Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Frank Egan brought claims alleging injury from asbestos exposure against Union Carbide Corporation and others. In an earlier lawsuit, Egan had asserted similar claims against Union Carbide, but those claims were dismissed without prejudice by stipulation. Egan then filed a new suit raising the same type of allegations, contending that the defendants placed asbestos into the stream of commerce, causing his injuries. Union Carbide, a corporation organized under New York law with its principal place of business in Texas, responded that North Dakota courts lacked personal jurisdiction over it and raised this defense in its answer.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, granted Union Carbide’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found Union Carbide did not have sufficient contacts with North Dakota to justify exercising personal jurisdiction. Egan argued that Union Carbide had waived this defense by not raising it in the prior litigation and that the company’s business registration in North Dakota constituted consent to jurisdiction, but the district court rejected these arguments.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that merely registering to do business in North Dakota does not amount to consent to general personal jurisdiction, as North Dakota law explicitly states that such registration alone is insufficient. The court further held that a defendant does not waive a personal jurisdiction defense by failing to raise it in an earlier case that was dismissed without prejudice. Finally, the act of negotiating a dismissal in the earlier litigation did not amount to the purposeful availment required by due process for establishing personal jurisdiction. Thus, the judgment dismissing Egan’s claims against Union Carbide was affirmed. View "Egan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A patient filed a medical malpractice action after a surgery was performed on her uninjured foot instead of her injured foot. The surgeon settled and was dismissed from the case prior to trial, and the case against the hospital proceeded to a jury trial. The jury awarded the patient substantial economic and noneconomic damages, apportioning 65% of the fault to the hospital and 35% to the surgeon. The hospital moved to reduce the noneconomic damages to the statutory cap, and the patient challenged the constitutionality of this cap.The District Court of Williams County held that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages was constitutional and reduced the noneconomic damages accordingly. The court apportioned fault and entered an amended judgment in favor of the patient, reflecting the statutory cap and including interest and costs. The hospital paid the full amount of the amended judgment, and the patient accepted payment and filed a satisfaction of judgment, though the satisfaction did not strictly comply with statutory requirements. Later, the patient filed a notice of appeal, challenging the constitutionality of the statutory cap, and the hospital filed a conditional cross-appeal regarding allocation of damages.The Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that by accepting full payment of the amended judgment and filing a satisfaction—without reserving any right to appeal—the patient waived her right to appeal. The court clarified that in non-divorce cases, voluntarily accepting the full amount of a judgment without expressly preserving any appellate issues constitutes waiver of the right to appeal. As a result, both the patient’s appeal and the hospital’s cross-appeal were dismissed. The court expressly abrogated any contrary rule suggested by the earlier decision in Tyler v. Shea, 4 N.D. 377, 61 N.W. 468 (1894). View "Cowan v. Slann" on Justia Law

Three minor children and their grandfather brought negligence, wrongful-death, and professional-malpractice claims related to the death of Luke Laducer, who died while in custody at the Cass County Jail. Laducer had been taken to a hospital after attempting suicide but was medically cleared and then jailed. He was found unresponsive later that day and died of hemorrhagic gastritis and colitis. The plaintiffs previously filed a federal lawsuit, where the state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice due to failure to serve an expert affidavit as required by North Dakota law, and the constitutional claims were decided on summary judgment.After the federal litigation, the plaintiffs, now omitting Laducer’s adult relatives and including additional defendants, filed this action in the District Court of Cass County. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred by res judicata and the two-year statute of limitations. The District Court granted the motion, finding both bars applicable, and entered judgment dismissing the case with prejudice.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and held that res judicata did not apply because the prior federal court dismissal of the state-law claims was without prejudice and did not constitute a decision on the merits. Additionally, the Court held that the disability provisions of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-25 tolled the statute of limitations for the plaintiffs, who were minors or imprisoned at the time the claims accrued, and that the statutory time caps had not been exceeded. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "L.G.L. v. County of Cass" on Justia Law

