Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A woman with COVID-19 and multiple underlying health conditions was admitted to a hospital and then transferred to a skilled nursing facility for ongoing treatment. During her stay at the facility, she was under the care of a physician who prescribed various treatments for her COVID-19 infection. Despite these interventions, her condition deteriorated, and she developed additional complications, including pressure wounds and dehydration. After being discharged from the facility without hospice or home health arrangements, she was readmitted to the hospital, where her condition continued to decline. She was eventually discharged home under hospice care and died shortly thereafter. Her surviving spouse filed a wrongful death lawsuit, alleging that the facility and physician were negligent in her care.The District Court of Garfield County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that they were immune from liability under both the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparation (PREP) Act and Oklahoma’s COVID-19 Public Health Emergency Limited Liability Act. The district court reasoned that the acts and omissions in question were incident to the provision of care for a COVID-19 patient and thus fell within the scope of the immunity statutes. The plaintiff appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo. It held that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of immunity. The court found that the defendants failed to provide evidence establishing a causal relationship between the administration or use of covered countermeasures and the plaintiff’s injuries, as required for PREP Act immunity. Additionally, the court determined that the defendants did not meet the evidentiary burden to show the requisite impact under the state COVID-19 Act, and that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding gross negligence. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "AUSTBO v. GREENBRIAR" on Justia Law

A mother, acting on behalf of her mentally incapacitated adult daughter, brought suit against a hospital, its health partners, and a registered nurse after her daughter suffered an anoxic brain injury. The injury occurred when the nurse, while cleaning the patient, dislodged the patient’s cuffed tracheostomy tube, which had been placed to treat COVID-19 pneumonia. The tube was out for approximately seven minutes, resulting in cardiac arrest and brain injury. The patient had been admitted with COVID-19 and was receiving oxygen through the tracheostomy at the time of the incident.The defendants moved to dismiss the case in the District Court of Oklahoma County, arguing that the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparation (PREP) Act provided them immunity from suit and liability, thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court considered documentary evidence submitted by the defendants and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff appealed, and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the district court, finding that the trial court had jurisdiction and that the defendants were not immune from suit.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the cuffed tracheostomy was a “covered countermeasure” under the PREP Act, the claims had a causal relationship with the administration and use of that countermeasure, and the defendants qualified as “covered persons.” The court found that the PREP Act confers both immunity from liability and suit for such claims, except for willful misconduct, which must be brought exclusively in federal court. Therefore, Oklahoma courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "FRANKLIN v. OU MEDICINE" on Justia Law

A nursing home resident’s legal representative, acting under a durable power of attorney, sued a nursing home for alleged medical negligence during the resident’s stay. Upon admission, the representative signed several documents, including an agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising from the resident’s care. The representative later claimed not to recall signing the documents but did not dispute her signature. The nursing home moved to compel arbitration based on the signed agreement, which expressly stated it was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The District Court of McCurtain County, Oklahoma, held a hearing on the motion to compel arbitration. The court found that a valid arbitration agreement existed, signed by both an authorized agent of the nursing home and the legal representative. The court determined that the FAA applied due to the involvement of interstate commerce and that the Oklahoma Nursing Home Care Act’s (NHCA) prohibition of arbitration agreements was preempted by federal law. The court granted the nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration and stayed the judicial proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the FAA preempts the NHCA’s categorical prohibition of arbitration agreements in the nursing home context when interstate commerce is involved and the agreement expressly invokes the FAA. The court found the arbitration agreement was validly executed and not unconscionable, distinguishing this case from prior Oklahoma precedent and aligning with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed the district court’s order compelling arbitration. View "Thompsonl v. Heartway Corp." on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought medical care for severe headaches and related symptoms from various providers in Oklahoma and Missouri, including Freeman Health System (FHS) and Dr. Gulshan Uppal in Joplin, Missouri. After multiple visits and treatments, she was ultimately diagnosed with serious neurological conditions and suffered lasting health consequences. She alleged that several healthcare providers, including FHS and Dr. Uppal, negligently diagnosed, treated, and discharged her.She filed suit in the District Court of Ottawa County, Oklahoma, naming multiple defendants. FHS and Dr. Uppal moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing their actions and contacts were insufficient for Oklahoma courts to exercise jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion, finding it lacked both general and specific personal jurisdiction over these defendants, primarily because the relevant treatment occurred in Missouri and the claims did not arise from FHS’s Oklahoma contacts. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the district court erred by only considering whether the suit “arose out of” the defendants’ contacts with Oklahoma, and not whether it “related to” those contacts, as required by the two-pronged standard for specific personal jurisdiction clarified in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana 8th Judicial District Court. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff met her burden regarding FHS’s contacts with Oklahoma, warranting further proceedings to determine if her claims “relate to” those contacts. However, the plaintiff failed to show sufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction over Dr. Uppal. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court’s opinion, affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Dr. Uppal, reversed the dismissal of FHS, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barfell v. Freeman Health System" on Justia Law

