Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought an action against Volvo Cars of North America, alleging defective design of a product. The case proceeded to trial. At Plaintiff’s request, the trial court included a pattern jury instruction to charge the jury that was the same standard jury charge in malpractice actions. The instruction tells the jury that a defendant who has special skills in a trade or profession is required to use the same degree of skill and care that others in the same trade or profession would reasonably use in the same situation. A jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because this was not a malpractice case but a design defect case, the charge should not have been given, and the error required reversal and a new trial. View "Reis v. Volvo Cars of N. Am." on Justia Law

In two personal injury actions, Plaintiffs sued property owners (Defendants), alleging that they suffered numerous injuries from exposure to lead-based paint at Defendants’ properties. Prior to the defense medical examinations, Supreme Court ordered Plaintiffs to produce medical reports detailing a diagnosis of each injury alleged to have been sustained by Plaintiffs. The Appellate Division affirmed the order. The Court of Appeals, in each case, modified the order of the Appellate Division, holding that Supreme Court exceeded its power in requiring Plaintiffs to provide medical evidence of each alleged injury or otherwise be precluded from offering evidence of the injury at trial. View "Hamilton v. Miller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was riding her bike on a roadway that was closed to vehicular traffic for repairs. Plaintiff received permission from Donald Bowles, a supervisor with the Department of Transportation for the City of New York to enter the closed portion and was subsequently injured after falling into a depression in the road. Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against the City of New York. The jury apportioned fault at forty percent to Plaintiff and sixty percent to the City, concluding that Bowles was negligent in permitting Plaintiff to enter the closed roadway. The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that Bowles was engaged in a governmental function when he closed the roadway, and therefore, the City was immune from liability. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, although the City was not held liable for its failure to repair the defect in the road, the jury was not foreclosed from finding that Bowles was negligent in carrying out the proprietary function of road maintenance. View "Wittorf v. City of New York" on Justia Law

A twelve-year-old middle school student (“student”) was injured when she was struck by a car before an approaching school bus stopped to pick her up. Plaintiff, the student’s mother, filed a personal injury action individually and on behalf of her daughter against the school district (“district”). The district moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty to a student not within its physical care or custody. Supreme Court denied the district’s motion, holding that the district court the student a duty of care because she was a special education student. The Appellate Division affirmed as modified, holding that the district did not owe the student a duty of care because she was a special education student, but, under the facts presented, the district owed a duty to the student based upon the actions of the district. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district did not owe a duty of reasonable care to the student under the circumstances of this case. View "Williams v. Weatherstone" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated litigation to recover wrongfully diverted and concealed proceeds of a loan agreement, asserting that Defendants conspired to avoid repayment by denying their ownership and control over entities used to conceal converted funds. Before the conclusion of discovery in New York, federal authorities arrested Defendants, charging them with tax evasion and alleging a conspiracy to commit fraud on the New York court by forging documents and suborning perjury. A jury convicted Defendants of tax evasion, and the district court concluded that Defendants had perpetrated fraud on Supreme Court in New York. After Defendants’ sentencing, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike Defendants’ pleadings and for a default judgment. Supreme Court determined that Defendants had perpetrated a fraud on the court and granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, holding (1) where a court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, conduct that constitutes fraud on the court, the court may impose sanctions including striking pleadings and entering default judgment against the offending parties; and (2) with one exception, the record supported such sanctions against Defendants. View "CDR Creances S.A.S. v. Cohen" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(a)(4), which allows a party to obtain discovery from a nonparty. John Kapon was the CEO of Acker, Merrall & Condit Company (AMC), a retailer and auctioneer of fine and rare wines, and the employer of Justin Christoph. In 2008, William Koch commenced an action against AMC in Supreme Court concerning alleged counterfeit wine that Rudy Kurniawan had consigned to AMC and that AMC had sold to Koch. In 2009, Koch commenced a fraud action in California against Kurniawan, alleging that Kurniawan had sold Respondent counterfeit wine through AMC’s auctions and sales. In 2012, Koch, seeking disclosure in the California action, served subpoenas on Kapon and Christoph (together, Petitioners). Petitioners filed motions to quash the subpoena, which Supreme Court denied. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Petitioners failed to show that the requested deposition testimony was irrelevant to the prosecution of the California action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the subpoenas satisfied the notice requirement of section 3101(a)(4); and (2) in moving to quash the subpoena, Petitioners failed to meet their burden of establishing that their deposition testimonies were irrelevant to the California action. View "Kapon v. Koch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this action for attorney deceit against Defendants. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the lawsuit was precluded by the three-year limitations period in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(2). Plaintiff argued that his action was timely because the applicable statute of limitations was the six-year period in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(1). Supreme Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the applicable statute of limitations was the three-year period in section 214(2) but that Defendants were equitably estopped from asserting this defense. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed Plaintiff’s amended complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that claims for attorney deceit are subject to the six-year statute of limitations in section 213(1). View "Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP" on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old Jessica Bowers sustained severe injuries when she was dragged into the rotating driveline of a tractor-driven post hole digger that was operated by her stepfather, who had borrowed the digger from Peter Smith. Smith had previously removed a plastic safety shield from the machine after years of use had left the shield damaged beyond repair. Plaintiff sued the digger’s seller, distributor, manufacturer, component maker, and others, asserting claims sounding in negligence and strict products liability. Defendants argued that they were entitled to summary judgment based on the substantial modification defense articulated in Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division of Package Machinery Company because Smith made post-sale modifications to the digger that rendered the digger defective and proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Supreme Court denied summary judgment with regard to the design defect claims. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff raised triable issues of fact regarding the defective design of the safety shield that were sufficient to defeat summary judgment based on substantial modification. View "Hoover v. New Holland N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Roberta Oldenborg was driving Matthew Isabella back from a business meeting in a vehicle owned by Michael Koubek when Oldenborg collided with a vehicle driven by Doris Hallock and owned by Peter Hallock. Isabella was injured in the accident but was precluded under the New York Workers’ Compensation Law from bringing an action against Oldenborg since she was his coworker. Instead, Isabella received workers’ compensation benefits secured by his employer. Isabella and his wife subsequently filed a personal injury action against the Hallocks. The Hallocks, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against Koubek seeking contribution and indemnification, asserting that the accident resulted from Oldenborg’s negligence and that Koubek was vicariously responsible. A jury found the Hallocks ten percent liable and Koubek ninety percent liable. The Court of Appeals answered a certified question of law and answered that a defendant may not pursue a third-party contribution claim against the owner of a vehicle where the vehicle driver’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries but the driver is protected from suit by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law. View "Isabella v. Koubek" on Justia Law

Plaintiff resided in an apartment from approximately 1997 until 2003. A corporation owned the building during Plaintiff’s occupancy until shortly before Plaintiff vacated the premises. In 2004, Plaintiff sued the corporation, the building’s current landlord, and other parties, alleging that she developed health problems due to mold and other harmful substances in the apartment. The corporation and landlord sought to dismiss the complaint to the extent that Plaintiff alleged mold-induced personal injuries, arguing that Plaintiff was unable to prove either general or specific causation. Supreme Court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s causes of action except those for property damage and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the complaint, concluding that the standard of scientific reliability set forth in Frye v. United States was satisfied in this case. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff did not demonstrate on the record a cause-and-effect relationship between exposure to indoor mold and the kinds of injuries she alleged. View "Cornell v. 360 W. 51st St. Realty, LLC" on Justia Law