Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") appealed a district court's judgment reversing an administrative law judge's ("ALJ") order, which affirmed WSI's order denying Ronald Kershaw's work injury claim. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in reversing the administrative law judge's order. The ALJ's decision was reinstated. View "Kershaw v. WSI" on Justia Law

Shealeen Hillerson, as "best friend" to T.D., a minor child, and T.D. appealed from a summary judgment dismissing their negligence lawsuit against the Missouri Valley Family YMCA for injuries T.D. suffered in a near-drowning accident while participating in a YMCA summer program. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the waiver of liability signed by T.D.'s mother was ambiguous, a question of fact existed as to the intent of the parties. Accordingly, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hillerson v. Bismarck Public Schools" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant John Schmitt appealed the dismissal of his claims against MeritCare Health System for defamation, tortious interference with a prospective business advantage, and violation of state antitrust law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiff's allegations lacked merit, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims. View "Schmitt v. MeritCare Health System" on Justia Law

Michelle and Tony Tweten brought an action against COUNTRY Preferred Insurance Company and American National Property and Casualty Company ("ANPAC"), seeking the full amount of underinsured motorist coverage from both insurance companies. The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota certified a question to the North Dakota Supreme Court that called for an interpretation of the Twetens' policies under North Dakota law. The federal court asked whether the Twetens as a divorced couple with separate insurance policies, were foreclosed from recovering up to the full amount of underinsured motorist benefits from their respective policies under the 'other insurance' clause contained in each policy and the statutory anti-stacking provisions of NDCC Ch. 26.1-40 following the death of their son in a car accident. The North Dakota Supreme Court answered the question "Yes." View "Tweten v. COUNTRY Preferred Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Petitioner Allen Davenport appealed a judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") decision to terminate benefits on his claim for treatment of his cervical spine and left shoulder and denying his claims for benefits for treatment of his anxiety and depression and lower back condition. He argued his anxiety and depression and his cervical spine, left shoulder and back conditions were "compensable injuries." Upon further review, the Supreme Court concluded Davenport failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that work incidents subject to this claim substantially accelerated the progression of, or substantially worsened the severity of, his existing conditions and that his physical injury caused at least 50 percent of his anxiety and depression. View "Davenport v. WSI" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Wotzka was a guest at the Radisson Hotel. While taking a shower, he slipped and fell out of the shower. Wotzka sued the Hotel, claiming the Hotel maintained a dangerous condition on its premises by failing to equip the shower with a non-skid strip, a bathmat, or a handrail at the shower level. The Hotel moved for summary judgment, arguing it was under no duty to provide a non-skid strip, a bathmat, or a handrail in its showers. The Hotel also argued it had no duty to warn of the open and obvious dangers of a slippery shower. Wotzka appealed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Hotel. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court misapplied the law of this case, and erroneously granted summary judgment because Wotzka raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the Radisson Hotel should have anticipated harm despite the obvious or known nature of the danger and failed to maintain the property in a reasonably safe manner. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Wotzka v. Minndakota Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

