Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Oregon Supreme Court
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In a case before the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, the plaintiffs, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, sued TNA NA Manufacturing, Inc. and Food Design, Inc., claiming negligence and product liability for a listeria outbreak that resulted from using the defendants' food processing equipment. The outbreak cost the plaintiffs around $20 million. The trial court and Court of Appeals upheld that the plaintiffs had waived any action in tort through their purchase contract with the defendants, as the contract contained a waiver of tort liability. The Supreme Court of Oregon, however, disagreed.The court ruled that, under Oregon law, a contract will not be construed to provide immunity from consequences of a party’s own negligence unless that intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed. The court found that the language in the contract between the plaintiffs and defendants did not meet this standard. The court held that to waive tort liability, contract language must be clear and explicit, stating that the waiver will not be deduced from inference or implication. The text of the contract must unambiguously show that the parties intended to disclaim actions outside of contract, i.e., actions in tort.Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. The court confirmed that, while no magic words are required for a waiver of tort liability to be effective, the use of terms such as "negligence" or "tort" may be helpful in demonstrating an explicit intent to waive such liability. View "Certain Underwriters v. TNA NA Manufacturing" on Justia Law

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A plaintiff, Robert Trebelhorn, suffered a serious knee injury at his apartment complex when a section of an elevated walkway collapsed due to deterioration. The defendants, Prime Wimbledon SPE, LLC, and Prime Administration, LLC, who owned and managed the apartment complex, were aware of the deteriorated condition of the walkway but chose not to repair it. Trebelhorn sued the defendants for negligence and violation of Oregon's Residential Landlord-Tenant Act and won. The jury awarded him just under $300,000 in damages and also imposed punitive damages of $10 million against each defendant. On post-verdict review, the trial court concluded that although the evidence supported some amount of punitive damages, the amount of $10 million would violate the defendants' due process rights. The trial court reduced the punitive damages to just under $2.7 million against each defendant. On cross-appeals, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court and affirmed. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon also agreed with the trial court that $10 million in punitive damages would violate the defendants' due process rights and affirmed the judgment of the trial court and the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Trebelhorn v. Prime Wimbledon SPE, LLC" on Justia Law

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In the State of Oregon, a woman whose husband was accidentally shot and killed during a camping trip filed a lawsuit against her husband's life insurance company. The woman claimed that the insurance company negligently failed to investigate and pay her claim for policy benefits, causing her economic harm and emotional distress. The trial court granted the insurance company's motions to dismiss the woman's negligence claim and to strike her claim for emotional distress damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, and the insurance company appealed the case to the Supreme Court of Oregon.The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the woman had pleaded facts sufficient to give rise to a legally cognizable common-law negligence claim for emotional distress damages. The court reasoned that the woman, as the surviving spouse of a deceased breadwinner, had a legally protected interest sufficient to support a common-law negligence claim for emotional distress damages against her husband's life insurance company for failure to reasonably investigate and promptly pay her claim for insurance benefits. The court concluded that the insurance claim practices that Oregon law requires and the emotional harm that foreseeably may occur if that law is violated are sufficiently weighty to merit imposition of liability for common-law negligence and recovery of emotional distress damages. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Oregon reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Moody v. Oregon Community Credit Union" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case is whether ORS 12.115(1) applied to actions in which plaintiffs allege their attorney negligently caused injury consisting solely of financial loss—here, the cost to plaintiffs of attempting to defend themselves against a claim for unpaid federal taxes and the anticipated cost of paying that tax liability. To this, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded the legislature intended the phrase “negligent injury to person or property” in ORS 12.115(1) to include negligence claims seeking to recover for the kind of injury to economic interests that plaintiffs have alleged. View "Marshall v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP" on Justia Law

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In 2014, decedent Aaron Martineau, age 28, arrived at the McKenzie-Willamette Hospital emergency room, complaining of sudden onset chest pain, shortness of breath, and other symptoms. He was seen by a physician assistant and by a physician, defendant Gary Josephsen, M.D.; both worked for defendant Doctor’s Emergency Room Corporation, P.C. (collectively, the ER defendants). Defendants did not adequately review the x-ray or refer decedent for further imaging or other tests to rule out or confirm the presence of serious cardiovascular or cardiopulmonary conditions. Instead, they diagnosed him with noncardiac chest pain and discharged him from the hospital. Approximately 24 hours after being discharged, decedent died from an aortic dissection in his heart. In this wrongful death action, two issues were presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review: (1) whether the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that physicians “are not negligent merely because their efforts were unsuccessful” and that a physician “does not guarantee a good result by undertaking to perform a service;” and (2) whether plaintiff had alleged a lost chance claim under Oregon’s survival statute, ORS 30.075, that was separately cognizable from her wrongful death claim under ORS 30.020. The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s lost chance claim before trial. Later, when submitting the wrongful death claim to the jury at the close of trial, the court included the challenged instruction—which was taken from Uniform Civil Jury Instruction (UCJI) 44.03 at defendants’ request—in its instructions to the jury. After the jury returned a verdict in defendants’ favor, plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the trial court had erred in dismissing plaintiff’s lost chance claim and by including UCJI 44.03 in the jury instructions. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded plaintiff did not allege a lost chance claim that was cognizable under Oregon law, and, further, the trial court did not err when it included UCJI 44.03 in the jury instructions. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court. View "Martineau v. McKenzie-Willamette Medical Center" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was whether the Oregon legislature intended to create an exception to ORS 656.018, the so-called “exclusive remedy” provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law, for injured workers whose claims have been deemed noncompensable on “major contributing cause” grounds. While employed by defendant Shore Terminals, LLC as a terminal operator, plaintiff Danny Bundy was assigned to stay and monitor the air quality from malfunctioning machinery without being given safety equipment, and he was exposed to dangerous levels of diesel, gasoline and ethanol fumes. After that incident, defendant initially accepted a workers’ compensation claim for "non-disabling exposure to gasoline vapors." Later, plaintiff asked defendant to accept and pay compensation for additional conditions arising out of the same incident, including "somatization disorder" and "undifferentiated somatoform disorder." Defendant specified that it was treating each of plaintiff’s subsequent requests as a "consequential condition claim" and was denying those claims on the basis that plaintiff’s work exposure was not the major contributing cause of the subsequent conditions. Plaintiff challenged those denials through the workers’ compensation system, but he was unable to establish that the work incident was the major contributing cause of his somatoform disorders. The Workers’ Compensation Board ultimately issued a final order determining that the disorders were not compensable conditions because plaintiff failed to establish that his work-related incident was the major contributing cause. Plaintiff acknowledged that the Workers’ Compensation Law generally immunized covered employers against civil liability for injuries arising out of a worker’s employment. Plaintiff argued, however, that his case fell within a statutory exception to that rule and that the trial court and Court of Appeals, both of which ruled in defendant’s favor on that legal question, erred in concluding otherwise. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff’s statutory argument failed, and that the trial court and Court of Appeals therefore did not err. View "Bundy v. NuStar GP LLC, et al." on Justia Law

