Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a Workers' Compensation employer's insurance carrier should be reimbursed from the Supersedeas Fund for specific payments made to a claimant prior to the ultimate grant of supersedeas. The question turned on whether the relevant payments constituted payments of "compensation" within the meaning of Section 443 of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), 77 P.S. 999(a), or, as argued by Appellant Bureau of Workers' Compensation, whether the payments are not reimbursable because they constitute payment of legal costs associated with obtaining a claimant's third-party tort settlement under Section 319 of the WCA, 77 P.S. 671. After review, the Court found no language in either Section 443 or Section 319 that would transform the relevant payments into something other than compensation merely because the amounts of the payments were calculated to compensate the claimant for the costs of recovering the third-party settlement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court. View "Bureau of Workers' Comp, Aplt v. WCAB(Excelsior Ins.)" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case was one of first impression: whether a medical general practitioner who provides incidental mental health treatment to a patient, with whom he then engages in a sexual affair, may be held to a particularized "specialist duty," applicable to mental health professionals, that prohibits consensual sexual contact with patients, such that the defendant general practitioner may be subject to medical malpractice liability in tort. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court declined to impose such a duty as a matter of Pennsylvania common law. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on any preserved issues remain that were not addressed as a result of the Superior Court's disposition. View "Thierfelder v. Wolfert" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this case to determine whether the immunity provisions of Section 23 of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act 44) applied to "subrogation and/or reimbursement claims sought against an employee who has entered into a third[-]party settlement with a Commonwealth [p]arty such as Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ('SEPTA')." Upon review of this matter, the Supreme Court held that the portion of Act 44 at issue in this case barred any claim made by the employer for the recoupment of workers' compensation benefits it paid. View "Fraizer v. W.C.A.B." on Justia Law

Appellants sought a new trial in this medical battery/lack-of-consent case on the ground that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the technical elements of battery, particularly the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact. They further maintained that the charge was erroneous because it instructed the jury that Appellants-Plaintiffs were required to prove that the surgeon who performed the allegedly unauthorized operation did so with the intent to harm. Viewing the jury charge in its entirety, the Supreme Court concluded that it clearly and accurately set forth the law. Contrary to Appellants' contentions, the jury charge did not require proof that the surgeon performed the operation with the intent to harm. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court, which affirmed the trial court's entry of judgment on the verdict in favor of Appellees. View "Cooper v. Lankenau Hospital, et al" on Justia Law

Ronald Bole appealed a superior court's order that affirmed an arbitration award that denied him recovery of underinsured motorist benefits. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal to determine whether the rescue doctrine allowed a volunteer firefighter responding to a crash to recover despite finding his injuries were the result of a superseding cause. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Bole could not, and did not disturb the arbitrator's determination. View "Bole v. Erie Insurance Exchange" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether it is against public policy to release reckless behavior in a pre-injury exculpatory clause. Appellant Camelback Ski Corporation, Inc. (“Camelback”) operates a ski resort in Tannersville, Pennsylvania that offers various winter activities, including skiing and snow tubing. Before permitting its patrons to enjoy snow tubing, Camelback requires each customer to sign a pre-printed release form. In 2003, Appellee Barbara Lichtman Tayar and her family visited Camelback’s facility in the early afternoon. Appellee and her family decided to join in, and, pursuant to Camelback’s requirement, Appellee signed the Release. Appellee and her family elected to use the family tubing slopes, and completed four successful runs down the mountain, with Appellant Brian Monaghan, a Camelback employee, releasing them from the summit safely each time. On the fifth time down the mountain, Appellee exited her snow tube and was immediately struck by another snow tuber coming down the slope. Employees rushed to assist Appellee out of the receiving area. As a result of the collision, Appellee suffered multiple comminuted factures of her right leg, for which she underwent surgery and required two metal plates and 14 screws to stabilize her ankle. A majority of the appellate court determined that the release at issue was valid only with respect to Camelback (and not Monaghan), and relieved Camelback from liability for only negligent conduct. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s order in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case. The Court reversed the order of the Superior Court to the degree it concluded that Monaghan was not covered by the Release. The Court affirmed the order to the degree it reversed the grant of summary judgment on the basis that the Release did not bar claims based on reckless conduct, and remanded for further proceedings; on the latter point, the Court affirmed on the alternative basis that, to the degree it released reckless conduct, the Release was against public policy.

