Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff claimed that he fell and was injured while walking on a New York City public sidewalk. Plaintiff brought this negligence action against West River Associates, LLC and Sandy and Rhina Mercado. Plaintiff specifically alleged that West River violated section 7-210 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, which establishes a duty on the part of the owner of real property abutting a sidewalk to maintain the sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition. West River moved for summary judgment, asserting that the area of the sidewalk upon which Plaintiff tripped was located entirely in front of the Mercado property, therefore, the defect did not abut the West River premises. Supreme Court granted West River’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that because West River did not own the property that abutted the sidewalk where Plaintiff tripped it fell, it was not responsible for maintaining the sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that factual questions existed as to whether West River breached its duty to maintain its sidewalk and, if so, whether that breach was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. View "Sangaray v. West River Assocs., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was born in 1992 with severe mental and physical difficulties. In 2008, Plaintiff commenced this personal injury action against BMW of North America, LLC and related BMW entities (collectively, Defendants), alleging that his disabilities were caused by in utero exposure to unleaded gasoline vapor caused by a defective fuel hose in his mother’s BMW. Defendants moved to preclude Plaintiff’s causation experts from testifying at trial, arguing that their opinion reached novel conclusions and did not use generally accepted principles and methodologies. Supreme Court granted Defendants’ motion to the extent that it precluded the testimony of two of Plaintiff’s causation experts. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the courts below properly precluded the two expert witnesses from testifying at trial as to causation because the experts did not rely on generally accepted methodologies in concluding that Plaintiff was exposed to a sufficient concentration of gasoline vapor to cause his injuries. View "Sean R. v. BMW of N. Am., LLC" on Justia Law

While being treated at South Nassau Communities Hospital by medical professionals employed by Island Medical Physicians, P.C. (collectively, Defendants), Lorraine Walsh was treated with medication that impaired her ability to safely operate an automobile. Afterwards, Walsh drove herself from the Hospital and was involved in an accident that injured Edwin Davis. Davis and his wife (together, Plaintiffs) brought this action against Defendants. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendants did not owe a duty to Plaintiffs to warn Walsh that the medication Defendants gave to Walsh either impaired or could have impaired her ability to safely operate a motor vehicle following her departure from the Hospital. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified by denying Defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint, holding that where a medical provider has administered to a patient medication that impairs or could impair the patient’s ability operate an automobile safely, the medical provider has a duty to third parties to warn the patient of that danger. View "Davis v. S. Nassau Communities Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (collectively, “Pegasus”) sued one defendant (“VarigLog”) for breach of contract and conversion and sought to hold other defendants (“MP defendants”) liable for VarigLog’s conduct on an alter ego theory. Pegasus served a notice to produce documents seeking electronically stores information (ESI) concerning Pegasus’s claims and VarigLog’s relationship with the MP defendants. VarigLog’s production was unsatisfactory to Pegasus. Supreme Court appointed a discovery referee to assist Pegasus and VarigLog in resolving the dispute. During the conferences it was established that computer crashes resulted in the loss of much of the ESI, and that data recovery efforts had proven unsuccessful. Pegasus moved for the imposition of spoliation sanctions against VarigLog and the MP defendants. Supreme Court granted the motion, concluding that the evidence was negligently destroyed. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division erred in determining that Pegasus had not attempted to make a showing that the destroyed documents were relevant to its claim. Remanded to the trial court for a determination as to whether the evidence was relevant to the claims asserted against Defendants and for the imposition of an appropriate sanction should the trial court decide that a sanction is warranted. View "Pegasus Aviation I, Inc. v Varig Logistica S.A." on Justia Law

