Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Salem Logistics entered into a loan agreement with Ark Royal Capital that required Salem to instruct its customers to send payments directly to an account maintained by Ark at Wachovia Bank. Salem subsequently agreed to provide freight bill auditing services to Variety Wholesalers. Salem requested that Variety send the amounts on the master invoices directly to the Wachovia account but did not inform Variety that the account was actually controlled by Ark. Variety later terminated its contract with Salem and filed suit for recovery of money it had forwarded to Salem that had not been paid to carriers. When Variety discovered the Wachovia account actually belonged to Ark, Variety added Ark as a defendant. The trial court entered summary judgment for Variety on its claim of conversion against Ark and for Ark on Variety's claim of constructive trust and ordered Ark to pay Variety $888,000. The court of appeals reversed and entered summary judgment for Ark on both issues. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on both issues, holding (1) summary judgment was improper because there were genuine issues of material fact to be resolved; and (2) accordingly, the trial court also erred in its award of damages to Variety.

A couple and their boy and girl were riding in the family's Ford Taurus when the car began to accelerate rapidly and slammed into a light pole. The children received serious injuries. The children, through their guardian ad litem, sued Ford Motor Company, claiming that the Taurus's seat belt system caused their enhanced injuries. After evidence was presented showing the children's father placed the girl's seatbelt behind her back, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Ford. At issue on appeal was the product alteration or modification defense provided to manufacturers and sellers in products liability actions by N.C. Gen. Stat. 99-B-3. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiffs were entitled to a directed verdict on Ford's affirmative defense under section 99B-3, reasoning that section 99B-3 gives a manufacturer or seller no defense when the product modifier is not a party to the action at the time of trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the General Assembly did not limit the use of this defense to those occasions when the one who alters or modifies the product is a party to the action at the time of trial. Remanded.

Plaintiff Penny Cummings filed a medical malpractice action against Defendants, a doctor and a health care facility. The trial court entered judgment for Defendants after a jury found that Defendants were not liable for Plaintiff's injuries. Based on two affidavits submitted by jurors after the trial alleging juror misconduct, Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order setting aside the verdict and awarding a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by considering the evidence of alleged juror misconduct in the form of the two affidavits because the affidavits were inadmissible pursuant to N.C. R. Evid. 606(b), which reflects the common law rule that affidavits of jurors are inadmissible for the purposes of impeaching the verdict except as they pertain to extraneous influences that may have affected the jury's decision.