Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Kyle Smith was allegedly drag racing on a motorcycle. A Stillwater police officer attempted to stop Smith. When he failed to stop, several Payne County and City of Stillwater law enforcement officers pursued Smith. In the course of the pursuit, Smith drove his motorcycle into the edge of a "T" intersection, resulting in a crash into a creek where he struck a tree and was killed. Petitioner-appellant Randy Smith (Kyle's Father) brought action against the state and political subdivisions alleging tortious conduct on the part of law enforcement in pursuing Kyle. The trial court dismissed the Board of County Commissioners on grounds of sovereign immunity, denied Smith's request to reconsider, and granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Stillwater after determining its officers owed no legal duty to Decedent. Smith appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. Both Smith and the County filed Petitions for Certiorari. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address: (1) whether the County was immune from suit for the actions taken by its law enforcement officers in pursuit of Kyle; and (2) whether the City and County owed a legal duty to Kyle. The Court answered both questions with a "no:" negligent performance of law enforcement function is not shielded from immunity; the provisions of 51 O.S. 155 do not immunize the State or its political subdivisions for the actions taken by their law enforcement officers engaged in police pursuits. Though the district court's dismissal of the County on the grounds of immunity was based upon an erroneous legal conclusion (and therefore its refusal to reconsider was an abuse of discretion), neither the County's nor the City's law enforcement personnel owed a duty of care to the decedent. This case was remanded back to the trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the County. View "Smith v. City of Stillwater" on Justia Law

Respondent-claimant, Ben Snell was employed by petitioner-employer Kentucky Fried Chicken of McAlester. He alleged that while at work he slipped and fell while carrying a tray of chicken weighing approximately 40 to 50 pounds. The trial court awarded claimant temporary total disability (TTD) and reasonable and necessary medical treatment for injuries to his neck, the second finger of his right hand, and aggravation of pre-existing conditions to his left knee and low back. All other issues were reserved. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) sustained the award. In its opinion, COCA ruled the standard of review in this case was the "any competent evidence" standard because of a holding in a previous opinion by the same division, "Westoak Industries, Inc. v. DeLeon," which held 85 O.S. 2011 sec. 340(D)(4), setting out "against the clear weight of the evidence" as the appellate standard of review in workers' compensation cases, constituted a violation of the separation of powers provision of the Oklahoma Constitution. Westoak was completely at odds with another COCA opinion, "Harvey v. Auto Plus of Woodward." "Harvey" held section 340(D)(4) was not unconstitutional as a separation of powers violation. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue as one of first impression since certiorari was not sought in either of the previous cases. The Court concluded that there was no constitutional separation of powers prohibition in in the Okla.Const., art IV, section 1 against the Legislature's adoption of the "against the clear weight of the evidence" standard of review in 85 O.S. 2011 sec. 340(D)(4). COCA's opinion was therefore vacated. Because "Westoak" and "Harvey" were totally inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion, they were both specifically overruled. View "Kentucky Fried Chicken of McAlester v. Snell" on Justia Law

Claimant was injured at work as she walked out a door used by employees to exit Employer's school building. A rug outside the door slipped out from under her, causing her to fall. At the time of this accident, claimant was leaving work early due to a family medical emergency. The Workers' Compensation Court found this injury to be compensable, but the Court of Civil Appeals ruled it was not. The Court of Civil Appeals held that claimant was on a personal mission at the time of the injury and vacated the award of benefits. The dispositive question for the Supreme Court's review was whether Claimant's injury while leaving work in response to a family medical emergency arose out of her employment. The Workers' Compensation Court answered this question in the affirmative. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Graham Public Schools v. Priddy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Walter Hall was allegedly injured while being transported to a medical appointment by a private prison facility, GEO. Two years and two months later, he filed a lawsuit against it for negligence. GEO filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired and the lawsuit was untimely. Hall insisted that the limitation period was tolled due to his injury. The trial court granted GEO's motion for summary judgment and Hall appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that pursuant to 57 O.S. 2011 sec. 566.4, compliance with the notice provisions of the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA) is required to bring a tort action against a private correctional facility. Because Hall did not comply with the GTCA and the notice of claim requirement of the GTCA was only tolled 90 days due to incapacity from an injury. The case was appropriately dismissed as untimely filed. View "Hall v. GEO Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to address two issues: (1) whether a political-subdivision employer may be required to provide workers' compensation benefits to an off-duty employee injured while providing services to a private entity; and (2) whether, under the facts presented, the claimant's salaries from his full-time employment as a deputy sheriff and his part-time job as a security officer may be combined when determining the amount of benefits to which the employee is entitled. Respondent-claimant John David Waldenville was injured while acting as a security guard for petitioner Cattlemen's Steakhouse, Inc. Initially, Cattlemen's contended that Waldenville was an independent contractor but later conceded that it had workers' compensation coverage for him through their insurer. Nevertheless, the employer continued to assert that Waldenville was an employee of respondent, Oklahoma County Sheriff's Department when injured. The trial court determined that: Cattlemen's was the employing entity when the employment-related injury occurred; Oklahoma County should be dismissed pursuant to 85 O.S. 2001 sec. 2b(G); Cattlemen's was estopped to dispute employee status based on the payment of workers' compensation premiums associated with Waldenville's employment; no evidence existed indicating that the employee was acting in his official capacity as a Deputy Sheriff at the time of the incident; and because the duties that Waldenville was carrying out at the time of his injury were the same or similar to those he executed as a Deputy Sheriff, the claimant's salaries were to be combined for establishment of weekly rates. The Supreme Court held that: (1) the "plain, clear, unmistakable, unambiguous, mandatory, and unequivocal" language of 85 O.S. 2011 sec. 313(G) mandated that private employers, hiring off-duty municipal employees, alone shall be responsible for the payment of workers' compensation benefits arising from incidents occurring during the hours of actual employment by the private employer; and (2) under the facts of this case, claimant was engaged in the same, or substantially similar, employment to that of his profession as a Major with the Oklahoma County Sheriff's Department when he was injured, warranting the combination of salaries for purposes of determining workers' compensation benefits. View "Cattlemen's Steakhouse, Inc. v. Waldenville" on Justia Law

