Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Michael Kosor, Jr., a homeowner in Southern Highlands, a Las Vegas residential common-interest community, sued the Southern Highlands Community Association (HOA) and its developer, Southern Highlands Development Corporation (SHDC), for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the homeowners' right to elect the HOA's board of directors. Kosor claimed that the community had surpassed the 75% home-sale threshold, ending the declarant control period, yet SHDC continued to appoint three of the five board members, violating homeowners' voting rights. The HOA and SHDC disputed Kosor's interpretation and calculations.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County denied Kosor's motion for a temporary restraining order, largely denied the HOA's and SHDC's motion to dismiss, and denied Kosor's motion for summary judgment. Kosor then sought to voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice, but the court dismissed it with prejudice and awarded fees and costs to the HOA and SHDC. Kosor appealed but later withdrew his appeal, acknowledging that he could not reinstate it or raise the same issues again. Subsequently, the HOA and SHDC sought additional fees and costs incurred on appeal, prompting Kosor to file a motion under NRCP 60(b)(4), arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to noncompliance with NRS 38.310's pre-suit ADR requirement.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that NRS 38.310, which mandates pre-suit mediation or arbitration for certain HOA-related claims, is a procedural claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement. The court determined that the district court had jurisdiction despite the parties' noncompliance with NRS 38.310 and properly denied Kosor's motion to vacate its judgment and fee-award orders as jurisdictionally void. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. View "KOSOR VS. S. HIGHLANDS CMTY. ASS'N" on Justia Law

Mary Roth and Aric Roth filed a lawsuit against Gary Meyer and other members of the Meyer family, including trustees of the Jean L. Ehrmantrout Residuary Trust, seeking to quiet title to a 10-acre property in Grant County, North Dakota. Gary Meyer had lived on the property since 1962 and believed he owned it, despite a 1982 conveyance to Dolores Meyer’s father, Anthony Ehrmantrout. Gary and Mary Roth cohabitated on the property from 2002 to 2022, during which time Gary conveyed his interest to Mary via quitclaim deed in 2010, and she later conveyed it to her son, Aric.The District Court of Grant County initially found that Gary Meyer had gained title to the property through adverse possession and quieted title in favor of Aric Roth. The court also ordered Gary Meyer to pay Mary Roth $52,500 for loans she had made to him, finding unjust enrichment. The Meyers appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its findings on adverse possession and unjust enrichment.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s finding of unjust enrichment, agreeing that Gary Meyer was enriched by the loans and had not repaid them, thus impoverishing Mary Roth. However, the Supreme Court found that the district court erred in its adverse possession analysis. The court noted that adverse possession requires clear and convincing evidence of actual, visible, continuous, notorious, distinct, and hostile possession for 20 years. The court found the district court’s findings insufficient to establish hostile possession, particularly given the family relationship and lack of evidence of hostile acts.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment on unjust enrichment but reversed the decision to quiet title in favor of Aric Roth. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "Roth v. Meyer" on Justia Law

In 2019, the New York Legislature enacted the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act (HSTPA), expanding rent stabilization to all municipalities in the state. The City of Kingston declared a housing emergency on August 1, 2022, opting into the Emergency Tenant Protection Act (ETPA). Petitioners, a group of landlords, sought to invalidate Kingston's opt-in and two guidelines set by the Kingston New York Rent Guidelines Board (KRGB).The Supreme Court upheld Kingston's emergency declaration, finding the city's survey methodology reasonable. However, it vacated the KRGB guidelines, ruling that the fair market rent guideline required a case-by-case determination and that the rent adjustment guideline lacked statutory authority.The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court's order, reinstating the KRGB guidelines. It held that the emergency declaration was based on a good faith study and that the fair market rent guideline did not require a case-by-case assessment. The rent adjustment guideline was also upheld, as the ETPA allows for rent adjustments without specifying that they must be upward.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. It found that the City's 2022 survey was reasonably reliable and relevant, supporting the emergency declaration. The court also upheld the fair market rent guideline, noting that it did not have an impermissibly retroactive effect, as no refunds were issued for periods before August 1, 2020. The challenge to the rent adjustment guideline was deemed unpreserved and not properly before the court. View "Matter of Hudson Val. Prop. Owners Assn. Inc. v City of Kingston" on Justia Law