A man filed a negligence lawsuit against two relatives who operated a farm, after he suffered serious injuries from carbon monoxide exposure while repairing a furnace in their shop. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants used a portable propane heater, not designed for indoor use, to warm the shop, which created a dangerous buildup of carbon monoxide. The plaintiff claimed he was unaware of the danger and was injured as a result. Testimony at trial established that the plaintiff had a longstanding relationship with the defendants, performed occasional repairs for them, and that others present in the shop around the same time did not experience symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning. Both sides presented expert witnesses on the issue of causation.The District Court of Barnes County, Southeast Judicial District, held a jury trial. The jury returned a verdict finding the defendants were not negligent, and the court entered judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claim. The court also awarded the defendants costs and disbursements, including expert witness fees, ultimately reducing the amount requested after considering the reasonableness of the fees. The plaintiff did not file any post-trial motions.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the plaintiff could not raise for the first time on appeal the argument that the jury’s verdict was against the greater weight of the evidence, as he had not preserved this issue by a post-trial motion. The court also found no reversible error in the district court’s refusal to give plaintiff’s requested jury instructions regarding duty of care and regulatory violations, concluding the instructions given were adequate and appropriate. Lastly, the court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding expert witness fees. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Alber v. Rodin" on Justia Law

The plaintiff received medical care at Sanford medical facilities in Fargo, North Dakota, in April 2022. He alleged that Sanford and its staff, including nurse Shannon Mulinex, refused to provide him pain medication, verbally abused and humiliated him, failed to investigate his complaints, engaged in a pattern of hostile conduct, and discharged him against his wishes. Based on these events, he brought six claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), as well as claims for general negligence, defamation, discrimination, and violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, reviewed the case after Sanford moved for summary judgment. Sanford argued that the plaintiff failed to serve an expert affidavit within three months as required by North Dakota law for professional negligence claims, and that the IIED claims did not allege conduct sufficiently extreme and outrageous. The district court denied the plaintiff’s oral motion for a continuance, finding he had received adequate notice of the hearing. The court granted summary judgment, dismissing all claims, concluding that several IIED claims required an expert affidavit and the remaining IIED claims did not meet the legal threshold for extreme and outrageous conduct. A supplemental order granted summary judgment to Mulinex for the same reasons.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s amended judgment. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance, that the plaintiff had not preserved the issue of additional discovery for appeal, and that the requirement for an expert affidavit applied to IIED claims involving medical decisions. The court further held that the conduct alleged in the remaining IIED claims did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct as a matter of law. The amended judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "McMahon v. Sanford" on Justia Law

The Anne Carlsen Center (ACC) petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court for a supervisory writ after the district court granted plaintiff A.K.-W.'s motion to compel discovery of documents that ACC claimed were not subject to disclosure. The case arose from an alleged sexual assault of A.K.-W., an autistic child, by an ACC employee. The plaintiff's grandmother and adoptive parent, Lisa Wibstad, noticed signs of trauma and sought medical care, leading to a Sexual Assault Nurse Examination (SANE) that documented injuries consistent with sexual contact. The employee was placed on administrative leave and later terminated, but criminal charges were dismissed for lack of probable cause. Wibstad then filed a civil suit against ACC.The district court ordered an in-camera review of the disputed documents and subsequently granted the motion to compel, concluding that the asserted privileges did not apply. The court ordered the documents to be re-designated from "sealed" to "confidential." ACC then sought a supervisory writ from the North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing that the district court's order was contrary to law and created an injustice without an adequate alternative remedy.The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the district court erred by not explaining why the asserted privileges did not apply and by not addressing necessary or agreed-upon redactions. The court noted that the district court's order lacked sufficient detail for meaningful review and directed the district court to vacate its order and enter a new order that addresses redactions and explains the decision on a document-by-document, privilege-by-privilege basis. The Supreme Court emphasized the need for specificity in claims of privilege and the importance of providing readable documents for review. View "Anne Carlsen Center v. LeFevre" on Justia Law

Prisca Fagnon petitioned for a disorderly conduct restraining order against Ndorleh Ngaima, alleging harassment on social media, stalking, threats with a knife, and physical violence resulting in a broken nose. A temporary restraining order was issued, and a hearing was held on February 18, 2025. Both parties testified, with Fagnon presenting evidence of a physical assault by Ngaima on July 24, 2023. Ngaima denied the allegations.The District Court of Stutsman County, Southeast Judicial District, found Fagnon's testimony credible and supported by photographic evidence of her injuries. The court determined that the act of physical violence constituted disorderly conduct and issued a restraining order for two years. Ngaima appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by issuing the order without reasonable grounds and that the findings were inadequate.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case, noting that the standard for issuing a disorderly conduct restraining order requires reasonable grounds to believe the respondent engaged in disorderly conduct. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion, as the evidence of physical violence was relevant and sufficient to support the restraining order. The court also addressed the time and distance factors, concluding that the severity of the conduct and the need for controlled contact between the parties justified the order.The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the findings were adequate and supported by the evidence. The court emphasized that physical violence is generally intended to adversely affect the safety, security, and privacy of another person, and the district court's credibility determinations were upheld. View "Fagnon v. Ngaima" on Justia Law