An Oklahoma worker was killed at Employer's jobsite in Texas. The employer's insurer paid the worker's Widow death benefits provided by Texas workers' compensation law. The widow also recovered damages in a wrongful death tort action in Texas. When the Insurer sought subrogation from the widow's wrongful death damages as allowed by Texas law, she filed suit in Oklahoma to prevent subrogation. She sought a declaratory judgment that the rights of Oklahoma workers and their dependents were governed by Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act, notwithstanding the worker's injury or death in another state, and any benefits that may be paid under another state's workers' compensation law. In particular, Widow asked the Oklahoma court to enforce the provision in Oklahoma law that forbids subrogation in cases of death benefits. The trial court granted the declaratory relief sought by the widow. On appeal by the Insurer, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the widow had to commence a proceeding by filing a claim with Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Court before Oklahoma could exercise jurisdiction over the benefits due the widow, including enforcement of the anti-subrogation provision in death benefit cases. Because she never filed a claim with Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Court, the Court of Civil Appeals held subrogation was proper. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and vacated the appellate court in this case. View "Holley v. ACE American Ins. Co." on Justia Law

First American Cash Advance, owned by Valued Services, L.L.C. was robbed twice. The first robbery occurred on New Year's Eve 2008, and the second was in the spring of 2009. Respondent-Claimant Leslie Tregenza was the branch manager and the only employee on the premises during both robberies. A man wearing something covering his face and a ball cap committed the first robbery; in the second, two men stole all of the cash on hand in the office. These men did not have guns. However, one of the robbers threw an empty plastic cash drawer at respondent's head. She did not return to work for her employer after the second robbery. Claimant filed her Form 3 in October 2009, alleging an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. She alleged she sustained an injury to her head with psychological overlay in the form of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and PTSD headaches. She sought permanent total disability (PTD) as a result of her injuries, claiming she was unable to work or to be out in public. The trial the court concluded respondent was permanently totally disabled and awarded her continuing medical maintenance in the nature of four annual office visits and prescription medication. The employer appealed the trial court's holding and the appellate court reversed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Workers' Compensation Court received competent evidence that Claimant was permanently totally disabled. The Court vacated the appellate court's decision and affirmed the order of the lower court. View "Valued Services, LLC v. Tregenza" on Justia Law

Charles Sheffer, Jennifer Sheffer, and their minor son, J.S., were injured when their tractor trailer collided with a rental vehicle leased to William Garris and driven by David Billups, employees of Carolina Forge Company, L.L.C. Plaintiffs sued Carolina Forge on theories of respondeat superior and negligent entrustment. They also sued the Buffalo Run Casino, the Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, and PTE, Inc. for dram-shop liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Carolina Forge, finding as a matter of law Carolina Forge was not liable for its employees' actions under a theory of respondeat superior and did not negligently entrust the rental vehicle to its employees. The trial court also dismissed, sua sponte, the Buffalo Run Casino, PTE, Inc., and the Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, determining that injunctions issued by the Western District of Oklahoma prohibited suit for any tort claims against a tribe or a tribal entity. Plaintiffs appealed both orders. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Peoria Tribe was immune from suit in state court for compact-based tort claims because Oklahoma state courts are not courts of competent jurisdiction as the term is used in the model gaming compact. Furthermore, the Court found that because Congress has not expressly abrogated tribal immunity from private, state court dram-shop claims and because the Peoria Tribe and its entities did not expressly waive their sovereign immunity by applying for and receiving a liquor license from the State, the tribe was immune from dram-shop liability in state court. View "Sheffer v. Buffalo Run Casino" on Justia Law

In 2009, respondent Adrian Melton suffered an on-the-job accident while working for his employer, Joe Brown Company, Inc. He was awarded eleven weeks of temporary total disability, granted permanent partial disability, and a psychological overlay. The employer appealed the award, which vacated some parts and sustained others. In 2011, the employer appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) which vacated the permanent partial impairment award because it failed to comply with the AMA Guides (5th Edition), and that an "any competent evidence" standard of review was inconsistent with 85 O.S. 2011 sec. 340, so the court used the "against the clear weight of the evidence" standard which had recently been revised. Respondent petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the COCA decision, arguing that the appellate court should have used the "any competent evidence" standard. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that because respondent's injury happened before the new standard went into effect, the "any competent evidence" standard should have been applied. With regard to respondent's awards of disability, the Court found that psychological overlay was not supported by appropriate expert testimony. Accordingly, the benefits as they related to the overlay were vacated. View "Joe Brown Company, Inc. v. Melton" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (the Sheffer family) were injured when their truck collided with a rental vehicle leased to and driven by employees of Carolina Forge Company, L.L.C. Plaintiffs sued Carolina Forge on theories of respondeat superior and negligent entrustment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Carolina Forge, finding as a matter of law that Carolina Forge was not liable for its employees' actions under that theory, and did not negligently entrust the rental to the employees. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded reasonable minds could have differed on whether the employees were in the course and scope of their employment at the time of the accident and whether Carolina Forge negligently entrusted the vehicle to them. The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sheffer v. Carolina Forge Company, LLC" on Justia Law