The common thread among these three appeals was that an individual tripped on a defect in a sidewalk or stairway and was injured but was prevented from going to trial on the ground that the defect was characterized as too trivial to be actionable. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division in two of the three cases, holding (1) a defendant seeking dismissal of a complaint on the basis that the alleged defect is trivial must make a prima facie showing that the defect is physically insignificant and that the characteristics of the defect or the surrounding circumstances do not increase the risks it poses; (2) in the first case, the Appellate Division properly ruled that the defect was not actionable; (3) in the second case, the Appellate Division erred in concluding that the defect was nonactionable, as a material triable issue of fact existed regarding whether the defect was trivial; and (4) in the third case, the Appellate Division erred in holding that the alleged defect was trivial, as the defendant failed to meet its initial burden of making a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as matter of law, and therefore, the burden did not shift to the plaintiff to establish the existence of a material triable issue of fact. View "Hutchinson v. Sheridan Hill House Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against Volvo Cars of North America, alleging defective design of a product. The case proceeded to trial. At Plaintiff’s request, the trial court included a pattern jury instruction to charge the jury that was the same standard jury charge in malpractice actions. The instruction tells the jury that a defendant who has special skills in a trade or profession is required to use the same degree of skill and care that others in the same trade or profession would reasonably use in the same situation. A jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because this was not a malpractice case but a design defect case, the charge should not have been given, and the error required reversal and a new trial. View "Reis v. Volvo Cars of N. Am." on Justia Law

In two personal injury actions, Plaintiffs sued property owners (Defendants), alleging that they suffered numerous injuries from exposure to lead-based paint at Defendants’ properties. Prior to the defense medical examinations, Supreme Court ordered Plaintiffs to produce medical reports detailing a diagnosis of each injury alleged to have been sustained by Plaintiffs. The Appellate Division affirmed the order. The Court of Appeals, in each case, modified the order of the Appellate Division, holding that Supreme Court exceeded its power in requiring Plaintiffs to provide medical evidence of each alleged injury or otherwise be precluded from offering evidence of the injury at trial. View "Hamilton v. Miller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was riding her bike on a roadway that was closed to vehicular traffic for repairs. Plaintiff received permission from Donald Bowles, a supervisor with the Department of Transportation for the City of New York to enter the closed portion and was subsequently injured after falling into a depression in the road. Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against the City of New York. The jury apportioned fault at forty percent to Plaintiff and sixty percent to the City, concluding that Bowles was negligent in permitting Plaintiff to enter the closed roadway. The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that Bowles was engaged in a governmental function when he closed the roadway, and therefore, the City was immune from liability. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, although the City was not held liable for its failure to repair the defect in the road, the jury was not foreclosed from finding that Bowles was negligent in carrying out the proprietary function of road maintenance. View "Wittorf v. City of New York" on Justia Law

A twelve-year-old middle school student (“student”) was injured when she was struck by a car before an approaching school bus stopped to pick her up. Plaintiff, the student’s mother, filed a personal injury action individually and on behalf of her daughter against the school district (“district”). The district moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty to a student not within its physical care or custody. Supreme Court denied the district’s motion, holding that the district court the student a duty of care because she was a special education student. The Appellate Division affirmed as modified, holding that the district did not owe the student a duty of care because she was a special education student, but, under the facts presented, the district owed a duty to the student based upon the actions of the district. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district did not owe a duty of reasonable care to the student under the circumstances of this case. View "Williams v. Weatherstone" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated litigation to recover wrongfully diverted and concealed proceeds of a loan agreement, asserting that Defendants conspired to avoid repayment by denying their ownership and control over entities used to conceal converted funds. Before the conclusion of discovery in New York, federal authorities arrested Defendants, charging them with tax evasion and alleging a conspiracy to commit fraud on the New York court by forging documents and suborning perjury. A jury convicted Defendants of tax evasion, and the district court concluded that Defendants had perpetrated fraud on Supreme Court in New York. After Defendants’ sentencing, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike Defendants’ pleadings and for a default judgment. Supreme Court determined that Defendants had perpetrated a fraud on the court and granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, holding (1) where a court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, conduct that constitutes fraud on the court, the court may impose sanctions including striking pleadings and entering default judgment against the offending parties; and (2) with one exception, the record supported such sanctions against Defendants. View "CDR Creances S.A.S. v. Cohen" on Justia Law