Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff received a wound from a dog bite from a pit bull. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, the owner of the building where the dog bite occurred. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, finding that the dog bite at issue occurred within the enclosure of the owner or keeper of the dog. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the second-floor apartment where the dog bite occurred was a separate enclosure for purposes of R.I. Gen. Laws 4-13-16. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) absent an inquiry into whether the second-floor apartment was kept locked and whether Defendant was excluded from the premises, it was impossible to determine whether the second-floor apartment was a separate enclosure within Defendant's house; and (2) there was a disputed issue of material fact was to whether Defendant knew of or permitted the dog's presence on his premises. View "Carreiro v. Tobin" on Justia Law

The underlying litigation arose from a real estate dispute between Plaintiff and several neighbors of Plaintiff (collectively, Codefendants). Codefendants retained attorneys (Attorney Defendants) to represent them in the property dispute. Attorney Defendants filed a notice of intent on behalf of Codefendants asserting Codefendants' right to their own property. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants and later amended his complaint setting forth claims against Attorney Defendants for slander and title and intentional interference with prospective advantage. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Attorney Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to establish an essential element of his claim of slander of title; and (2) the notice of intent could not be said to constitute an improper act of interference, and therefore, Attorney Defendants were entitled to summary judgment with respect to the intentional interference claim. View "Beauregard v. Gouin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in a motor-vehicle collision with an underinsured driver (Tortfeasor). Tortfeasor was insured by Progressive Insurance Company (Progressive). Progressive paid Plaintiff its policy limits of $25,000. Plaintiff then sought recovery for personal injuries pursuant to the uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions (UM/UIM coverage) of her policy with Encompass Insurance Company (Encompass). Arbitrators issued a total award of $172,750. Plaintiff sought confirmation of the arbitration award. Encompass objected, arguing that Plaintiff's UM/UIM policy provided $100,000 maximum coverage, that Encompass had paid the policy limits in accordance with the insurance contract, and that, under Rhode Island law, Plaintiff was not entitled to recover from Encompass in excess of her policy limits. The trial justice vacated the portion of the award in excess of the $100,000 policy limit and confirmed the remainder of the arbitration award. The Supreme Court vacated the order of the superior court and directed that the arbitration award be reinstated in its entirety, holding that the superior court was incorrect in its interpretation of the law, and no grounds for modification or vacation of the award existed. View "Wheeler v. Encompass Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Nelson and Elaine Cruz, filed a complaint against the car dealership where Nelson purchased his vehicle (Ricky Smith), alleging that while Nelson was cleaning the inside of his minivan, both front airbags unexpectedly deployed, injuring him. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged negligence, strict products liability, negligent misrepresentation, and res ipsa loquitur. In addition, Elaine sought damages for loss of consortium. The trial justice granted Ricky Smith's motion for summary judgment on all counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice properly granted summary judgment in Ricky Smith's favor on Nelson's claims of negligence and misrepresentation, and consequently, Elaine was barred from recovering damages for loss of consortium. View "Cruz v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp." on Justia Law

After she slipped and fell on an icy surface, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging negligence by Defendant in failing property to maintain its property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, finding, among other things, that Defendant, a commercial lessor, did not have a duty of care to Plaintiff, an invitee of a tenant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in finding that Defendant owed no duty of care to Plaintiff; and (2) Plaintiff's argument that the trial court erred in denying her request for a continuance to conduct further discovery was waived, and even if the issue not been waived, the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in declining to grant a continuance. View "Berard v. HCP, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in a civil action brought by the State against various former lead pigment manufacturers and the Lead Industries Association. In this opinion, the Court considered appeals from two superior court rulings concerning the apportionment of co-examiners' fees in particular and the payment of costs in general. The Court first considered the State's appeal from an order granting the motion of certain defendants for the reimbursement of all previously paid fees, costs, and expenses related to the engagement of the co-examiners. At issue here was whether the State was responsible for such expenses under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Court then addressed certain defendants' appeal from an order denying their motion for an award of allowable costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the superior court, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in concluding that the State waived its sovereign immunity because it filed the underlying lawsuit and in ordering the State to reimburse the defendants for the costs associated with the co-examiners; and (2) the totality of the circumstances supported the trial justice's determination that each party should bear its own costs. View "State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n " on Justia Law

This case arose from a public-nuisance lawsuit filed by the State in 1999 against Sherwin-Williams and other paint companies not relevant to this appeal. Defendants prevailed on appeal. The parties then began to dispute the expenses involved with defending the lead-paint cases. Sherwin-Williams filed a motion for a protective order prohibiting the disclosure of and the use of an internal company document through which the State sought to demonstrate that Sherwin-Williams had benefited from significant insurance coverage when it defended the underlying lawsuit. The superior court denied the order. Sherwin-Williams appealed, arguing that the disclosure of the document would offend the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's denial of Sherwin-Williams' motion, holding that the document was protected under the work-product doctrine and that this doctrine was not waived. Remanded with directions to enter an appropriate protective order. View "State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a civil action against the City of Providence for personal injuries she suffered after a school bus she was operating fell into a sinkhole on a city roadway. The trial court found that the City was negligent and awarded Plaintiff $59,239 in damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in admitting certain affidavits into evidence because the affidavits were subscribed and sworn to under oath in the presence of a notary and therefore met legislative requirements; and (2) the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in ruling that the collateral-source rule excluded evidence of Plaintiff's receipt of workers' compensation benefits. View "Morel v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sustained injuries when he was shot by Defendant, a police officer. Plaintiff filed a civil action against Defendant seeking damages. The jury entered a verdict in Defendant's favor, finding Plaintiff did not prove that Defendant acted unreasonably under the circumstances when he shot and injured Plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed, asserting that he was unfairly prejudiced when the trial justice allowed Defendant to introduce into evidence a redacted police department database report that included Plaintiff's basic biographical information, his mug shot, and a reference to his arrest for possession of a shotgun in 1992. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting the redacted report. View "Thomas v. Proctor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action against Bishop Hendricken High School and its agents alleging negligence, contending that the school failed to supervise its students and failed to protect its students by using safety glass in a bathroom window. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that the school did not breach its duty to provide a safe learning environment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to prove the existence of a disputed issue of material fact regarding Defendants' duty to supervise; and (2) Plaintiff presented no evidence that would show it was foreseeable that a student could be injured as a result of the school's failure to install safety glass. View "Daniels v. Fluette" on Justia Law