An employee alleged a work-related knee injury and filed a timely claim for workers’ compensation benefits, including a request for a hearing. The employer denied the claim, asserting the injury was not work-related. After an independent medical evaluation found the knee pain was due to a preexisting condition, no further medical treatment was sought or provided through the workers’ compensation system for over nine months. The employer then moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that the employee had failed to receive or seek benefits for a period exceeding six months, as required by Oklahoma law.An Administrative Law Judge denied the employer’s motion to dismiss, relying on precedent from the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, and held that because the employee had requested a hearing within six months of filing the claim, dismissal was not warranted. The Workers’ Compensation Commission affirmed this decision, agreeing that the employee’s timely request for a hearing satisfied the statutory requirements and that further inquiry into whether benefits were sought or received was unnecessary.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and reversed the Commission’s order. The Court held that under 85A O.S. § 69(A)(4), an employee must not only make a timely request for a hearing but must also continue to actively pursue the claim by receiving or seeking benefits for any six-month period during the life of the claim. The Court found that the employee’s failure to seek or receive benefits for more than six months triggered the employer’s right to dismissal. The Court also held that the statute is constitutional, as it applies equally to all injured employees and does not violate due process or constitute a special law. The Commission’s order was vacated and the employer’s motion to dismiss was granted. View "OBI HOLDING COMPANY v. SCHULTZ-BUTZBACH" on Justia Law

William D. Lunn, individually and as the representative of the estates of his three deceased children, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Continental Motors, Inc. (CMI) in October 2009, alleging a design defect caused an airplane crash that killed his children. In September 2012, CMI made an unapportioned offer of judgment for $300,000, which Lunn rejected. After a lengthy litigation process, a jury found in favor of CMI. Lunn moved for a new trial, which the district court granted in February 2021. CMI appealed, arguing the claims were barred by the statute of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) reversed the district court's decision.CMI then sought attorney's fees, claiming entitlement under the offer of judgment statute since the judgment was less than their offer. The district court denied the motion, ruling the unapportioned offer invalid. CMI appealed this decision. COCA affirmed the district court's ruling, referencing prior cases that required offers of judgment to be apportioned among plaintiffs to be valid.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case to address whether an offer of judgment under 12 O.S.2021, § 1101.1(A) must be apportioned among multiple plaintiffs. The court held that such offers must indeed be apportioned to allow each plaintiff to independently evaluate the settlement offer. The court emphasized that unapportioned offers create confusion and hinder the plaintiffs' ability to assess the offer's value relative to their claims. Consequently, the court vacated COCA's opinion and affirmed the district court's judgment, ruling CMI's unapportioned offer invalid. View "Lunn v. Continental Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

