Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This case raised the question of whether an uninsured driver who was injured in a motor vehicle accident with an insured driver, may sue the insured driver in tort for economic damages. "The question highlight[ed] a tension" in the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S. 1701-1799, and Pennsylvania decisional precedent, as noted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. On the one hand, Section 1714 of the MVFRL prohibits uninsured drivers from recovering first-party benefits, which include medical and income loss benefits. On the other, Section 1705 of the MVFRL deems uninsured drivers to have chosen the limited tort alternative, which permits recovery of damages for economic loss sustained in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of another person. Loss is commonly understood as being comprised of damages for medical expenses and wage loss. "Thus, it may appear as though the MVFRL both prohibits and permits insurance recovery to uninsured drivers for this category of damages or loss." The Supreme Court answered the question posed by the Third Circuit in the negative: Section 1714 of the MVFRL does not preclude an uninsured motorist from recovering tort damages for economic loss from an alleged third-party tortfeasor under the torfeasor’s liability coverage.

Brothers-Appellees Gerald and Louis Garzone are licensed funeral home directors in Philadelphia. They contracted with a business that sold human cadavers and harvested tissue for resale and medical use. The arrangement was undertaken without the knowledge or consent of the families of the deceased and continued through September 2005, at which point Michael Mastromarino, owner of Biomedical Tissue Services, learned that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was investigating him. Mastromarino advised Appellees to destroy their records days before FDA investigators arrived. A grand jury charged Appellees with 244 counts of theft by unlawful taking (of body parts), abuse of corpses, and various other charges. Appellees informed the Commonwealth that they intended to continue to trial, even knowing that all other codefendants intended to plead guilty and cooperate with the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth prepared for trial, but on the scheduled trial date, Appellees pleaded guilty to all charges. At sentencing, the Commonwealth asked if the court would "consider requiring the defendants to pay cost[s] of prosecution or a portion," arguing that its personnel had to devote extensive resources and hours to prepare for a long trial. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether a trial court may order a convicted offender to pay the costs of the Commonwealth (for the sum total of salaries of the attorneys, investigators and other officials involved in preparing for trial). The Superior Court vacated the trial court’s imposition of such costs. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court: "Although our reasoning does not track that of the panel below, we are in agreement with its central holding that, "[a]lthough the crimes in this case are particularly heinous, if the General Assembly intended to permit such recovery of regularly paid salaries of assistant district attorneys and detectives to be costs associated with the prosecution, the Legislature would have expressly done so."

The Supreme Court granted review of this case to consider whether a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) exists where the emotional distress results from a "negligent breach of a contractual or fiduciary duty," absent physical impact or injury. After review of the development of the tort of NIED under Pennsylvania law and that of other states, the Court concluded that it was appropriate to extend liability for the infliction of emotional distress to a limited "species" of cases. Specifically, the Court suggested that NIED was not available in "garden-variety breach of contractual or fiduciary duty cases," but only in those cases where there exists a special relationship where it is foreseeable that a breach of the relevant duty would result in emotional harm so extreme that a reasonable person should not be expected to endure the resulting distress. The Court further concluded that recovery for NIED claims does not require a physical impact.

Appellant Brenda Jones was involved in an automobile accident with another driver that caused damage to her vehicle. Appellant's insurance policy with Nationwide Property and Casualty Company (Nationwide) included collision coverage for the vehicle involved, subject to a $500 deductible. The policy also provided Nationwide with the right of subrogation. Nationwide paid Appellant for all damage to the vehicle, reduced by the $500 deductible. Nationwide then filed a subrogation claim against the other driver and recovered under the other driver's liability coverage. The recovery, while in excess of Appellant's deductible, was only ninety percent of the amount Nationwide paid Appellant under the collision coverage policy. Nationwide paid Jones a pro rata share of the subrogation award by reimbursing her for ninety percent of her deductible, which amounted to $450. Appellant filed a class action against Nationwide claiming that Nationwide's uniform practice of pro rating reimbursements of deductibles violated the "made whole" doctrine. All claims were based upon Appellant's conclusion that Nationwide should have reimbursed her for her entire $500 deductible, despite the provision in the policy granting Nationwide subrogation rights. Appellant also sought injunctive relief to stop Nationwide's practice of pro rata deductible reimbursement. The Supreme Court concluded that the "made whole" doctrine did not apply to the collision coverage at issue in this case, the Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellant's class action.