KJ Carpenter purchased a vacant lot in a development governed by a Declaration of Restrictions and Obligations (DRO) that required all building plans to be approved by the Architectural Review Committee (Committee). Carpenter initially submitted a building proposal with asphalt shingles, which was approved. Later, he submitted an amended plan requesting a full metal roof, which was denied based on the restrictive covenant limiting roofing materials to cedar shakes, cedar shingles, or earth-toned colored shingles.Carpenter filed a lawsuit seeking court approval to construct a home with a full metal roof, arguing that the Committee had previously approved metal roofing for other houses, thereby waiving the restrictive covenant. He also contended that the "no waiver" clause in the DRO did not apply because the Committee's prior approvals were not in response to breaches.The District Court of Burleigh County granted summary judgment in favor of Southbay Homeowners Association, holding that Carpenter failed to raise any genuine issues of material fact. The court found that the restrictive covenant was clear and unambiguous, and the "no waiver" clause allowed the Committee to approve metal roofs for other properties while denying Carpenter's request.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that the "no waiver" clause precluded Carpenter from claiming a waiver of the restrictive covenant. The court held that the Committee's approval of partial metal roofs did not constitute a breach, but the two homes with full metal roofs were in violation of the DRO. The court concluded that Carpenter did not demonstrate a clear intent to waive both the restrictive covenant and the "no waiver" clause, and thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment. Southbay's request for costs and attorney's fees was denied. View "Carpenter v. Southbay Homeowners Association" on Justia Law

Brandon James Caldwell and Jenny Lynn Caldwell were married in 2008 and later moved to Montana. They separated in June 2020, and Jenny filed for dissolution of marriage, proposing a parenting plan for their three minor children. The District Court issued several interim parenting plans but did not finalize one. The couple reached a Property Settlement Agreement in April 2021, agreeing to divide their assets, including two homes. Disputes arose over the appraisal of their marital home in Highwood, Montana, leading to further court proceedings.The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, held multiple hearings and allowed a second appraisal of the Highwood property, despite Brandon's objections. The court found the initial appraisal undervalued the property and ordered a new appraisal to ensure an equitable division of assets. The final decree, issued in March 2024, included the second appraisal's value but did not incorporate a final parenting plan, which was an oversight.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court's decision to allow a second appraisal and use its value for property division, finding no abuse of discretion. The court emphasized the need for accurate property valuation to achieve equitable distribution. However, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the District Court to issue a final parenting plan based on the existing record, as required by Montana law. The final decree was otherwise affirmed. View "Marriage of: Caldwell" on Justia Law

A limited partnership, owning an apartment complex in Norman, Oklahoma, transferred its general and limited partnership interests to new owners in 2022. The Cleveland County Assessor subsequently increased the fair cash value of the property from $18,437,401 in 2022 to $42,500,000 in 2023, exceeding the constitutionally allowed 5% annual increase for ad valorem taxation. The partnership, Icon, protested this increase, arguing that the transfer of partnership interests did not constitute a transfer of property title.The Cleveland County Board of Equalization denied Icon's protest, and the Oklahoma Court of Tax Review granted summary judgment in favor of the Assessor, concluding that the transfer of partnership interests was equivalent to a transfer of property title, thus lifting the 5% cap on valuation increases. Icon appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the transfer of partnership interests should be treated as a transfer of property title under Okla. Const. art. 10, §8B. The court held that the transfer of partnership interests was a transfer of personal property, not real property, and did not constitute a transfer, change, or conveyance of the property title. Therefore, the 5% cap on annual increases in property valuation for ad valorem taxation should not have been lifted. The court vacated the Oklahoma Court of Tax Review's order and remanded the case. View "THE ICON AT NORMAN APTS, LP v. DOUGLAS WARR, CLEVELAND COUNTY ASSESSOR" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the sale of real property. Patricia Ann Scott, the seller, previously sued real estate agent Kaylee Schnelle for professional negligence, alleging mishandling of the sale. Schnelle's motions for summary judgment and directed verdict were denied, and the jury found in her favor. Subsequently, Schnelle filed a malicious prosecution claim against Scott and her attorneys, arguing they lacked probable cause and conspired against her. The defendants moved to dismiss, citing the prior denials as evidence of probable cause.The district court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the previous denials were factors to consider but did not conclusively establish probable cause. The court found Schnelle's allegations sufficient to support her claim. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that the denials did not create a rebuttable presumption of probable cause.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case to determine if such denials should create a rebuttable presumption of probable cause. The court concluded that while the denials are factors in the probable cause analysis, they do not create a rebuttable presumption. The court emphasized the need for a careful, case-by-case analysis rather than a bright-line rule. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the denials of summary judgment and directed verdict motions do not establish probable cause as a matter of law. View "Cantafio v. Schnelle" on Justia Law

