Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Travis Carpenter, a Clinton Township police officer, was involved in a motor vehicle accident outside his own jurisdiction while responding to a general dispatch call for assistance from an officer in another jurisdiction. The passenger in the vehicle that collided with Carpenter's vehicle filed a personal-injury suit naming as defendants, inter alia, Carpenter and Clinton Township. The trial court granted summary judgment to Carpenter and Clinton Township, concluding that they were entitled to immunity under Ohio Rev. Code 2744 because Carpenter was on an emergency call for purposes of the statute as he had a professional obligation to respond to the dispatch. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Carpenter could be considered to have been on an emergency call at the time of the accident for purposes of chapter 2744 when the evidence was insufficient to establish the existence of a mutual-aid agreement between the jurisdictions because application of the immunity statutes in this case did not depend on whether a mutual-aid agreement existed.

Employee splashed bleach in her left eye while working for Employer. While Employee lost little vision as a result of the accident, Employee experienced other complications, including light sensitivity and reduced depth perception. Employee subsequently underwent a corneal transplant. Employee sought scheduled-loss compensation under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57(B), alleging she had sustained a total loss of vision in her left eye due to the removal of her cornea. A staff hearing officer for Industrial Commission of Ohio agreed and awarded Employee a total loss of use. Employer filed a complaint in mandamus. The court of appeals issued a writ ordering the commission to vacate its order, concluding that the commission had abused its discretion in awarding compensation for a total loss of vision. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals pursuant to State ex rel. Baker v. Coast to Coast Manpower, L.L.C.

After Employee was fired by Employer, Employee filed an action against Employer, claiming wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Employee argued that he was fired because he had expressed concerns about the safety of Employer's workplace to outside parties. Employer asserted it terminated Employee for insubordination. The trial court granted summary judgment to Employer, concluding that Employee failed to articulate a clear specific public policy that was jeopardized by his termination. The appellate court reversed, holding that there was a clear public policy favoring fire safety in the workplace and that retaliation against employees who raise concerns over fire safety violates public policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employee did not articulate a clear public policy applicable to his claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.

This case arose because the settlement of a personal-injury suit brought by a recipient of workers' compensation benefits against a third-party tortfeasor did not make any provision to repay the statutory subrogee, the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation. The Bureau brought suit against both the recipient of the workers' compensation benefits and third-party tortfeasor under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.931(G) to recover the full amount of its subrogation interest. The trial court held that a two-year limitations period applied and that it had expired. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a six-year limitations period applied and that it had not yet run out. At issue on appeal was whether a claim under section 4123.931(G) brought by a statutory subrogee to recover its subrogation interest is subject to a two-year statute of limitations, the same period applicable to the injured worker's personal-injury suit against the third party, or to a six-year statute of limitations for an action on a liability created by statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the claim in this case was an action upon a liability created by statute and that the statute of limitations was six years.

Appellants, PNH Inc. and Ronald Creatore, filed an action against Alfa Laval Flow, Inc., which manufactures equipment for sanitary processing of food and beverages, for abuse of process and tortious interference with a contract. Appellants asserted that Alfa Laval Flow misused an involuntary-bankruptcy case it filed against its distributor in an effort to eliminate Creatore as a competitor in the sale of equipment for sanitary processing of food and beverages. The trial court dismissed the claims. The Seventh District affirmed, holding that federal law preempts state-law causes of action alleging the abuse of bankruptcy proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the United States Bankruptcy Code preempts state-law claims that allow the recovery of damages for misconduct committed by a litigant during bankruptcy proceedings.

Virginia King was injured in an automobile accident and was treated for her injuries at Toledo Hospital. Although King informed the hospital staff that she was covered by a health-insuring corporation, the hospital billed King's automobile insurer for the services rendered. King sued the hospital and ProMedica Health System (Appellants). Each of King's causes of action was based on the claim that Appellants violated Ohio Rev. Code. 1751.60(A) by billing the automobile insurer instead of the health-insuring corporation. Section 1751.60(A) stated that every provider that contracts with a health-insuring corporation to provide health-care services to an insured shall seek payment solely from the corporation. The trial court granted Appellants' motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals reversed. At issue on appeal was whether section 1751.60(A) prohibited a provider from seeking payment for medical treatment rendered to an insured injured in an automobile accident from the insured's automobile insurance medical benefits. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) section 1751.60(A) applies only when a health-care provider seeks payment from an insured, and (2) section 1751.60(A) does not conflict with Ohio's law on the coordination of insurance benefits.

The Industrial Commission of Ohio found that Angela Benedetti, Inc. (ABI) violated two newly added specific safety requirements that resulted in an injury to an ABI employee. ABI filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in permitting the injured employee to amend his specific safety requirement violations application and in finding violations of the specific safety requirements. The court of appeals upheld the Commission's order and denied the writ. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the reasoning provided by the court of appeals but not given in this opinion.

Larry Engel filed a medical-malpractice suit in the county court of common pleas against Dr. Marek Skoskiewicz, who practiced general surgery at a county hospital. Skoskiewicz asserted he was entitled to personal immunity pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 9.86 because, at the time of the surgeries, he was acting in his capacity as a volunteer clinical instructor of the University of Toledo College of Medicine and was therefore an officer or employee of the state. Accordingly, Engel filed a malpractice action against the College of Medicine in the court of claims, which possesses exclusive jurisdiction over personal-immunity claims, and sought a determination as to whether Skoskiewicz was entitled to personal immunity as a state employee. The court of common pleas stayed Engel's malpractice suit pending resolution of the personal-immunity issue. The court concluded that Skoskiewicz had performed the operations as a state employee and therefore was entitled to personal immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Skoskiewicz was not an employee of the College of Medicine and that he did hold an appointed office or position with the state. Accordingly, Skoskiewicz was not entitled to personal immunity pursuant to the statute. Remanded.

Appellant Juan Lackey, who drove trucks for Penske Truck Leasing Company, injured his knee at work. After surgery was performed, Lackey returned to work and filed retirement papers with Penske. Nothing in his retirement documents indicted that Lackey's retirement was connected to the industrial injury. Following his retirement, Lackey requested temporary total disability compensation (TTC). A district hearing officer for Lackey, the state industrial commission, denied the request, finding Lackey had voluntarily retired for reasons unrelated to his injury and Lackey's retirement constituted a voluntary abandonment of the entire labor market. On appeal, a staff hearing officer affirmed. Lackey appealed to the commission, and the commission denied the appeal. The court of appeals denied Lackey's mandamus action after finding the commission's findings were supported by evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that Lackey's retirement was unrelated to his injury, and, accordingly, Lackey could receive postretirement TTC only if he were gainfully employed elsewhere and prevented from doing that job by his industrial injury.

Appellant Luiz Paneto injured his left foot and ankle at work. After surgery, Paneto still used a cane to walk and had a limp. Paneto moved appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio for scheduled loss compensation, alleging a total loss of use of his left leg. The commission denied the application after finding Paneto's loss of use was not total. After being awarded permanent total disability (PTD) compensation, Paneto reapplied for total-loss-of-use compensation, alleging his PTD award was a new or changed circumstance that warranted reconsideration of the previous denial. The commission disagreed and further appeal was refused. The court of appeals upheld the commission's order. After Paneto filed his notice of appeal the commission terminated Paneto's PTD compensation after learning Paneto concealed his full-time employment. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, finding (1) because the PTD compensation was terminated, it is not a new or changed circumstance sufficient to permit the commission to reopen the issue of scheduled loss benefits; and (2) the evidence supports the commission's determination that Paneto did not have a total loss of use, which negates the need for any further discussion.