Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a UPS driver, was delivering a package to the home of Defendants when he was bitten on his arm and leg by one of Defendants’ dogs. Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants, alleging that he was injured as a result of Defendants’ negligence in failing to secure their dogs. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact about whether Defendants knew of the dog’s vicious propensity. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that material issues of fact existed that could permit a fact-finder that the dog did have a vicious propensity and that Defendants knew of it. View "Coogan v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Rose Nulman Park Foundation, owned real property that was used as a park. In 2011, Defendants, Robert Lamoureux and Four Twenty Corporation, completed construction on a $1.8 million home. A prospective buyer of the home had a survey conducted which revealed that the building was entirely located on Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants, asserting that the structure constituted a continuing trespass on the property and requesting a mandatory injunction ordering Defendants to remove the structure. The trial justice concluded that a 13,000 square foot intrusion, amounting to six percent of the Nulman property, was not a de minimus encroachment and, accordingly, ordered Defendants to remove the structure. The Supreme Court affirmed after concluding that it would be unjust to order the transfer of title to a portion of the Nulman property to Defendants or to award only money damages, holding that injunctive relief was the appropriate remedy in this case. View "Rose Nulman Park Found. v. Four Twenty Corp." on Justia Law

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires that all pilots obtain and maintain a valid medical certificate. After he was involved in motor-vehicle accident, Plaintiff, a commercial pilot, surrendered his medical certificate at the request at the FAA. Plaintiff subsequently sought reinstatement from the FAA. The FAA retained Defendant, a physician, as a medical consultant to opine whether Plaintiff met the FAA’s criteria for alcohol dependence. After reviewing certain medical documents, Defendant determined that Plaintiff was substance dependent. Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging that Defendant was negligent in making his report and that the FAA had relied on Defendant’s conclusion to Plaintiff’s detriment. The superior court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of care to accurately reach or report the conclusions of his records review. The Supreme Court quashed the order of the superior court, holding that Defendant did not owe Plaintiff a duty of care in this case. View "Woodruff v. Gitlow" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was crossing a street when she was struck by a vehicle operated by John Faelle, owned by Hertz Corporation, and purportedly rented to Anthony Carroccio. Plaintiff filed an action against Faelle, Hertz, and Carroccio. Hertz moved for summary judgment, arguing that it did not consent to Faelle’s operation of the vehicle that struck Plaintiff and, alternatively, that 49 U.S.C. 30106, the Graves Amendment, precluded the vicarious liability of Hertz as the owner of the vehicle. The superior court granted Hertz’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment was not appropriate where (1) Hertz’s consent to Faelle’s operation of the vehicle remained an issue of material fact; and (2) the rental record did not establish the period of the rental for purposes of the Graves Amendment because it did not identify the vehicle involved in the accident. Remanded for trial. View "Marble v. Faelle" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit, individually and per proxima amici, against numerous defendants, alleging, inter alia, negligence, lack of informed consent, and vicarious liability for injuries sustained by their minor daughter, Yendee, who was born with a genetic blood disorder. Four groups of defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-14.1(1), an act that tolls the three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims when the person claiming injury is a minor, barred Plaintiffs’ claims. The trial justice entered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that all of Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred but that Yendee retained the right to bring suit on her own behalf when she reached the age of majority, and up to three years thereafter. After issuing an order to show cause, the Supreme Court (1) vacated the judgments entered in favor of defendants Corning Incorporated and Quest Diagnostics, LLC because Plaintiffs’ allegations against these defendants were not medical malpractice claims; and (2) directed that Plaintiffs’ appeal, as well as the appeals and cross-appeals of Rhode Island Hospital, Miriam Hospital, Women & Infants Hospital and each hospital’s associated medical professionals, be assigned to the Court’s regular calendar for further briefing and argument. View "Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company and other defendants, alleging multiple counts. A jury found Defendants liable for abuse of process and awarded compensatory and punitive damages against each defendant. On May 31, 2012, judgments were entered against Defendants. On August 31, 2012, Metropolitan filed an appeal from the May 31, 2012 judgment, and on September 18, 2012, Plaintiff filed a notice of cross-appeal from the May 31, 2012 judgment. Metropolitan moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s cross-appeal, arguing that it was untimely because it was not filed within the initial twenty-day appeal period that began to run after entry of the August 20, 2012 orders. The trial justice denied Metropolitan’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff’s cross-appeal was timely because it was filed within twenty days of Metropolitan’s August 31, 2012 notice of appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s September 18, 2012 notice of cross-appeal was timely because it was filed within the twenty-day period triggered by Metropolitan’s August 31, 2012 notice of appeal. View "Miller v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Scott Cohen’s vehicle collided with the rear of Antonio Soares’s stopped vehicle because Cohen's vision was temporarily impaired by the glare from the morning sun. Cohen waved to Kris Ellinwood, a police officer who was directing traffic at the time, to approach the scene. Cohen assured Ellinwood that everyone was unharmed but did not mention the sun glare. Ellinwood was writing down information in between Cohen's and Soares's vehicles when Andrew Thornley, who did not see Cohen’s vehicle due to solar glare, struck the rear of Cohen’s vehicle, causing Ellinwood to be pinned between Cohen’s and Soares’s vehicles and crushing his legs. Ellinwood filed an action against Cohen, alleging that Cohen negligently failed to warn him of the solar glare, a dangerous condition. The superior court granted Cohen’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the public safety officer’s rule shielded Cohen from liability. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the public-safety officer’s rule barred Ellinwood’s negligence claim as a matter of law because Ellinwood could have reasonably foreseen that he could be struck and injured by another vehicle while coming to Cohen’s assistance. View "Ellinwood v. Cohen" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff’s car was struck from behind by a car operated by Defendant, Plaintiff began experiencing pain in her back and legs, which led to two surgical procedures on her spine. Plaintiff filed a negligence suit against Defendants seeking damages. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff and awarded her damages in the amount of $193,584. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial and/or additur, contending that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that the jury’s damages award failed adequately to compensate her for her injuries so as to shock the conscience. The superior court granted an additur of $428, 416 to the jury award and, if Defendants rejected the additur, granted Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the limited issue of damages. Defendants rejected the additur. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s grant of Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the issue of damages, holding that the trial justice (1) adequately set forth sufficient record evidence to support his independent judgment; and (2) was not clearly wrong in determining that the jury’s award of damages was inadequate. View "Rose v. Cariello" on Justia Law