Steve Kovachevich, a homebuyer, was required to purchase private mortgage insurance (PMI) when he took out a mortgage with a down payment of less than 20%. After a year, he requested his mortgage servicer, LoanCare, to cancel his PMI. LoanCare initially denied the request, stating he had not paid down enough of his mortgage to qualify for cancellation under the Homeowners Protection Act (HPA). However, LoanCare agreed to voluntarily cancel the PMI upon meeting certain conditions, which Kovachevich fulfilled. Subsequently, he sought a refund of the prepaid PMI premiums from the mortgage insurer, National Mortgage Insurance Corporation (NMIC), but was denied.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Kovachevich’s claim under the HPA, ruling that he was not entitled to a refund of unearned premiums under § 4902(f) because his PMI was canceled voluntarily and not under the statutory benchmarks of the HPA. The court also dismissed his state-law claims of unjust enrichment and conversion, stating it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction after dismissing the federal claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Kovachevich’s HPA claim, agreeing that § 4902(f) only mandates refunds for PMI canceled under the statutory benchmarks, not for voluntary cancellations. However, the appellate court vacated the dismissal of the state-law claims and remanded them to the district court to consider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. View "Kovachevich v. National Mortgage Insurance Corporation" on Justia Law

In 1997, William Brokaw Price’s parents entered into a contract with Carri Scharf Trucking, Inc. (CST) for surface-level mining on their property. The contract allowed CST to extract sand, gravel, and topsoil in exchange for royalty payments. As the contract neared its end in 2010, Bill Price, Brokaw’s father, communicated with CST about future plans for the property but passed away shortly after. Years later, Brokaw discovered that the property had not been reclaimed as required by the contract, leading to a dispute over CST’s reclamation obligations and alleged trespassing.The Prices sued CST for breach of contract, and CST counterclaimed for breach based on the Prices’ trespass accusations. The first trial ended in a mistrial, and the second trial resulted in a verdict for CST. The district court denied the Prices’ motion for judgment as a matter of law and rejected CST’s request for attorney’s fees under the contract’s fee-shifting provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the contract did not set a firm deadline for reclamation and allowed for a jury to resolve factual disputes about the instructions given by Bill Price. The jury had a sufficient basis for its verdict in favor of CST. Additionally, the court held that CST was not entitled to attorney’s fees because the contract’s fee-shifting provision only applied to parties enforcing the contract’s terms, and CST’s successful defense did not trigger that provision. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects. View "Price v Carri Scharf Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

A charter city in California entered into an agreement with a private developer to revitalize a nearly vacant mall into a multipurpose development. The city contributed approximately $51.36 million in local funds for public improvements, while the developer invested $143 million of its own funds and obtained additional loans. The developer selected the contractors and paid workers less than the prevailing wage, relying on a city ordinance exempting the project from the Prevailing Wage Law (PWL).The Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) determined that the project was subject to the PWL, as it involved public funds. The developer challenged this determination, but the Superior Court of Riverside County affirmed the DIR's decision, concluding that the project was not a municipal affair exempt from the PWL.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that the project was not a municipal affair under the home rule provision of the California Constitution. The court distinguished this case from others where charter cities directly managed and funded public works projects. Here, the developer controlled the construction, selected contractors, and bore the majority of the financial burden. The court concluded that the primary purpose of the project was to benefit the developer, not the city, and thus, the PWL applied. The judgment was affirmed, and the DIR was awarded costs on appeal. View "Palm Springs Promenade, LLC v. Dept. of Industrial Relations" on Justia Law