Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the city of Cuyahoga Falls was immune from liability, pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2744, in an action brought by a minor and his parents after the minor was injured at an indoor swimming pool maintained by the city. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city on the ground that indoor swimming pools do not fall under section 2744.02(B)(4), which sets forth an exception to immunity for injury caused by negligence of a political subdivision's employee within or on the grounds of a building used in connection with a governmental function. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the pool was in a building used in connection with the performance of a governmental function, and therefore, the exception to political-subdivision tort immunity applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the city was not immune from liability because the exception to immunity contained in Ohio Rev. Code 2744.02(B)(4) was applicable. View "M.H. v. City of Cuyahoga Falls" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were skiing and Defendant was snowboarding at the same resort when Defendant and one of Plaintiffs collided, injuring Plaintiff. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant and his parents, alleging that Defendant had acted negligently, carelessly, recklessly, willfully, and wantonly in causing the collision. The trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to determined whether Defendant had violated any duties under Ohio Rev. Code 4169.08 or 4169.09 and if he did, whether negligence per se applied. The court also held that a genuine issue of material fact existed whether Defendant was reckless. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on somewhat different grounds, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact, but only as to whether Defendant's actions were more than negligent, that is, whether his actions were reckless or intentional under the common law. View "Horvath v. Ish" on Justia Law

Appellee was working as an apprentice lineman for Appellant, an electrical-utility construction contractor, when he came into contact with an energized line and received an electric shock, which caused severe burns. Appellee filed this action against Appellant, alleging workplace intentional tort in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2745.01 and common law. He alleged that Appellant knew with substantial certainty that he would be injured when working alone in an elevated lift bucket near energized high-voltage power lines without the use of protective rubber gloves and sleeves. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) protective rubber gloves and sleeves are personal items that an employee controls and do not constitute "an equipment safety guard" for purposes of section 2745.01(C), and an employee's failure to use them, or an employer's failure to require an employee to use them, does not constitute the deliberate removal by an employer of an equipment safety guard; and (2) consequently, Appellee failed to establish a rebuttable presumption of intent pursuant to section 2745.01(C), and Appellant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Hewitt v. L.E. Myers Co." on Justia Law

Appellant filed an application for permanent total disability (PTD). The Industrial Commission of Ohio found Appellant was capable of sedentary sustained remunerative employment and denied her request for PTD. Appellant filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion. The court of appeals denied the mandamus action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission's conclusion that Appellant's allowed conditions did not foreclose sustained remunerative employment was not an abuse of discretion; (2) the Commission did not abuse its discretion in failing to view Appellant's rehabilitation efforts favorably; and (3) the Commission did not improperly factor the economic climate into the PTD equation. View "State ex rel. Guthrie v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

Certain individuals who worked for American Chemical Society (ACS) founded Leadscope Inc. and later received a patent for technology similar to that on which they worked while at ACS. ACS filed a lawsuit against Leadscope. A newspaper subsequently published an article about the suit quoting ACS's counsel. In pertinent part, the jury returned verdicts in favor of Leadscope on its counterclaims for defamation and unfair competition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) upheld the appellate court's decision affirming the trial court's denial of ACS's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the unfair competition claim, holding (i) a party alleging a claim for unfair competition must show the action is baseless and the opposing party had the intent to injure the party's ability to be competitive, and (ii) the jury instructions here did not meet that test, but the jury could not reasonably have made any other determination with proper instructions; and (2) reversed the appellate court's finding that the trial court properly overruled ACS's motion for JNOV on Leadscope's counterclaim for defamation, holding (i) ACS's statements were not defamatory, and (ii) a client is vicariously liable for its attorney's defamatory statements only if the client ratified the statements. View "Am. Chem. Soc'y v. Leadscope, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, Craig Ali was a police officer for appellant, the village of Oakwood. That spring, his department assigned him to perform traffic-control duties on a highway-construction project overseen by appellee, Kokosing Construction Company, Inc. Ali was injured while performing those duties. At issue was which entity was Ali's employer for purposes of his workers' compensation claim. A district hearing officer with the Industrial Commission of Ohio found that Kokosing was Ali's employer at the time of injury. A staff hearing officer reversed, finding the correct employer was Oakwood Village. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the commission, when confronted with two potential employers, may, but is not required to, use any of the State ex rel. Lord v. Daugherty and Fisher v. Mayfield factors it believes will assist analysis; (2) therefore, the commission did not abuse its discretion by not directly discussing the three enumerated Lord/Fisher factors; and (3) the staff hearing officer's decision was supported by evidence in the record.

Appellee received temporary total disability compensation (TTC) for a period of a year and a half during which time Appellee also helped his wife with her business. Appellee was not paid for his services. Appellant Industrial Commission of Ohio learned of these activities, determined that they constituted "work," and concluded that TTC should not have been paid. Accordingly, the TTC award was vacated and overpayment was declared. In addition, the Commission found McBee had committed fraud by submitting disability paperwork during the relevant time period, in which Appellee certified he was not working. The court of appeals overturned the finding of fraud after concluding that the evidence did not prove McBee knew that his unpaid activities for his wife's company constituted "work" for purposes of TTC eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no evidence that McBee knowingly misled the Commission because there was no evidence McBee knew his unpaid activities constituted work that would preclude TTC.

Appellant had an allowed workers' compensation claim arising from a 2002 injury. Appellant retired from Appellee a year later and never worked again. In 2009, the Industrial Commission of Ohio denied Appellant's application for temporary total disability compensation (TTC) after finding, among other things, that Appellant had abandoned the work force for reasons unrelated to his injury. Appellant subsequently filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion in denying TTC. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant could not credibly assert that he had lost income due to his industrial injury, and therefore, the Commission did not err in denying TTC.

Appellants were defendants in a tort action instituted by Appellees, executors of a decedent's estate. Appellees' complaint alleged, inter alia, negligence, violation of the Ohio Nursing Home Patients' Bill of Rights, and wrongful death. Appellants filed motions to bifurcate the trial to separate Appellees' claims for compensatory damages from their claims for punitive damages. The common pleas court denied the motions. The court of appeals dismissed Appellants' appeal for lack of a final, appealable order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in dismissing the appeal, as the trial court's order denying Appellants' motions to bifurcate the trial constituted a final, appealable order pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2505.02(B)(6). Remanded for application of Havel v. Villa St. Joseph.

Paula Eastley, as the administrator of the estate of her son, Steven Hieneman, filed an amended complaint against Dr. Paul Volkman and Tri-State Healthcare, LLC, the clinic where Volkman practiced, and Denise Huffman, doing business as Tri-State Health Care. The jury found that Volkman's medical malpractice and Huffman's negligence had proximately caused Hieneman's death, and the trial court entered judgment in Eastley's favor. The court of appeals affirmed. Although two of the three judges on the court found that based on an ordinary negligence theory, the jury's verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, a dissenting judge prevented a reversal by concluding that because Huffman had not renewed her motion for a directed verdict or filed a motion for new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, she had forfeited all but plain error review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when the evidence to be considered is in the court's record, motions are not required to challenge manifest weight of the evidence on appeal; and (2) in civil cases, the sufficiency of the evidence is quantitatively and qualitatively different from the weight of the evidence. Remanded for consideration of the issue based upon the appropriate standard.