Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(a)(4), which allows a party to obtain discovery from a nonparty. John Kapon was the CEO of Acker, Merrall & Condit Company (AMC), a retailer and auctioneer of fine and rare wines, and the employer of Justin Christoph. In 2008, William Koch commenced an action against AMC in Supreme Court concerning alleged counterfeit wine that Rudy Kurniawan had consigned to AMC and that AMC had sold to Koch. In 2009, Koch commenced a fraud action in California against Kurniawan, alleging that Kurniawan had sold Respondent counterfeit wine through AMC’s auctions and sales. In 2012, Koch, seeking disclosure in the California action, served subpoenas on Kapon and Christoph (together, Petitioners). Petitioners filed motions to quash the subpoena, which Supreme Court denied. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Petitioners failed to show that the requested deposition testimony was irrelevant to the prosecution of the California action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the subpoenas satisfied the notice requirement of section 3101(a)(4); and (2) in moving to quash the subpoena, Petitioners failed to meet their burden of establishing that their deposition testimonies were irrelevant to the California action. View "Kapon v. Koch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this action for attorney deceit against Defendants. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the lawsuit was precluded by the three-year limitations period in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(2). Plaintiff argued that his action was timely because the applicable statute of limitations was the six-year period in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(1). Supreme Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the applicable statute of limitations was the three-year period in section 214(2) but that Defendants were equitably estopped from asserting this defense. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed Plaintiff’s amended complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that claims for attorney deceit are subject to the six-year statute of limitations in section 213(1). View "Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP" on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old Jessica Bowers sustained severe injuries when she was dragged into the rotating driveline of a tractor-driven post hole digger that was operated by her stepfather, who had borrowed the digger from Peter Smith. Smith had previously removed a plastic safety shield from the machine after years of use had left the shield damaged beyond repair. Plaintiff sued the digger’s seller, distributor, manufacturer, component maker, and others, asserting claims sounding in negligence and strict products liability. Defendants argued that they were entitled to summary judgment based on the substantial modification defense articulated in Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division of Package Machinery Company because Smith made post-sale modifications to the digger that rendered the digger defective and proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Supreme Court denied summary judgment with regard to the design defect claims. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff raised triable issues of fact regarding the defective design of the safety shield that were sufficient to defeat summary judgment based on substantial modification. View "Hoover v. New Holland N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Roberta Oldenborg was driving Matthew Isabella back from a business meeting in a vehicle owned by Michael Koubek when Oldenborg collided with a vehicle driven by Doris Hallock and owned by Peter Hallock. Isabella was injured in the accident but was precluded under the New York Workers’ Compensation Law from bringing an action against Oldenborg since she was his coworker. Instead, Isabella received workers’ compensation benefits secured by his employer. Isabella and his wife subsequently filed a personal injury action against the Hallocks. The Hallocks, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against Koubek seeking contribution and indemnification, asserting that the accident resulted from Oldenborg’s negligence and that Koubek was vicariously responsible. A jury found the Hallocks ten percent liable and Koubek ninety percent liable. The Court of Appeals answered a certified question of law and answered that a defendant may not pursue a third-party contribution claim against the owner of a vehicle where the vehicle driver’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries but the driver is protected from suit by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law. View "Isabella v. Koubek" on Justia Law

Plaintiff resided in an apartment from approximately 1997 until 2003. A corporation owned the building during Plaintiff’s occupancy until shortly before Plaintiff vacated the premises. In 2004, Plaintiff sued the corporation, the building’s current landlord, and other parties, alleging that she developed health problems due to mold and other harmful substances in the apartment. The corporation and landlord sought to dismiss the complaint to the extent that Plaintiff alleged mold-induced personal injuries, arguing that Plaintiff was unable to prove either general or specific causation. Supreme Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s causes of action except those for property damage and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the complaint, concluding that the standard of scientific reliability set forth in Frye v. United States was satisfied in this case. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff did not demonstrate on the record a cause-and-effect relationship between exposure to indoor mold and the kinds of injuries she alleged. View "Cornell v. 360 W. 51st St. Realty, LLC" on Justia Law

