Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, a field engineer for Verdigris Valley Electric Cooperative (Employer) met with a contract electrician for Integrated Service Company LLC (INSERV) in Catoosa, concerning the installation of additional underground electrical service. They discussed the location of the additional service to the building and decided to use an existing junction box which the engineer observed was surrounded by a yellow metal barricade. He would later note: "I normally recommend that our members [customers] install a protective post an [sic] each corner of a pad mounted device in high traffic areas such as the INSERV plant, to help protect from getting ran [sic] over by vehicles or other equipment. I would never suggest having a barrier of any kind in front of any opening or door on VVEC equipment." Employer's work crew, consisting of Employer was dispatched to install additional underground electrical service to INSERV. The four-man crew consisted of Jones, Jackson, Day, and Tiger. Jones and Jackson were journeymen electricians and Jones was the foreman. Day and Jason Tiger were apprentices. Tiger had been in the journeyman apprentice program for approximately nine months of a four-year program. At the time of his death, Tiger had been certified only in the climbing school portion of his journeyman training. Day had worked for Employer only one month. When the crew arrived at the work site, they found the junction box surrounded by a yellow painted steel barricade, erected presumably to protect it from being struck by vehicles or trailers. The record did not establish who erected or owned the barricade, but Employer owned the junction box and associated electrical equipment. Affixed to the junction box was a warning concerning hazardous voltage and underground power cables and a notice from Employer. Despite this, Tiger was electrocuted attempting to make a connection to the junction box. His widow sued Employer and INSERV pursuant to "Parret v. UNICCO Service Co.," (127 P.3d 572), asserting that Employer knew that injury or death was substantially certain to result from the task Tiger and his coworkers were directed to complete and the conditions in which they were required to work. The District Court denied the employer's motion for summary judgment but granted a second motion for summary judgment after additional discovery. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed after its review of the trial court record, finding material issues of fact remained in dispute. View "Tiger v. Verdigris Valley Electric Cooperative" on Justia Law

The issue this medical malpractice action presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on orders excluding testimony from plaintiffs' two expert witnesses and a summary judgment granted to defendants based upon the excluded testimony. Mrs. Nelson went to the Emergency Department of St. Mary's Regional Medical Center seeking medical assistance on the evening of July 21, 2006. The emergency room physician, Dr. Vaughan, ordered diagnostic tests, diagnosed an incarcerated hernia with possible bowel obstruction, and attempted to reduce the hernia. Dr. Vaughan telephoned Dr. Shepherd, Mrs. Nelson's internist and primary care provider. Dr. Shepherd instructed Dr. Vaughan to telephone Dr. Shreck, a surgeon. Dr. Shreck came to the hospital, reduced Mrs. Nelson's hernia, and she was admitted to the hospital. The medical record indicated Dr. Shreck reduced Mrs. Nelson's incarcerated hernia by manipulation. Mrs. Nelson became septic, went into septic shock during the morning of July 22nd, and she had a cardiac arrest while being prepared for surgery to address a perforated or dead bowel. She was resuscitated. After the surgery, Mrs. Nelson was given medicines to raise and control her blood pressure. Dr. Shepherd then switched Mrs. Nelson's medication to vasopressin. At approximately 11:00 p.m., Mrs. Nelson's blood pressure started to fall, her pulse became unstable and she died. A medical malpractice action was brought against Mrs. Nelson's medical providers for her last illness. Dr. Shepherd and Enid Medical Associates moved to exclude the proposed testimony of plaintiffs' two expert witnesses. They argued each witness had not provided legally proper testimony on the issue of the cause of Mrs. Nelson's demise because the testimony did not satisfy the requirements of "Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.," (509 U.S. 579 (1993)). The two defendants also sought summary judgment because the causation element of the malpractice claim action was missing from plaintiffs' claim. After review, the Supreme Court held that the opinions of the two witnesses on the issue of causation satisfied the requirements of 12 O.S. 2702, and reversed the summary judgment granted by the District Court. View "Nelson v. Enid Medical Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

Carla Maree was a nursing home resident at Willow Park Health Care Center, Lawton, Oklahoma. In early 2011, Carla Maree fell; two days later she died. Petitioner Mamie Maree, as personal representative of the estate of Carla Sue Maree, sued Defendant/Real Party in Interest's, PSG-Willow Park, L.L.C., d/b/a Willow Park Health Center (Nursing Home), for, among other things, negligence, for allegedly failing to timely respond to a "call light" and provide Carla Maree with appropriate assistance. Petitioner's counsel claimed that during participation in other litigation against the same Defendant, they became aware of "certain individuals and entities intertwined amongst and actually part of the named Defendant." Petitioner appealed when the trial court denied her motion to add these newly-discovered individuals and entities to her lawsuit. She made an application to the Oklahoma Supreme Court to assume original jurisdiction and petitioned for a Writ of Prohibition prohibiting the Honorable Gerald Neuwirth, District Judge of Comanche County, Oklahoma (Respondent) from enforcing his January 21, 2016, Order denying Petitioner's Motion to Amend Petition to add additional defendants. In addition, Petitioner petitioned for a Writ of Mandamus ordering Respondent to allow Petitioner to amend her Petition and add additional defendants. After review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court decided the merits without affording Petitioner an opportunity for discovery to develop her claims. This was error and warranted the granting of a Writ of Prohibition to prevent the trial court from enforcing its January 21, 2016, order. The court dismissed Petitioner's application for a writ of mandamus. View "Maree v. Neuwirth" on Justia Law

