Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Fairfield City Schools (Fairfield) sought reimbursement for a total disability compensation award given to one of its employees. Edward Carpenter, Jr. had hypertension since 1995. In 2002, he injured his back while at work. Mr. Carpenterâs injury resulted in a considerable amount of disability compensation. In 2008, Fairfield requested handicap reimbursement from the Ohio Bureau of Workersâ Compensation for at least part of the disability payments it made to Mr. Carpenter. Fairfieldâs application alleged that Mr. Carpenterâs pre-existing hypertension is a cardiac disease that delayed his recovery from back surgery, contributing to prolonged disability payments. The Bureau rejected Fairfieldâs application as âinsufficient to establish cardiac disease as a pre-existing condition.â Fairfield appealed the Bureauâs decision multiple times. With every appeal, Fairfield added additional doctorâs reports and Bureau datasheets to support its argument that hypertension is a cardiac disease. The court of appeals eventually denied Fairfieldâs appeal and application for a writ of mandamus. The appellate court found that the Bureau had exclusive authority to weigh the evidence Fairfield submitted, and the Bureau could find Fairfieldâs evidence insufficient to prove hypertension was a cardiac disease. Fairfield appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court agreed with the Bureauâs and appellate courtâs decisions. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs judgment.

Appellee John Reinhold is an appraiser. He performed appraisals on three properties in 2001 and 2002 that served as collateral for three separate mortgage loans made by Airline Unionâs Mortgage Company (AUM). Appellee completed the last of these appraisals on June 12, 2002. In these various transactions, Appellant Flagstar Bank received and reviewed Appelleeâs appraisals and accordingly purchased the mortgage loans from AUM. These properties were later subjected to foreclosure actions leaving deficiencies on the loans. Flagstar filed a complaint against AUM and Appellee. In the complaint, Flagstar alleged that the three appraisals were materially inaccurate and that the actual fair market value of each of these properties was significantly lower than the appraised values. Appellee denied any professional negligence and filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. Flagstar appealed this decision. The appellate court affirmed the trial courtâs judgment. The Supreme Court found that the record supported the lower courtsâ decisions to grant Appellee summary judgment. The Court disagreed with Flagstar that the state âdelayed damagesâ rule applied in this case, and used the âdiscovery rule.â The Court affirmed the appellate courtâs decision.

Appellee Loudin appeals judgment from the lower court that found that her medical-malpractice claim could survive summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirms the appellate court's holding, and remands the case to the trial court to decide an award of damages for infliction of emotional distress. Appellant received regular breast cancer screenings from Appellant Radiology & Imaging Services, and had always received normal prognoses. During self-examination, Appellee detected a lump that was found to be cancerous. Experts testified the lump grew from one to two centimeters between 2003 and 2004, the years when Appellee received "normal" mammograms. Appellee commenced suit against Appellant asserting medical negligence claims; appellant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Appellants characterized the complaint as one solely for infliction of emotional distress, and that Appellee had not established a medical malpractice claim. Because both parties' arguments relied on facts outside the pleadings, the trial court converted the appellant's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, and granted appellant's motion against all claims for relief in the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding the metastasis of cancer is a compensible physical injury and that the medical negligence claim should have survived summary judgment. The Supreme Court granted this discretionary appeal, and affirmed the appellate court's judgment.

In this appeal, the Supreme Court interpreted an exclusion in a homeowner's insurance policy that denied coverage for claims "arising out of" premises that are owned by the insured, but are not an insured location under the policy. Appellee Westfield Insurance provided Appellants Michael and Marilyn Hunter's insurance on their Ohio home; the Hunters hold an additional policy for any personal liability that arises from bodily injury or property damages. The Hunters also own a farm in Indiana that is not a named insured location under the Westfield policy. The Hunters purchased liability insurance for the Indiana property from co-appellant Grinell Mutual Reinsurance Company. Children playing on the Indiana property suffered bodily injuries on the property, and brought suit against the Hunters for negligence. The Hunters applied to Westfield seeking indemnification under their personal liability policy. Westfield brought a declaratory judgment action against the Hunters and Grinell seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the Hunters for claims asserted in the Indiana lawsuit. At trial, the court reasoned that the claims raised by the injured children "arose out of" premises that were not insured by Westfield, therefore Westfield had no duty to indemnify the Hunters for personal liability claims. Grinnell appealed to the Supreme Court for discretionary review, and secured an order from the appellate court certifying that its decision in this case was in conflict with that of another state appellate court. On review of the lower courts' holdings, the Supreme Court found that the Westfield policy does exclude coverage for claims arising from the Indiana property, or any claims based solely on the insured's ownership of the property on which the injury occurred.