Charter Oak Production Co., LLC paid to settle a property damage claim after a pipeline installed on its easement ruptured, causing a saltwater spill on the property of Jason and Melissa Mills. Charter Oak sought indemnity from JM Eagle, Inc., the manufacturer, and Rainmaker Sales, Inc., the distributor, alleging the pipe was defective. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of JM Eagle and Rainmaker, finding that Charter Oak lacked the necessary legal relationship to assert an indemnity claim and that the claim was barred by the economic loss rule.The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, reversed the district court's decision. It found that Charter Oak's non-delegable duty to the Millses created the legal relationship necessary to support an indemnity claim against JM Eagle and Rainmaker. Additionally, it held that Charter Oak's claim was not barred by the economic loss rule.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case. It held that Charter Oak's non-delegable duty as the dominant tenant of the easement established the legal relationship necessary to seek indemnity from JM Eagle and Rainmaker. The court also held that the economic loss rule did not bar Charter Oak's indemnity claim, as it sought reimbursement for damage to property other than the defective product itself. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' decision, reversed the district court's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Mills v. J-M Mfg. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Philip Sanders filed a petition in the District Court for Creek County, alleging that Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC caused the wrongful death of his wife, Brenda Jean Sanders, during her confinement in the Creek County Jail. Brenda Sanders was booked into the jail on October 17, 2016, and her health deteriorated over four weeks. She was transported to a hospital on November 20, 2016, diagnosed with severe sepsis and other conditions, and died the next day.The District Court granted Turn Key's motion to dismiss Sanders' petition, citing immunity under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, and allowed Sanders thirty days to amend his petition. Sanders did not amend and appealed the dismissal. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the District Court's order, but Turn Key filed a petition for certiorari to review the appellate court's decision. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma granted certiorari.The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that Sanders' appeal was premature as it challenged an interlocutory order, and appellate jurisdiction was absent. The Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and withdrew it from publication. The Court recast Sanders' petition in error as an application to assume original jurisdiction and a petition for prohibition. The Court concluded that the Governmental Tort Claims Act makes licensed medical professionals "employees" of the state when under contract with city, county, or state entities and providing medical care to inmates or detainees. The Court assumed original jurisdiction and denied the petition for a writ of prohibition. View "Sanders v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC" on Justia Law

In August 2014, a train operated by BNSF Railway Company collided with a pickup truck driven by Paul Watson at a railroad crossing in Pawnee County, Oklahoma. Watson, who was not wearing a seatbelt, died instantly, while his wife Terri and their minor child, both belted, survived with injuries. Terri Watson, on behalf of herself, her child, and as a representative of her deceased husband's estate, filed a wrongful death and personal injury lawsuit against BNSF, alleging negligent maintenance of the crossing and failure to install adequate safety features.The case went to trial, and after three weeks of testimony and evidence, the jury found in favor of BNSF on all claims. The plaintiffs' motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, found prejudicial errors in the jury instructions, specifically noting that the instructions were biased in favor of BNSF and required an excessive degree of care from Watson. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new trial.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. The court found that the jury instructions, when considered as a whole, were not so prejudicial as to mislead the jury. The court noted that the instructions accurately reflected Oklahoma law and did not impose a higher standard of care on Watson than required. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, affirmed the trial court's judgment, and reinstated the jury's verdict in favor of BNSF. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "WATSON v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY" on Justia Law

Mark Glen Spencer died from sepsis two days after a surgical procedure performed by Dr. Lana Nelson at Norman Regional Medical Authority. Spencer's brother, Jimmy Wayne Spencer, acting as the Special Administrator of the estate, filed a wrongful death action against the hospital and Dr. Nelson, alleging negligent and grossly negligent treatment. The hospital delayed providing complete medical records, which were essential for evaluating the claim.The District Court dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the potential claim before the statutory deadline and that Dr. Nelson, as a hospital employee, was immune from individual liability under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the discovery rule did not apply to wrongful death claims under the GTCA and that Dr. Nelson could not be individually sued for actions within the scope of her employment.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion. The Supreme Court held that the discovery rule applies to wrongful death actions arising from medical negligence under the GTCA. It also ruled that governmental employees have no immunity under the GTCA for gross negligence or acts outside the scope of employment. The court found that the trial court erred in making factual determinations on a motion to dismiss and that it should have taken the plaintiff's allegations as true. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "SPENCER v. NELSON" on Justia Law