Appellant Anne Marie Morack worked for Appellee Gentex Corporation for over thirty years. In 2005, she left when swelling and pain in her hands were too overwhelming for her to continue work. She sought medical help, and notified her employer of the pain. In early 2005, Appellant applied for short-term disability, noting on her application for benefits that she did not believe her injury was work-related. After consultation with a specialist, Appellee learned that her injury was work-related. Gentex ultimately appealed the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board's decision granting Appellant's claim to the Commonwealth Court, contending that Appellant did not timely notify her supervisor of the injury nor aptly describe the injury to comply with the state workers' compensation act. The Commonwealth Court reversed, finding Appellant did not aptly describe her injury nor give Gentex adequate notice. The Supreme Court granted allocatur to determine what constitutes sufficient notice under the Act, and to "speak to" an employer's duty to conduct reasonable investigations into the circumstances surrounding a work-related injury. Under the Act, notice is a prerequisite to receive workers' compensation benefits, and the claimant bears the burden of demonstrating that proper notice was given. Upon review of the applicable case law in this instance, the Court found that, "consistent with the humanitarian purposes of the Act, [the Court] made it clear that even imperfect notice can satisfy" its strictures. The Court employed a "totality of the circumstances" approach to determining whether Appellant in this case both satisfied the notice and description of the injury in making her claim for benefits. In reversing the Commonwealth Court, the Supreme Court found that Appellant's collective communications with Gentex satisfied the notification requirements of the Act.

Appellant Walnut Street Associates (WSA) provides insurance brokerage services and helps employers obtain health insurance for their employees. Appellee Brokerage Concepts, Inc. (BCI) is a third party administrator of employee benefit plans. Procacci retained BCI as administrator of its insurance plans, and BCI paid commissions to WSA based on premiums paid by Procacci. In 2005, Procacci requested BCI reduce its costs, but BCI would not meet Procacciâs proposal. Procacci then notified BCI that it would take its business elsewhere. BCI asked Procacci to reconsider, and in the process, disclosed to Procacci how much it paid to WSA as its broker. The amount was higher than Procacci believed WSA had been earning, but there was no dispute that BCIâs statements about WSAâs compensation were true. As a result of BCIâs letter, Procacci terminated its contract with WSA. WSA sued BCI alleging that BCI tortiously interfered with the WSA/Procacci contract by disclosing the amount of WSAâs compensation. BCI argued that it could not be liable for tortious interference because what it said was true, or otherwise justified and privileged. At trial, the jury found that BCI did interfere in the WSA/Procacci contract. BCI appealed, and the appellate court reversed the trial courtâs judgment. The appellate court adopted a section of the Restatement of Torts, which said that truth is a defense to a claim of tortious interference. WSA maintained that the Restatement was not applicable according to Pennsylvania law. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and adopted the Restatement defense that truth is a defense to claims of tortious interference with contractual relations. The Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court.

In 1998, Appellee Stephen Heim filed a professional liability action against two doctors and their medical practices alleging that their negligent care from 1992 to 1996 caused the death of his wife. In August 2000, Mr. Heim received a jury verdict for over $1 million. The jury attributed a substantial percentage of fault to Mrs. Heim, and apportioned the remaining liability among the defendant doctors, which they bore jointly and severally. At the time of the alleged negligent acts, the doctors each maintained primary professional liability insurance coverage for $200,000 per occurrence under a policy issued by a private insurer. That insurer went bankrupt, and the policy was assumed by the Pennsylvania Property and Casualty Association (PPCIGA). Excess liability protection was provided to health care providers through a government-run contingency fund known as the Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund (CAT Fund). It was determined that the primary insurance policy left a $100,000 shortfall in order to satisfy Mr. Heimâs judgment. The CAT Fund determined it had no responsibility to redress the shortfall from the primary insurerâs bankruptcy. With no insurance money to protect them, Mr. Heim sued against the doctorsâ assets seeking to recover the unpaid portion of the judgment that neither the insurance company nor the CAT Fund would pay. The Commonwealth Court ruled in Mr. Heimâs favor, but in accordance with joint and several liability, applied the order to both PPCIGA and the CAT Fund. The Fund appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that under the statutory scheme that governs the CAT Fund, the facts of this case clearly implicated the Fundâs responsibility to the doctors to pay for the $100,000 shortfall left by their primary insurance policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court.