Claimant James Loyd was awarded permanent partial disability benefits after being injured on the job. Loyd did not appeal, and the order became final. Less than a month after such order was issued, Loyd filed a "Form 9" requesting continuing medical maintenance and requesting a portion of his permanent partial disability award be commuted to a lump sum payment. When this request was denied and the denial upheld by the Workers' Compensation Court and Court of Appeals, he appealed. Upon consideration, the Supreme Court hold that a claimant may seek to commute his or her permanent partial disability award after the hearing on permanent partial disability under 85 O.S. 2001 sec. 41(A). Additionally, the Court concluded that because Loyd did not request reservation of continuing medical maintenance and the trial court's order awarding permanent partial disability did not address or reserve the issue of continuing medical maintenance, Loyd's only recourse was to seek continuing medical maintenance through a reopening proceeding under 85 O.S. 2001 sec. 28. View "Loyd v. Michelin North America, Inc." on Justia Law

Claimant Nancy Bruce worked as a Certified Nurse's Assistant, or "residential life staff aide," for the Oklahoma Department of Human Services for twenty-six years. Her duties consisted primarily of lifting clients, cleaning them up, feeding them, and daily care. In 2012, Claimant was injured while lifting one such client. Although her Employer admitted the injury, the trial court denied compensability finding Claimant's employment was not the major cause of her injury. Claimant appealed, and a three-judge panel reversed and found that Claimant's employment was the major cause of the injury to her neck. Employer appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the order of the three-judge panel. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the three-judge panel's decision finding Claimant's work-related injury was the major cause of Claimant's neck injury was not against the clear weight of the evidence. The Court therefore vacated the Court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the order of the three-judge panel. View "Dept. of Human Svcs v. Bruce" on Justia Law

This was a medical malpractice case premised in part on the doctrine of informed consent. Appellant Teresa Allen swallowed a small nail. She went to Duncan Regional Hospital's emergency room. Appellee John Harrison, D.O., emergency room physician (Physician), examined Allen. An X-ray confirmed the presence of a foreign body in Allen's stomach, just below the diaphragm. Based on Physician's assessment and clinical judgment, Physician discharged Allen prescribing: (1) "a high-fiber diet to let the nail pass;" (2) return to the hospital if she had any problems; and (3) follow up with her family doctor in three days. A few days later following severe vomiting, Allen went to the emergency room at Southwestern Hospital in Lawton. That same day, the hospital performed emergency surgery to remove the ingested nail from Allen's intestines. At that time, Allen was treated for a perforated and infected bowel. In addition, Allen endured two additional surgeries to treat the complications that arose from the initial surgery. Allen sued Duncan Regional Hospital and Physician for the defendants' alleged medical negligence and failure to obtain Allen's informed consent. Specifically, Allen contended that Physician failed to disclose the potential risk in letting the nail pass through her digestive system as well as the alternatives to his recommended course of treatment. Had Physician effectively discharged his duty to disclose, Allen would have "chosen the option of no treatment or a different course of treatment." The issue presented on certiorari review was whether the doctrine of informed consent required a physician to obtain the patient's consent before implementing a nonsurgical or noninvasive course of treatment. "Inherent in the question presented, is whether a physician-in addition to discussing with the patient treatment alternatives that the physician recommends-should discuss medically reasonable alternatives that the physician does not recommend." After review of the trial court record, the Oklahoma Supreme Court answered both of those questions in the affirmative. View "Allen v. Harrison" on Justia Law

In 2007, Lahoma Pierson Hall (Ms. Hall) died in the care of hospice after a seven-day stay in AHS Tulsa Regional Medical Center (Hospital). On March 20, 2009, Appellants Kenneth Pierson, and Paula Taylor, (Ms. Hall's son and granddaughter) filed a petition (Pierson I), against the Hospital stating claims on their own behalf. After amending the petition several times, Appellants filed their fourth amended petition on October 23, 2009. Appellants stated therein "[t]he plaintiffs are not pleading to have the court act on Ms. Lahoma Hall's rights for relief for actions such as medical malpractice or wrongful death." On February 24, 2010, the trial court dismissed the petition in Pierson I without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Appellants filed "Pierson II" in 2012, appealing the dismissal of their wrongful death case. In early 2013, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal, noting that "[e]ven if the Third Amended Petition relates back to the original petition, the original petition was filed more than two years after Decedent's death. Therefore, Appellant's wrongful death action is barred by the two-year statute of limitations." The questions presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court's review were whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applied to state court actions and whether the Appellees, judges on the Court of Civil Appeals, were immune from suit. The Court answered the first question in the negative and the second in the affirmative. View "Pierson v. Joplin" on Justia Law