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Claimant Hipolito Coria sought review of the Court of Appeals’ decision reversing a penalty that the Workers’ Compensation Board imposed on respondent SAIF for unreasonable claims processing. The board imposed the penalty pursuant to ORS 656.262(11)(a), which provides, in part, that, if an “insurer . . . unreasonably refuses to pay compensation,” the insurer “shall be liable for an additional amount up to 25 percent of the amounts then due,” plus penalty-related attorney fees. On review, the parties disagreed about the board’s reason for imposing the penalty. They also disagreed about many of the procedural and substantive legal requirements for imposing penalties pursuant to ORS 656.262(11)(a). The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the board’s imposition of the penalty was not supported by substantial reason because the board’s order failed to “articulate a rational connection between the facts and the legal conclusions it draws from them.” Consequently, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the board to explain its reasoning; necessarily, the Court did not reach the parties’ arguments about the legal requirements for imposing penalties pursuant to ORS 656.262(11)(a). View "SAIF v. Coria" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Gregg Lawrence sued defendant Oregon State Fair Council for negligence, alleging that defendant had failed “to supervise and maintain its premises in a reasonably safe manner” so that guests walking on the property would not be injured. Plaintiff alleged that, as a result, the aluminum bleachers at a show that he attended with his wife and mother were wet and unsafe, causing him to fall and incur injuries. The trial court granted defendant’s pretrial motion to exclude certain evidence. During trial, at plaintiff’s request, the trial court reconsidered its ruling, but adhered to its decision to exclude the evidence. After a verdict for defendant, plaintiff appealed, arguing the trial court erred in its evidentiary ruling. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that plaintiff had not done enough to preserve the issue of the admissibility of the challenged evidence. To this the Oregon Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for a determination of that issue on its merits. View "Lawrence v. Oregon State Fair Council" on Justia Law

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In 2014, plaintiffs Roberta and Kevin Haas' stopped car was struck by a car driven by defendant Mark Carter. Plaintiffs brought this negligence action against defendants, Carter's estate and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, seeking to recover economic and noneconomic damages. Carter died after plaintiffs filed suit. State Farm was Roberta Haas' insurer, whom she sued for breach of contract, alleging it failed to pay all the personal injury protection benefits that were due. At trial, one of the primary issues was whether Carter’s driving was a cause-in-fact of the injuries that plaintiffs alleged, and the issue on appeal became whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on causation. The jury returned a verdict for defendants. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court determined the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on causation, and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Haas v. Estate of Mark Steven Carter" on Justia Law

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The United States District Court for the District of Oregon certified two questions of law to the Oregon Supreme Court. Plaintiff, through a conservator, brought this action after he suffered catastrophic brain damage at the hands of his mother’s boyfriend. Plaintiff alleged that those injuries were caused by the failure of defendants— Jefferson County, Jefferson County Deputy Sheriff Anderson, and Warm Springs Police Department Officer Aryanfard— to respond to an earlier report of child abuse in the manner that Oregon law required. Specifically, plaintiff alleged he had suffered abuse from the boyfriend a month earlier, that medical personnel had reported those injuries to defendants, and that defendants had negligently failed to take certain actions required by Oregon statutes that governed the reporting of child abuse. Plaintiff also alleged a claim under Oregon’s Vulnerable Person Act, ORS 124.100-124.140, which created a statutory private right of action for enhanced damages against a person who has caused, or “permitt[ed] another person to engage in,” financial or physical abuse of a vulnerable person. Before any litigation of plaintiff’s factual allegations, the parties identified two unresolved questions about the meaning of the Oregon statutes on which plaintiff had based his claims, and the district court certified two questions: (1) whether a claim for Abuse of a Vulnerable Person under ORS § 124.100 et seq., was available against public bodies; and (2) whether a violation of Oregon’s mandatory child abuse reporting law serve as a basis for statutory liability. With respect to Oregon’s Vulnerable Person Act, the Supreme Court concluded that a claim under that act was available against a public body, through the Oregon Tort Claims Act (OTCA), when the claim is based on the acts or omissions of officers, employees, or agents of the public body acting within the scope of their employment or duties. With respect to the "statutory liability," the Court concluded that the Oregon legislature did not intend to create a statutory private right of action to address violations of the duties that the child-abuse-reporting statutes plausibly may have imposed on defendants in this case: duties that apply to law enforcement agencies that have received, and personnel who are investigating, an existing report of child abuse. View "E. J. T. v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law