Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals certified two questions of Oregon law to the Oregon Supreme Court. This case arose when plaintiff, who was legally blind, was injured when she stepped into a hole while jogging in a public park in the City of Portland (the City). Plaintiff filed a complaint against the City and defendants Gibson and Stillson. Defendant Gibson had created the hole to fix a malfunctioning sprinkler head; he was a park technician with primary responsibility for maintenance of the park. Defendant Stillson was the maintenance supervisor for all westside parks in the City. As framed by the Ninth Circuit, the questions were: (1) whether individual employees responsible for repairing, maintaining, and operating improvements on City-owned recreational land made available to the public for recreational purposes are “owner[s]” of the land, as defined in the Oregon Public Use of Lands Act, and therefore immune from liability for their negligence; and (2) if such employees are “owner[s]” under the Act, whether the Act, as applied to them, violated the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the individual employees in this case did not qualify as “owner[s]” under the Act, and that the Court need not address the second certified question. View "Johnson v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that, after being served alcohol at defendant’s bar when he was visibly intoxicated, a patron, Mayfield, walked down the street to another business location and, without intending to do so, fired a gun through the doorway, causing injuries to plaintiffs. The trial court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion, concluding that plaintiffs had presented insufficient evidence to permit an inference that the type of harm that plaintiffs suffered was reasonably foreseeable to defendant when it served alcohol to Mayfield while he was visibly intoxicated. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the ensuing judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ claim against defendant. On review, the Supreme Court concluded plaintiffs’ evidence was not sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the harm that plaintiffs suffered was a reasonably foreseeable risk of defendant’s conduct. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Chapman v. Mayfield" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two individuals who purchased Marlboro Light cigarettes in Oregon. Defendant Philip Morris was the company that manufactured, marketed, and sold Marlboro Lights. Plaintiffs brought this action under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA), alleging that defendant misrepresented that Marlboro Lights would deliver less tar and nicotine than regular Marlboros and that, as a result of that misrepresentation, plaintiffs suffered economic losses. Plaintiffs moved to certify a class consisting of approximately 100,000 individuals who had purchased at least one pack of Marlboro Lights in Oregon over a 30-year period (from 1971 to 2001). The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion after concluding that individual inquiries so predominated over common ones that a class action was not a superior means to adjudicate the putative class’s UTPA claim. On appeal, a majority of the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court’s predominance assessment, concluding that the essential elements of the UTPA claim could be proved through evidence common to the class. The majority remanded to the trial court to reconsider whether, without the trial court’s predominance assessment, a class action was a superior means of litigating the class claims. In granting defendant’s petition for review, the Supreme Court considered whether common issues predominated for purposes of the class action certification decision, and what a private plaintiff in a UTPA case of this nature had to prove. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly denied class certification, and accordingly, it reversed the contrary decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the individual plaintiffs’ claims. View "Pearson v. Philip Morris, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Linda Two Two and Patricia Fodge filed a complaint against defendant that included claims for negligence and strict liability. Plaintiffs alleged that they had been injured in separate incidents in 2008 when an elevator in the building in which they worked dropped unexpectedly and stopped abruptly. In their negligence claim, plaintiffs alleged that defendant had negligently designed, installed, and maintained that elevator and that defendant's negligence was the direct and proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. In their strict liability claim, plaintiffs alleged that defendant had designed, installed, and constructed the elevator and that the elevator was defective and dangerous. Defendant sought summary judgment on both claims. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on both claims. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court decided that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' negligence claim, but did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' strict liability claim. View "Two Two v. Fujitec America, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue in this mandamus proceeding was whether the trial court correctly denied defendants' motion to change venue. Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, initiated a medical malpractice action against defendants in Multnomah County. Defendants argued that venue was in Clackamas County, because that was where the clinic was located, where the doctor who provided the husband's medical services resided, and where the husband received treatment. Plaintiffs argued that venue is proper in Multnomah County, because defendants solicited patients who lived in that county, referred patients to imaging facilities in that county, used medical education programs in that county, and "identified" the clinic's location in its website as the "Portland area." The trial court denied defendants' motion, explaining that defendants, by soliciting patients in Multnomah County, "purposely availed themselves of the court's jurisdiction" in that county. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court mistakenly conflated personal jurisdiction considerations with the statutory requirements for venue and erred in denying defendants' motion. The Court therefore granted defendants relief and granted the writ. View "Kohring v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when one negligent driver and (shortly thereafter) another negligent driver collided with the truck in which plaintiff was a passenger. The underinsured motorist benefits available to plaintiff under the terms of the insurance policy that she purchased from turned on the meaning of the term "accident" as that term was used in that policy and is used in corresponding Oregon financial responsibility statutes. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended that the term "accident" have its ordinary meaning, and that plaintiff presented evidence from which a jury could find that her injuries had been incurred in more than one "accident." Under the facts of this case, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Wright v. Turner" on Justia Law

Claimant injured his low back while at work in April 2008, and his employer accepted his subsequent claim for a lumbar strain. Claimant was taken off work after his injury and, during the next several months, received an extensive course of chiropractic care. In An examining physician declared claimant medically stationary and released him to regular work without restriction. Based on the physician's findings, the employer issued a notice of closure that did not award benefits to claimant. Claimant was unsuccessful in his request for reconsideration. The Supreme Court, after its review of this case, concluded that the Department of Consumer and Business Services (DCBS) erred in its interpretation of the rules with regard to claimant's injury and determination for benefits. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the board for further proceedings. View "Schleiss v. SAIF Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Oregon resident, sustained injuries in a motorcycle accident that occurred in Wyoming. She filed an action in Oregon seeking damages for her injuries, naming as a defendant Grand Teton Cycles, LLC, a Harley-Davidson franchisee with a physical presence in Idaho and Wyoming. The trial court determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant and granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court allowed plaintiff's petition for review to determine whether defendant had sufficient contacts with Oregon for a court in this state to exercise specific jurisdiction over it. The Supreme Court concluded that this litigation did not arise out of or relate to defendant's activities in Oregon. However, the Court affirmed for different reasons than the Court of Appeals, and disavowed the substantive relevance test to the extent that it was advanced in "State ex rel Michelin v. Wells," (657 P2d 207 (1982)). View "Robinson v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner and her friend were crossing a street late at night when defendant, who had been drinking, hit them with his car and seriously injured them. Defendant pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence of intoxicants and two counts of assault in the fourth degree for "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caus[ing] physical injury." The trial court sentenced defendant to a combination of supervised probation, jail time, fines, and suspension of his driver's license. The trial court judgment also granted the state 90 days to submit a "reasonable final restitution amount." The state timely submitted a proposed supplemental judgment requesting that defendant be ordered to pay restitution in an amount that defendant stipulated represented the full amount of petitioner's economic damages. Petitioner filed suit, alleging that the trial court had violated her right to "receive prompt restitution" under Article I, section 42(1)(d) of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied petitioner's claim, and, pursuant to ORS 147.539, petitioner sought direct review of that order with the Supreme Court. Finding no constitutional violation, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Oregon v. Algeo" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a plaintiff was required to present expert testimony from a medical doctor to establish the standard of care and breach of the standard of care. Plaintiff presented expert testimony from a biomechanical engineer familiar with use of the medical device installed on plaintiff's cervical spine by defendant, a neurosurgeon. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence from her expert witness who was not a medical doctor to present a jury question on at least one aspect of her negligence claim. View "Trees v. Ordonez" on Justia Law