In 2014, Petitioner Theresa Maxwell suffered an injury to her knee while working for her Employer, Respondent Sprint PCS. She promptly notified her Employer and timely filed a CC-Form-3 with the Workers' Compensation Commission. The Employer admitted Petitioner's injury to her knee was compensable, and she had surgery to repair a tendon in her knee. Petitioner also received temporary total disability benefits from February 6, 2014, until February 24, 2014. After reaching maximum medical improvement on July 2, 2014, she returned to her pre-injury position with her employer earning her pre-injury wages. Later that year, Petitioner filed a request for a contested hearing on the issue of permanent partial disability. The ALJ concluded that Petitioner sustained 2% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole as a result of the injury to her knee and that the rate of compensation was $323.00 for a total award of $2,261.00. However, because she returned to her pre-injury position and pay, the ALJ ordered the award of benefits be deferred at a rate of $323.00 beginning July 2, 2014, for every week Petitioner worked in her pre-injury or equivalent job. Petitioner appealed the order, and the Workers' Compensation Commission sitting en banc affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that scheduled members are exempt from the AMA Guides under the AWCA. The Court also held that the permanent partial disability deferral provision of 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 sec. 45(C)(5) was an unconstitutional violation of due process under Art. 2, section 7.51 Sections 45(C)(5)(a-e) were invalid and stricken. The deferral of permanent partial disability benefits to a subclass of injured workers under 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 sec. 46(C) was an unconstitutional special law under Art. 5, sec. 59.52. Only that portion of Section 46(C) that made the deferral provision applicable to injuries to the body as a whole or "other cases" was invalid. Any definitional provisions found in 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 section 2, as were deemed invalid to the extent they were inconsistent with the Court's opinion with regard to this matter. On remand, the Commission, through its ALJs, were mandated to take all action necessary to implement the pronouncement made by this case. View "Maxwell v. Sprint PCS" on Justia Law

Petitioner Yaumary Torres, a former employee of Seaboard Foods, LLC, filed a workers' compensation claim alleging she was injured on-the-job and needed surgery. Seaboard argued that she was barred from receiving workers' compensation because she alleged a cumulative-trauma injury and she had not worked a continuous 180-day period for Seaboard. The administrative law judge denied her claim, finding she had not worked the 180-day period. The Workers' Compensation Commission affirmed the order of the administrative judge. The administrative order was appealed to the Workers' Compensation Commission, and the Commission affirmed the order of the administrative judge. Petitioner then appealed the Commission's order to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held 85A O.S. sec. 2(14) violated the Due Process Section of the Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 2 section 7, when applied to petitioner because the statute's overinclusive and underinclusive classifications were not rationally related to legitimate State interests of: (1) preventing workers' compensation fraud; and (2) decreasing employers' costs. The Workers' Compensation commission was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2007, a paramedic supervisor, defendant Ethan Barstow collided with a vehicle driven by the plaintiff-appellee Elizabeth Gowens resulting in damage to both vehicles and injury to Gowens. At the time of the collision, Barstow worked as a paramedic supervisor for the defendant-appellant EMSSTAT, which is a division of the defendant-appellant Norman Regional Hospital Authority, a public trust d/b/a Norman Regional Hospital (collectively, NRH). NRH was a political subdivision for purposes of the Government Tort Claims Act (GTCA). Gowens initially sued Barstow and the City of Norman ex rel. EMSSTAT for her injuries. Both Barstow and the City of Norman were later dismissed from the lawsuit. Central to this case was the intersection where the accident occurred, described as being "almost a five-way intersection" with no stop sign and a hill. At the close of the evidence, NRH moved for a directed verdict which the trial court overruled. In its order, the trial court found : (1) Barstow was an employee of NRH and was acting in that capacity when driving through the intersection; (2) Barstow was responding to a call for service and more likely than not had his lights and siren on while driving; (3) the fact that he most likely used his lights and sirens did not provide blanket protection under 47 O.S. 11-1062; (4) the unusual layout of the intersection required a heightened use of care by all; (5) in this situation Barstow's high rate of speed did endanger the life and property of Gowens; and (6) Mr. Barstow was a cause of the accident. The trial court ruled in plaintiff's favor, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding that an entity covered under the GTCA, was immune from reckless acts committed by its emergency vehicle drivers and also such drivers, and therefore their employers, could not be held liable for mere negligence. The Supreme Court vacated the COCA's opinion, affirmed the trial court's decision and addressed other issues properly raised on appeal which were not addressed by the COCA. View "Gowens v. Barstow" on Justia Law