At issue in this direct appeal to the Supreme Court was a statutory prerequisite to the obligation of the Insurance Department to defend certain medical professional liability actions asserted against health care providers, and to the requirement for payment of claims asserted in such actions from the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Fund. Specifically, resolution of the appeal turned on when, under the governing statute, a "claim" is "made" outside a specified four-year time period. On June 4, 2007, Joanna Ziv filed a praecipe for a writ of summons naming Appellant Phillip Yussen, M.D. and other medical providers as defendants. A complaint was filed on August 2, 2007, alleging medical negligence last occurring on July 7, 2003. Appellant’s primary insurer, Pennsylvania Healthcare Providers Insurance Exchange, requested that the claim be accorded Section 715 status by the Insurance Department. The Department denied such request, however, on the basis that the claim had been made less than four years after the alleged malpractice. Appellant initially challenged this determination in the administrative setting, and a hearing ensued. Before the examiner, Appellant argued that, consistent with the policy definition of a "claim," the date on which a claim is made for purposes of Section 715 cannot precede the date on which notice is provided to the insured. Appellee, on the other hand, contended that a claim is made when it is first asserted, instituted, or comes into existence - including upon the tender of a demand or the commencement of a legal action - and that notice to the insured or insurer is not a necessary prerequisite. In this regard, Appellee Medical Care Availability & Reduction of Error Fund highlighted that Section 715 does require "notice" of the claim to trigger the provider's obligation to report the claim to the Fund within 180 days, but the statute does not contain such an express notice component in delineating the four-year requirement. The Commonwealth Court sustained exceptions to the hearing examiner's recommendation lodged by Appellee and entered judgment in its favor. In its review, the Supreme Court found "claim" and "made" as used in Section 715 ambiguous. The Court determined that for purposes of Section 715, the mere filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons does not suffice to make a claim, at least in absence of some notice or demand communicated to those from whom damages are sought. The Court remanded the case for entry of judgment in Appellant's favor.

The civil action underlying this appeal was selected as a test case for the admissibility of expert opinion evidence to the effect that each and every fiber of inhaled asbestos is a substantial contributing factor to any asbestos-related disease. The inquiry has proceeded under principles derived from 'Frye v. United States' (293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)). Upon its consideration of the evidence presented by both sides, the trial court sustained the Frye challenge and precluded the plaintiffs from adducing the 'any exposure' opinion. Focusing upon methodology, the judge found no support for the any exposure theory of specific causation in any of the sources upon which the expert relied. The Superior Court majority was very critical of the trial court's treatment of the Frye challenge on several fronts. While finding error in the threshold determination, the Superior Court nevertheless proceeded to review the trial court's finding as to general acceptance, concluding that the judge had abused his discretion. At the outset, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court's decision to conduct a Frye hearing concerning the any-exposure opinion to be appropriate. While the Superior Court was correct that the trial court judge did not embellish his opinion with specific citations to the record, his findings and conclusions were 'amply supported throughout that record nonetheless.' The Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse his discretion in its Frye assessment. The order of the Superior Court was reversed, and the case was remanded for consideration of whether there were remaining, preserved issues on appeal which were obviated by the intermediate court's approach to the common pleas court's ruling.

This appeal arose out of a medical-device product liability action in which a strict liability, design-defect theory was asserted. Given that the surgical instrument at issue was said to have multiple applications, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the trial court's threshold risk-utility analysis should have been limited to the particular one alleged to have caused the decedent harm. Additionally, the appeal was allowed to consider the degree to which an appellate court is bound by such weight and credibility determinations as may be made by a trial court in a risk-utility assessment. The decedent Sandra Selepec, underwent gastric bypass surgery in August 2002. The surgeon used a product manufactured by Appellee Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. known as an ETS-Flex45 Articulating Endoscopic Linear Cutter, or an "endocutter." Appellee also marketed its product as being useful in more traditional surgery, in which larger incisions are made to expose organs to open view and accessibility. Mrs. Selepec's surgery was of this latter kind. During recovery, Mrs. Selepec experienced complications, and surgeons reentered her abdomen to discover that two of the bypass staples failed. On the merits, Appellee argued that courts applying the risk-utility analysis have always considered the risks, benefits, and design constraints associated with all intended uses of a product; to artificially limit the risk utility analysis to the particular use to which a plaintiff put a product in a particular case would be to ignore the inherent, essential characteristics that informed the design; and to hold multi-use products to the same standard as single-use products would be tantamount to requiring the sale of multiple single-use products, which would be inefficient and impractical, if not impossible. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that trial courts are not restricted to considering a single use of a multiuse product in design defect, threshold, risk-utility balancing. The Court also declined to disturb the Superior Court's legal determination as to the appropriate risk-utility calculus.

In this appeal by allowance, the Supreme Court considered whether the "separate disease" rule (also referred to as the "two-disease" rule) allows an individual to bring separate lawsuits for more than one malignant disease which allegedly resulted from the same asbestos exposure. The matter arose from Appellee Herbert Daley's 1989 diagnosis of pulmonary asbestosis and squamous-cell carcinoma in his right lung. He filed suit against several defendants seeking compensatory damages for work-related injuries and settled. In 2005, Appellee filed suit against US Supply, Duro-Dyne and A.W. Chesterson alleging that a late diagnosis of mesothelioma was caused by the same exposure that resulted in his lung cancer. The companies argued that Pennsylvania had not adopted the two-disease rule, and that his mesothelioma diagnosis was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Upon review, the Court concluded that the rule did apply, and, accordingly, the Court affirmed an order of the Superior Court, which reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of U.S. Supply Co. and Duro-Dyne Corp.