Jacob Severson sought treatment from Dr. Shabnum Gupta at a Sanford facility in Fargo for the removal of four genital warts using cryotherapy. Following the procedure, Severson experienced blistering and scarring in the genital area and returned to Sanford multiple times for treatment. He later sought mental health support, claiming the procedure caused his issues. Severson also visited a dermatologist for additional warts and was referred to the urology department for a physical abnormality. In January 2024, Severson filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Sanford and Dr. Gupta.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied Severson's motion to amend his complaint. Severson argued that his claim fell under exceptions to the North Dakota Century Code (N.D.C.C.) § 28-01-46, which requires an expert affidavit in medical negligence cases. He claimed his case involved an "obvious occurrence" of negligence, which does not require expert testimony. The district court disagreed, finding that the intricacies of cryotherapy and its potential adverse effects were not within the knowledge of a layperson and that the wrong organ exception did not apply.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Severson's claim did not meet the "obvious occurrence" exception and that he failed to provide the required expert affidavit within three months of commencing the lawsuit. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Severson's motion to amend his complaint to allege medical battery, as the amendment would have been futile based on the existing record. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Severson v. Gupta" on Justia Law

Joe and Lora Killoran, along with their businesses, Maple Valley Ag Products, LLC, and Maple Valley Ag Chemicals, Inc., sued Kip Kaler for slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and unlawful interference with business. The Killorans alleged that Kaler made defamatory statements during Co-op meetings, calling them "crooks and thieves" and advising others not to do business with them. These statements allegedly caused significant reputational harm, economic losses, and mental distress to the Killorans and their businesses.The District Court of Cass County dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court found that the slander claim was not well-pled, as the Killorans failed to provide sufficient factual support for the statements made by Kaler and did not adequately plead the falsity of the statements. The IIED claim was dismissed because the court determined that Kaler's conduct was not extreme and outrageous enough to permit recovery. The unlawful interference with business claim was dismissed due to the lack of an independent tort to support it, following the dismissal of the slander and IIED claims.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the IIED claim, agreeing that Kaler's conduct did not meet the threshold for extreme and outrageous behavior. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the slander claim, finding that the district court had improperly applied the pleading standards and failed to accept the allegations as true. The court also reversed the dismissal of the unlawful interference with business claim, as the potential for an independent tort (slander) existed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Killoran v. Kaler" on Justia Law

Kristine Gail Walden and Shay Alan Walden were married in April 2016 and separated in June 2020. Kristine initiated divorce proceedings in September 2022. At the time of the trial in December 2023, Kristine was 54 and worked part-time, while Shay, 53, was self-employed. The district court heard testimony about their assets, debts, and the conduct leading to the breakdown of their marriage, including domestic violence by Shay that resulted in a permanent eye injury to Kristine. The court divided the marital property and debt, ordered Shay to pay spousal support of $1,000 per month for seven years, property payments totaling $43,587, and attorney’s fees of $8,350. Shay was also assigned a debt of $35,433.66 incurred after the divorce proceedings began.The district court awarded spousal support based on the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, considering the parties' ages, earning abilities, health, and financial circumstances. The court found Kristine had a monthly income of $2,400 and expenses of $6,400, while Shay had a gross monthly income of $12,500 and expenses of $5,017. The court concluded Kristine needed spousal support and Shay had the ability to pay without undue hardship. Shay’s argument that the court deviated from statutory limits for spousal support was dismissed as the applicable version of the statute was correctly applied.The court’s property and debt distribution was found to be equitable, considering the short-term nature of the marriage and the contributions of each party. Shay’s arguments against the distribution of the marital home’s equity and Kristine’s medical debt were rejected. The court’s decision to assign Shay the debt incurred after the divorce proceedings was also upheld.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the court did not clearly err in its findings and that the award of attorney’s fees was justified based on Shay’s actions that increased the costs of the proceedings. View "Walden v. Walden" on Justia Law