Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was crossing a street by foot when she was struck by a vehicle driven by Defendant. Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging negligence, and Defendant's employer (Employer). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. The trial justice denied Plaintiff's motion for a new trial, concluding that reasonable minds could differ over the evidence. Plaintiff appealed, contending her motion for a new trial should have been granted because the evidence preponderated against the jury's verdict. The supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice was not clearly wrong in ruling that reasonable minds could disagree about whether Defendant could or should have seen Plaintiff before his vehicle struck her, and the trial justice did not overlook material evidence when she did not specifically address photographs taken immediately after the accident. View "Mead v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., Inc." on Justia Law

Dean Pepper, the owner and sole shareholder of D.F. Pepper Construction (DFP) was driving one of his trucks home in the early winter morning. An icy road caused the truck to slide into Pepper's house and crash through the foundation and west wall. The house was later condemned and demolished as a result of the damage. The house was insured by Nationwide Casualty Insurance Company. Nationwide paid the loss. As subrogee of Pepper, Nationwide then sued DFP, the registered owner of the truck, alleging vicarious liability for the negligence of its employee, Pepper. The superior court issued judgment in favor of Nationwide, finding that Pepper had been negligent and that the antisubrogation rule did not apply in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. D.F. Pepper Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

Dr. James Gallo treated Plaintiff in 2003 and 2004. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Gallo and West Bay Psychiatry Associations, including claims for slander for remarks uttered in two separate proceedings. The first alleged slander occurred when Gallo's deposition was taken in connection with Plaintiff's case before the Workers' Compensation Court (WCC). The second alleged slander occurred when Gallo testified before the Rhode Island Department of Education (RIDE) regarding Plaintiff's alleged wrongful termination from her teaching position. The superior court entered summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff's slander claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the motion justice did not err in finding (1) Plaintiff's claim for slander based on Gallo's WCC deposition testimony was time-barred; and (2) Plaintiff's claim for slander based on Gallo's RIDE testimony was immunized from defamation claims by the testimonial privilege because it qualified as having occurred in a judicial proceeding. View "Francis v. Gallo" on Justia Law

A motor vehicle collision involving Plaintiff and Defendant occurred when Plaintiff was riding his motorcycle and Defendant was driving a car belonging to his girlfriend. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant and his girlfriend, alleging that Defendant had been negligently operating the car at the time of the collision. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the incident was in actuality a rear-end collision caused by Plaintiff. The superior court granted Defendants' motion, concluding that Plaintiff had struck the car from the rear. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was sufficient conflicting evidence on the issue of negligence for this case to be submitted to a fact-finder. View "DeMaio v. Ciccone" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a civil action against Sportsman's Inn, Inc., a hotel and lounge, and DLM, Inc., the corporation that leased the premises to the hotel, alleging that he was shot as a result of the failure of Defendants to provide adequate security at the business. Several months later, Plaintiff learned that the property where the hotel was located was for sale, and moved for a preliminary injunction. The trial justice granted Plaintiff's motion to enjoin the sale of the property, concluding that Plaintiff had established a likelihood of success that the corporate formalities should be disregarded and that Sportsman's Inn had breached its duty of reasonable care to him. Defendants appealed, contending that the trial justice erred in finding Plaintiff had demonstrated there was a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of the negligence claim and that the corporate veil should be pierced. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's order granting a preliminary injunction, holding that Plaintiff did not establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of his underlying negligence claim and that a "piercing of the corporate veil" analysis was unnecessary at this stage of the litigation. View "Vasquez v. Sportsman's Inn, Inc." on Justia Law

After Shelley Tyre died, her parents brought a wrongful-death action against Shelley's husband, David Swain, alleging that he caused Shelley's wrongful death, that he was a slayer pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 33-1.1-1(3), and he should be subject to civil liability for a criminal act. After a jury trial, the court found in favor of Shelley's parents on all three counts. The probate judge later issued an order declaring that neither Swain, nor his heirs at law, should receive directly or indirectly from Shelley's estate pursuant to the Rhode Island Slayer's Act. Accordingly, Plaintiffs, David's children and Shelley's stepchildren, were precluded from inhering under Shelley's will as contingent beneficiaries because this inheritance would confer a benefit on their father. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' taking under Shelley's will would unquestionably confer a benefit upon David, in direct contravention of the Slayer's Act. View "Swain v. Estate of Tyre" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sent a notice of claim to Defendants, a town and its finance director, for injuries she sustained on the town's sidewalk. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the complaint should be dismissed because the notice of the place of injury was insufficient as a matter of law because Plaintiff misidentified the location where her injury occurred and her descriptions of the location were inconsistent. The trial justice granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the relevant statute clearly and unambiguously requires that the notice of claim must be specific, and therefore, the notice in this case was insufficient. View "Carbone v. Ward" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was employed as a school bus driver, broadcasted that the bus she was driving, which was full of elementary-school children, had been struck by gunfire and that panic had spread among the children. Displeased with the manner in which Plaintiff handled the situation, the Town of Johnson school department requested that Plaintiff no longer be assigned to transport Johnson students. Eventually, Plaintiff left her employment. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit for wrongful termination against members of the Johnson public schools (Defendants), alleging that Defendants wrongfully requested that Plaintiff be terminated from her employment. In response to the trial justice's remarks, Plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to include a claim of tortious interference, which the trial justice denied. Thereafter, the superior court granted summary judgment against Plaintiff. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint without specific findings. Remanded. View "Lomastro v. Iacovelli" on Justia Law

An automobile registered to Defendant struck a parked car that was registered to Plaintiff. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint against Defendant seeking damages pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 31-33-6 and 31-33-7. Section 31-33-6 provided that a vehicle owner may be liable for the acts of another person who operates the owner's car with the consent of the owner. Section 31-337 provided that the absence of consent shall be an affirmative defense and proved by the defendant. Defendant raised such an affirmative defense in her answer to Plaintiff's complaint. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment, ruling that Defendant's car was stolen, and Defendant did not give permission for anyone to drive the vehicle. Plaintiff appealed, contending that inconsistencies in the evidence created genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendant gave the unidentified driver consent to use her car the day of the collision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact regarding the issue of consent precluded summary judgment in this case. View "Pichardo v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Joseph and Josephine Iozzi owned a home located in Cranston. On October 15, 2005, excessive rainfall overwhelmed the sewer system servicing the Iozzis's home, causing water and sewage to back up and enter their basement, resulting in extensive damage to their home and personal property. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory relief and compensatory damages from Triton Ocean State, LLC (Triton); U.S. Filter Operating Services, Inc. (Veolia); and Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless). The complaint alleged that Triton and Veolia were jointly and severally liable for negligently "operating, maintaining and repairing the sewer disposal system" in the city. As to Peerless, the complaint alleged that it was liable for breach of contract for rejecting plaintiffs' claim for damages under their homeowner's insurance policy. Peerless moved for summary judgment arguing that the language in the homeowner's policy was clear and unambiguous and excluded coverage for the claims Plaintiffs made. Triton and Veolia filed a joint motion for summary judgment arguing that neither of them had a contractual or common-law responsibility to Plaintiffs for the damage to their property because a lease service agreement with the City of Cranston relieved them of responsibility for the damage and because the flooding that caused Plaintiffs' damages was caused by an "Act of God." Agreeing with the superior court's reasoning for granting defendants' motions for summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of Plaintiffs' case.