amounts for the 311 weeks precedent Watson's death but denied Claimant the award for the remaining weeks. The Workers' compensation Board affirmed. The appellate division modified the award by ruling that Claimant was entitled to an additional posthumous award for the remaining cap weeks. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that WCL 15(3)(w) does not provide for any unaccrued portion of a nonscheduled award to remain payable following an injured employee's death. View "Green v. Dutchess County BOCES" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court awarding damages in favor of Plaintiff alleging that a commercial talcum powder that his deceased wife used daily for a period of more than ten years during the 1960s and early 1970s proximately caused his wife's illness, holding that Plaintiff's proof of causation was insufficient as a matter of law.In 2016, the decedent passed away. Plaintiff, her husband, sued Defendant, alleging that Defendant supplied another company with talc contaminated with asbestos that was then used in a commercial talcum powder. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff's favor. The appellate division modified the judgment in connection with the damages awarded but otherwise affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff's proof failed as a matter of law to meet the test for proving causation in toxic tort cases. View "Nemeth v. Brenntag North America" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that separate schedule loss of use (SLU) awards for different injuries to the same statutory member are contemplated by N.Y. Work. Comp. Law **(WCL) 15 and that, when a complainant proves that the second injury, considered by itself without consideration of the first injury, has caused an increased loss of use, the claimant is entitled to an SLU award commensurate with that increased loss of use.At issue in these consolidated appeals was whether, under WCL 15, a claimant's SLU award must be reduced by the percentage loss determined for a prior SLU award to a different subpart of the same body member enumerated in section 15. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment below, holding that separate SLU awards for a member's subparts are authorized by statute. View "Johnson v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division modifying the order of Supreme Court by granting Plaintiff summary judgment on his claim brought under N.Y. Labor Law 241(6), holding that the section 241(6) claim must be dismissed.Plaintiff was struck by a power buggy while working at the World Trade Center Transportation Hub construction site owned by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority). Plaintiff filed this action against the Port Authority, bringing claims under N.Y. Labor Law 241(6) and N.Y. Labor Law 200(1). Supreme Court granted the Port Authority summary judgment on the section 200(1) claim but denied summary judgment on the section 241(6) claim. The Appellate Division modified by granting Plaintiff summary judgment on the section 241(6) claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 12 NYCRR 23-9.9(a) does not set forth a concrete specification sufficient to give rise to a non-delegable duty under section 241(6). View "Toussaint v. Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reiterated that plaintiffs must establish that a municipality owed them a special duty when they assert a negligence claim based on actions taken by the municipality acting in a governmental capacity and that plaintiffs may establish a special duty when a municipality's police force plans and executes a no-knock search warrant at a person's residence.Plaintiff bought this action in federal court against the City of Binghamton and its police department, arguing that the City breached a special duty and was liable under a respondent superior theory for a police officer's negligence in shooting Plaintiff. The jury determined that the City was liable under a respondeat superior theory. The City moved for judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted the motion, determining that the City did not owe Plaintiff a special duty. On appeal, the federal circuit court certified a question of law to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals answered that a special duty arises when the police plan and execute a no-knock search warrant at an identified residence, running to the individuals within the targeted premises at the time the warrant is executed. View "Ferreira v. City of Binghamton" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held in these consolidated appeals that liability for the death benefits claims at issue could not be transferred to the Special Fund for Reopened Cases (the Special Fund).At issue in these appeals was whether New York Workers' Compensation Law 25-a(1-a), under which no liability for claims submitted on or after January 1, 2014 may be transferred to the Special Fund, forecloses the transfer of liability for a death benefits claim submitted on or after the cut-off date, regardless of the prior transfer of liability for a worker's disability claim arising out of the same injury. The Court of Appeals held that, based on the plain statutory language and this Court's established precedent, liability for the death benefits claims at issue in these cases could not be transferred to the Special Fund. View "Verneau v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y." on Justia Law