Workforce Safety & Insurance (WSI) appealed a district court's judgment reversing its denial of worker's compensation benefits to claimant Brenda Albright. Albright submitted her claim to WSI for a work-related back injury. Albright had a history of back problems; an independent medical records review of Albright's case showed she had "well-documented multilevel degenerative disk pathology" which contributed to the claim at issue here. The ALJ hearing Albright's case concluded her injury was not the result of a single incident, and denied her application for benefits. Finding that the evidence in the record supported the ALJ's decision to deny Albright's application for benefits, the Supreme Court reversed the district court, affirmed the ALJ and reinstated WSI's order denying benefits. View "Albright v. ND Workforce Safety & Ins" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of April 11, 2008, Jeremy Rustad and Heidi Hanna were killed in a plane crash in McLean County. Rustad was piloting his Cessna aircraft and Hanna was a passenger when the plane crashed. The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable causes of the accident were due to pilot error and pilot impairment due to alcohol. The estate published a notice to creditors of Rustad for three successive weeks beginning May 22, 2008, informing them they had three months to file claims. On September 24, 2008, Olson, as "co-personal representative of the estate of Heidi Hanna, deceased, caretaker of [B.H.], a minor, and temporary guardian of [B.H.], a minor," filed a claim against the estate asserting the estate was indebted to Hanna's estate and to Hanna's children. The estate "disallowed" Olson's claim. In early 2009, Olson filed this wrongful death and survival action against the estate. The estate moved for summary judgment dismissing the action. The estate argued Olson's claims were barred because she did not serve the personal representative in that capacity and the failure to present her claims in the probate action made them res judicata. The estate also argued Olson could not show Hanna was injured before Rustad died, and therefore, both the wrongful death and survivor claims were barred under the nonclaim provisions of the Probate Code. The district court rejected the estate's arguments that service of process was insufficient and that the action was barred by res judicata. The court concluded Olson presented no evidence to show Hanna died before Rustad, and dismissed the wrongful death and survival actions because they were barred by the nonclaim provisions of the Probate Code. The district court further noted Rustad had an aircraft insurance policy and the nonclaim provisions did not prevent Olson from recovering to the extent of insurance coverage available for the accident. The court ruled the language in the insurance policy unambiguously limited coverage under the circumstances to $103,000, and a judgment was entered in favor of Olson for $103,000. The Estate appealed; the Supreme Court, after review of the trial court record, affirmed. View "Olson v. Estate of Rustad" on Justia Law

Carol Johnson appealed the denial of her motions for summary judgment, to amend her complaint, and the grant of the defendants' summary judgment motions for various claims related to her involuntary hospitalization. Johnson also appealed an order denying her motion for reconsideration and an order denying her objections to the district court's award of costs and disbursements to the defendants. In 2009, Johnson, a formerly licensed attorney in California appearing pro se, sued Dr. Natalya Bronson, Registered Nurse B.R. Clark, Prairie St. John's Hospital, John Does 1-100, Jane Does 1-100 (collectively "Medical Defendants"), and Attorney Steven Mottinger after being involuntarily hospitalized. Her claims against the Medical Defendants essentially asserted that because "[a]t all material times, [she] was without mental defect or disease of any kind whatsoever," the Medical Defendants had no authority to involuntarily commit her. Johnson's claims against Mottinger asserted that he committed legal malpractice in his representation of Johnson and was also liable for false imprisonment and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Johnson alleged that, as a result of Mottinger and the Medical Defendants' conduct, she was subjected to numerous electronic hazards and suffered "severe and serious injuries and monetary damages." Johnson sought compensatory damages for costs related to medical care and treatment, pain and suffering, and the "loss of the enjoyment of life." Johnson sought damages in excess of $10,000,000 for lost wages and reduced earning capacity, asserting her ability to reenter the legal profession had been destroyed due to the stigma of being civilly committed. Finding no reason to overturn the trial court's decisions to deny Johnson's motions, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Johnson v. Bronson" on Justia Law

Michael Jassek appealed a district court judgment that affirmed the binding dispute resolution decision of Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") that denied payment for a myoelectric prosthesis. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore vacated the judgment. Jassek contended that because WSI failed to explain its reasons for disregarding the medical evidence favorable to Jassek, its binding dispute resolution decision was arbitrary, and that WSI's binding dispute resolution procedure violated his right to due process because it failed to provide a formal hearing. The language of N.D.C.C. 65-02-20 unambiguously provides that "[a] dispute resolution decision under this section requested by a medical provider concerning . . . a request for . . . treatment is not reviewable by any court." The statute based appealability on the identity of the party who requests binding dispute resolution, not on who appeals the binding dispute resolution decision. Jassek’s orthotist was a "medical provider," and this dispute concernd "a request for diagnostic tests or treatment," specifically the determination of an appropriate prosthetic device. Accordingly, WSI's decision on the medical provider’s request for binding dispute resolution was not reviewable by the district court, the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction, and the judgment affirming WSI's decision was void. View "Jassek v. Workforce Safety and Insurance" on Justia Law