Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A young boy died after he trespassed onto plaintiff Corporation's property and played on industrial equipment. A settlement was eventually reached with the decedent's estate. Corporation thereafter filed suit against its Insurer, asserting that Insurer was liable to Corporation for the defense expenses it had incurred from the representation provided by Insurer's independent legal counsel. The superior court granted summary judgment for Insurer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Corporation was not entitled to have Insurer subsidize the engagement of independent counsel to represent Corporation in addition to the law firm that Insurer had hired to represent Corporation in connection with the fatal accident because there was no actual conflict between the prime interests of the Insurer and those of the Corporation since no civil action had been commenced when Corporation engaged independent counsel; and (2) Corporation's argument that Insurer ratified its engagement of independent counsel by not objecting to the fact that Corporation had engaged independent counsel was without merit.

Plaintiff, a diesel mechanic, brought suit against Defendant, his former employer, for damages to his tools that allegedly occurred after Defendant fired him. The superior court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff for $7,360 in damages. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err (1) by denying Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law, as Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence establishing the damages element of the negligence claim; (2) by permitting the testimony of a witness whose name was absent from the initial witness list, as the witness's appearance at trial could not have created an element of surprise or otherwise prejudiced Defendant; and (3) in calculating the damages.

In two civil actions, Plaintiffs in the underlying action alleged that Cheaters, Inc. and Cheaters Holding Corporation negligently and/or recklessly served alcoholic beverages to William Powers, who afterwards drove a vehicle off the premises and collided with other vehicles, resulting in one death and injuries to others. Before the accident, United National Insurance Corporation had issued an insurance policy to Cheaters and the Holding Corporation. Based on the policy's on-premises endorsement and liquor liability exclusion, United National disclaimed any responsibility for the defense and/or indemnification of the Holding Corporation. Plaintiff corporations then filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment as to their rights under the terms of the policy. The superior court hearing justice granted United National's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the on-premises endorsement, which limited coverage to on-premises losses only, applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that coverage was barred by the on-premises endorsement.

The Town of North Providence hired Everett McCain and appointed him as a lineman in the communications division of the fire department. McCain subsequently sustained injuries during the performance of his duties. Accordingly, the Town rendered injured-on-duty (IOD) payments to McCain pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 45-19-1. Later, the Town ceased making payments to McCain on the ground that McCain was not a "sworn firefighter" and, for that reason, was ineligible to collect IOD payments. McCain filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, asserting his right to IOD benefits. The superior court denied the writ but granted declaratory relief in favor of McCain, concluding that McCain was qualified as a "firefighter" eligible to receive benefits under section 45-19-1. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the clear and unambiguous language set forth in section 45-19-1(c), McCain met the definition of "firefighter" at the time of his injury for purposes of collecting IOD benefits under that statute.

Plaintiff James Casale was employed by Defendant City of Cranston when he was injured. During his incapacity, Plaintiff received injured-on-duty (IOD) benefits from the City. In accordance with its policy with Plaintiff, Plaintiff's insurer, Amica Mutual Insurance Company, tendered $100,000 in uninsured motorist benefits to Plaintiff minus the amount that the City paid to Plaintiff for IOD benefits. Plaintiff subsequently initiated this declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial determination that R.I. Gen. Laws 45-19-1.1, which requires that an employer be reimbursed out of the proceeds received from the third party, was inapplicable to his case and that the City was not entitled to reimbursement from uninsured motorist benefits Plaintiff recovered under the policy. The trial justice concluded that the City was not entitled to reimbursement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice correctly held that Defendant was not entitled to reimbursement for the IOD payments paid to Plaintiff; and (2) because Plaintiff did not collect any money from the tortfeasor, section 45-19-1.1 was inapplicable to this case.

Plaintiff Yi Gu was struck by Edmund Hathaway, a driver for the Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA), while crossing an intersection. Plaintiff brought suit against RIPTA and Hathaway (collectively, Defendants), for injuries arising from Hathaway's alleged negligence. At the close of evidence but before final arguments, the jurors walked from the courthouse to the intersection where the accident occurred to view the accident scene. The jury ultimately returned a verdict for Defendants. The trial justice subsequently denied Plaintiff's motions for a new trial and for reconsideration of that decision. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court and remanded the case, holding that Plaintiff's motion for a new trial should have been granted due to several errors that occurred during the jury view of the scene of the collision.

Plaintiff brought a patient to the hospital while working as an EMT/firefighter for the city. After he had delivered his patient but while he was still at the hospital, a nurse asked Plaintiff to assist her with a disorderly patient. While attempting to place a spit mask on the patient, Plaintiff was seriously and permanently injured. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants, the hospital and the company that provided security to the hospital, alleging they were negligent when they failed to restrain the patient and that that failure caused Plaintiff's injuries. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiff's claim was barred by the firefighter's rule. At issue on appeal was whether the rule applies only when an injury arises from the same circumstances that originally brought the firefighter to the scene. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the firefighter's rule barred Plaintiff's claim where (1) Plaintiff was injured during the course of his employment as an on-duty EMT/firefighter; (2) Plaintiff reasonably could have anticipated that he would be injured in this manner; and (3) Defendants' negligence in improperly restraining the aggressive patients caused Plaintiff to be summoned to the scene where he was injured.

Plaintiff, a professional limousine driver, was injured when he was struck by a car while unloading luggage from a limousine at an airport. Plaintiff reached settlements with his employer's insurance company and the driver whose car struck him but remained less-than-fully compensated for his injuries. Plaintiff subsequently filed an underinsured-motorist claim with his Insurer under the terms of his personal automobile policy. Insurer denied the claim, citing two exclusions from the policy's provisions for uninsured-motorist coverage. Plaintiff filed suit, and the superior court ruled that the exclusions were void on grounds of public policy. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Insurer's denial of coverage was both lawful and not inconsistent with public policy. Remanded.

This case arose out of a dispute over real property. Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, brought an action against Defendant, a dentist, for trespass and private nuisance, and to quiet title. Plaintiffs stated in their complaint that they were the exclusive owners of the disputed property and that Defendant intentionally encroached upon this property without their consent. Defendant counterclaimed for adverse possession. The trial justice entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in finding that Defendant's use of the property did not meet the "open and notorious" element of adverse possession.

Plaintiff, a former police officer, filed an action against Defendants, the Town of Portsmouth, its then chief of police, and a now retired lieutenant, alleging several causes of action arising from an investigation into Plaintiff's conduct during an officer training exercise. The superior court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the trial justice properly granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendants on the claims of malicious prosecution and tortious interference with contractual relations; but (2) the trial justice erred by granting Plaintiff's R.I. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the chief of police and lieutenant's counterclaim for defamation arising from an inflammatory letter that Plaintiff submitted to the town council to notify the council of his forthcoming suit in accordance with R.I. Gen. Laws 45-15-5 where (i) absolute privilege did not apply in this instance because the notice required by section 45-15-5 was not part of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, and (ii) baseless claims and allegations made by parties who must provide notice under section 45-15-5 are not protected by absolute immunity under McDonald v. Smith. Remanded.