This action stemmed from property damage and the resulting business interruption sustained by Plaintiffs as a result of water damages that occurred following three separate roof breaches. Plaintiffs were Deborah Voss and three business entities owned and controlled by her. Plaintiffs sued CH Insurance Brokerage Services Co. (CHI), their insurance broker, arguing that a special relationship existed with CHI and that CHI had negligently secured inadequate levels of business interruption insurance for the three losses. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for CHI, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that CHI did not satisfy its initial burden of establishing the absence of a material issue of fact as to the existence of a special relationship. View "Voss v. Netherlands Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against Defendants, the construction manager and owner of a building at a construction site, after a large, flat object fell and injured his hand. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, a violation of N.Y. Lab. Law 241(6). Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s section 241(6) claim, arguing the form that injured Plaintiff’s hand was not subject to the safety requirements of Industrial Code N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 12,23-2.2(a). The Court of Appeals remitted the matter for further proceedings for a hearing on whether the object as issue was a “form” within the meaning of the Industrial Code. After a hearing, Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff’s section 241(6) claim, concluding that the form at issue did not come within the coverage of the regulation or section 241(6). The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment to Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals accepted certification and concluded that the Appellate Division’s order should be affirmed, holding that the language of N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 12,23-2.2(a) could sensibly be applied to the form that fell on Plaintiff’s hand. View "Morris v. Pavarini Constr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants, a construction company and the owner of a building, after he was injured when a heavy conduit pipe fell on his hand while he was working at the building, alleging that Defendants violated N.Y. Lab. Law 240(1). Supreme Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on liability, concluding that the conduit, being attached to the ceiling by a compression coupling that failed, was not properly secured so as to give proper protection to Plaintiff. The Appellate Division modified the order of the Supreme Court by denying Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendants’ failure to provide a protective device, i.e., a set-screw coupling rather than the purportedly inadequate compression coupling, was a proximate of his accident. The Court of Appeals accepted certification and held that the order of Supreme Court as modified by the Appellate Court was not property made, as Defendants’ failure to use a set screw couple was not a violation of section 240(1). View "Fabrizi v. 1095 Ave. of the Ams., LLC" on Justia Law

Filippo Gallina and his wife (Plaintiffs) commenced a personal injury action against Preferred Trucking Services Corp. Preferred Trucking was insured by County-Wide Insurance Company under a policy that required insureds to cooperate with Country-Wide in its investigation of a claim or defense against a lawsuit. The next year, Country-Wide disclaimed its obligation to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking based upon Preferred Trucking’s refusal to cooperate in the defense. Supreme Court subsequently awarded judgment to Plaintiffs. Thereafter, Country-Wide filed this action against Preferred Trucking and Plaintiffs seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking in the underlying action. Supreme Court concluded that Country-Wide was obligated to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking. At issue on appeal was whether Country-Wide’s disclaimer was timely as a matter of law. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that Country-Wide’s disclaimer was untimely because it came four months after Country-Wide learned of the ground for the disclaimer. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Country-Wide was not obligated to defend and indemnify Preferred Trucking, as Country-Wide established as a matter of law that its delay was reasonable. View "Country-Wide Ins. Co. v. Preferred Trucking Servs. Corp. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff was being treated at a private medical facility, a nurse employed by the clinic committed an unauthorized disclosure of Plaintiff’s confidential health information. Plaintiff filed this action in federal court against Defendants, various affiliated entities that allegedly owned or otherwise controlled the clinic. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss all eight of Plaintiff’s claims. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of all but one of Plaintiff’s causes of action, reserving decision on Plaintiff’s claim of breach of fiduciary duty. In a separate opinion, the Second Circuit found the nurse’s actions were not foreseeable to Defendants nor taken within the scope of her employment. The court, however, certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding Defendants’ liability where respondeat superior liability is absent. The Court of Appeals answered that, under New York law, the common law right of action for breach of the fiduciary duty of confidentiality for the unauthorized disclosure of medical information may not run directly against medical corporations when the employee responsible for the breach acts outside the scope of her employment. View "Doe v. Guthrie Clinic, Ltd." on Justia Law