A work van being driven by cable installer Nelson Ovalles collided with a car being driven by Barbara Cayer. Cayer filed a lawsuit against Ovalles and the company on whose behalf Ovalles apparently performed cable-installation work, Cox Rhode Island Telecom, LLC (“Cox”). Cox filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it could not be vicariously liable for Ovalles’s actions because it did not own the vehicle or have an employment relationship with Ovalles. The superior court granted the motion. Cayer appealed, contending (1) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Ovalles was Cox’s employee at the time of the accident, and (2) the superior court erred by denying her motion to amend her complaint to assert claims against a contractor for Cox. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Cox because Ovalles could not be considered Cox’s employee; and (2) denied and dismissed the appeal with regard to the motion to amend, holding that it was improperly before the Court because the order denying Cayer’s motion to amend did not fall within an exception to the final-judgment rule. View "Cayer v. Cox R.I. Telecom, LLC" on Justia Law

Mary Cummings, a participant in a charitable fundraising walk for the benefit of Defendants, was injured when she was struck by a vehicle operated by James Brown, an employee of Bluelinx Corporation. Cummings settled all claims against all Defendants. Brown and Bluelinx then filed suit against Defendants seeking contribution toward the settlement. A jury found that Defendants’s negligence was the proximate cause of Cummings’s injuries and apportioned Defendants’ fault at twenty percent. The superior court subsequently granted Defendants’ renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that there was not a legally sufficient basis for the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, as a matter of law, there was no cognizable duty of care owed by Defendants in this case. View "Brown v. Stanley" on Justia Law