Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

After Employee, an electrician, received a work-related injury, Employee sought additional workers' compensation benefits, alleging that Employer committed a violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), which proximately caused his industrial injury. The requirement in question directs employers to supply protective apparatus to employees working on specified electrical equipment. A staff hearing officer (SHO) for the Industrial Commission of Ohio granted Employee's VSSR application after finding that Employer had violated Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-5-12(A). Employer filed a complaint in mandamus, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in finding a VSSR. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employer violated section 4123:1-5-12(A) because it did not supply Employee with protective equipment for the main breaker cabinet Employer worked on when he was injured.

David Barno, a temporary worker on a construction project, alleged that he was injured as a result of Ruscilli Construction Company's violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR) pertaining to floor openings on construction sites. After a workers' compensation claim was allowed, Barno filed an application for additional compensation with Industrial Commission of Ohio, alleging a violation of Ohio Admin. Code 4123:1-3-04(D). A Commission staff hearing officer (SHO) found that Ruscilli had violated section 4123:1-3-04(D)(1). The court of appeals vacated the SHO's order and remanded the cause to the Commission, finding that the order misinterpreted the applicable safety requirement and that it was based on significant mistakes of fact. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the SHO's order contained at least four major errors involving both law and fact, and therefore, the order was premised in findings that lacked evidentiary support.

Kenneth Schwering and his wife were driving a Ford when they were involved in a traffic accident. Schwering's wife was killed and Schwering was injured. Both were wearing their seatbelts. Schwering filed a complaint against Ford Motor Company and TRW Safety Systems, asserting products-liability and negligence claims. After the case proceeded to a jury trial, the trial judge declared a mistrial. Before the second trial began, Schwering filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 41(A)(1)(a). Schwering subsequently filed a lawsuit in the U.S. district court, asserting the same claims against the same defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss the federal action, arguing that Schwering's voluntary dismissal of the state action did not occur "before the commencement of trial" as required by Rule Civ. R. 41(A)(1)(a), and thus the dismissal could not have been "without prejudice." The Supreme Court accepted certification from the U.S. district court and held that a plaintiff may not voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(A)(1)(a) when a trial court declares a mistrial after the jury has been empaneled and trial has commenced.

While receiving permanent total disability compensation, Appellant Donald McNea's was engaged in the illegal sale of narcotics. Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio terminated McNea's benefits after finding that he had engaged in sustained remunerative employment while receiving those benefits. McNea filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals. The court found no abuse of discretion had occurred and denied the writ. McNea appealed, challenging the Commission's finding that he was performing, or capable of performing, sustained remunerative work while receiving benefits, a determination that generated a declaration of overpayment for compensation paid during that period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in characterizing McNea's remunerative employment as sustained, and the Commission did not violate McNea's due process rights by terminating his benefits while he was in prison.

Rick Warner was a construction worker who had periods of unemployment each year that were the result of seasonal layoffs. After being injured at work, Warner asked the Industrial Commission of Ohio to establish his average weekly wage (AWW) for the purpose of awarding future compensation. At issue was the treatment to be accorded those weeks of unemployment in calculating Warner's AWW. A commission staff hearing officer excluded from the wage total the amount of unemployment compensation received but included in the weekly divisor the number of weeks that Warner did not work. The court of appeals subsequently issued a limited writ of mandamus ordering the commission to further consider Warner's request. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals judgment ordering further consideration of the adequacy of Warner's job search, as, in setting the AWW, any period of unemployment due to causes beyond the employee's control shall be eliminated from the weekly divisor; and (2) reversed the portion of the court of appeals judgment ordering the commission to include the amount of Warner's unemployment compensation from his wage total.

Appellants, homeowners, filed suit against Centex Homes, alleging various causes of action, including breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranty, and failure to perform in a workmanlike manner. Centex Homes moved for summary judgment, arguing that Appellants had waived all warranties except the specific limited warranty that Centex Homes provided in the sales agreements. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for a trial on Appellants' tort claims that Centex Homes breached its duty to construct their homes in a workmanlike manner using ordinary care, as (1) in Ohio a duty to construct houses in a workmanlike manner using ordinary care is imposed by law on all home builders; and (2) a home buyer cannot waive his right to enforce the home builder's duty to construct the house in a workmanlike manner. Remanded.

Employee filed a workers' compensation claim against Employer, which was denied by the Industrial Commission. Employee filed a notice of appeal but failed to name as an appellee the administrator of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation. Employee later filed a motion for leave to amend his petition, this time naming the administrator as a party pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512. The court of common pleas dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and denied Employee's motion to amend his petition. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Employee's failure to name the administrator in the notice of appeal did not deprive the court of common pleas of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 4123.412's requirements that a party appealing from an Industrial Commission order name the administrator as a party of the appeal and serve the administrator with notice of the appeal are not jurisdictional requirements; and (2) Employee perfected his appeal by amending the complaint to name the administrator as a party and then notifying him by serving him with a copy of the amended complaint, thus vesting the common pleas court with jurisdiction to rule on his motion to amend.

Lisa Mullins, the widow and administrator of the estate of Charles Mullins, filed a complaint against Appellants, a doctor and a medical facility, alleging negligence in the treatment of Charles that resulted in his death. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the estate. The court of appeals remanded the matter, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on Lisa's alleged contributory negligence and denying Appellants' motion for a new trial. On remand, Lisa filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge sitting in the court of common pleas from retrying the issue of the medical negligence of Appellants at a second jury trial. The court of appeals granted the writ to prevent the judge from retrying the negligence issue in the case against Appellants. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and denied the writ, holding that the court erred in determining that a retrial of the negligence claim against Appellants patently and unambiguously violated the court's mandate in the prior appeal.

Employee alleged that his political-subdivision Employer committed an intentional tort against him and engaged in negligent conduct. Employer filed a motion for summary judgment on the claims, alleging immunity from suit under the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act. The trial court denied the motion, concluding (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed, and (2) the express exception to immunity contained in the Act did not apply because Employee's claims did not arise out of the employment relationship. The appellate court affirmed and concluded that the express exception to immunity in the Act prevented Employer from raising immunity pursuant to the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the exception to the Act removed the protection of immunity for a political-subdivision employer for injuries to its employees that arise out of the employment relationship, and a political subdivision was at risk for liability in intentional-tort suits that satisfied the terms of Ohio Rev. Code 2745.01.

Employee injured his back while working for Employer. Employee returned to light-duty work but complained about his job duties. Employer offered him another position within his physical limitations, but Employee resigned. Employee subsequently filed a motion for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. The Industrial Commission of Ohio initially denied the request. After Employee's claim was additionally allowed for another medical condition, Employee filed a new motion for TTD benefits. The Commission awarded Employee benefits based on new and changed circumstances from the Commission's previous order. The court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to vacate its second order and to enter an order denying TTD compensation, concluding that the Commission had abused its discretion when it relied on the additionally allowed medical condition as a new and changed circumstance since the previous order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee did not present evidence to justify the Commission's exercise of continuing jurisdiction; and (2) Employee was ineligible to receive TTD compensation for the period requested because his injury was not the reason that he could not return to his former position of employment.