Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hospital (the Hospital) was a defendant at trial in the underlying civil case.  On the morning of the trial, Appellants removed the case to federal court for the second time on the same grounds as the initial removal.  The federal district court judge again remanded the case to state court.  The state trial judge, imposed severe sanctions against the Appellants for the delay created by the second removal.  Appellants argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that they should not have been sanctioned for the second removal because it was done in good faith. The Supreme Court agreed with both [the trial judge's] version of the facts and his conclusion that the second removal was not based on good grounds and was interposed solely for delay: "[w]hile Rule 11 is evaluated by a subjective standard, the rule still may be violated with a filing that is so patently without merit that no reasonable attorney could have a good faith belief in its propriety.  We find such is the case here." The Court affirmed the lower court's imposition of sanctions.

Carolina Chloride, Inc. sued Richland County alleging the County incorrectly advised it of the legal zoning classification of its property and that it lost a potential sale of the property due to the zoning issue.  The trial judge directed a verdict for the County on all of Carolina Chloride's claims.  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded as to the claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation but upheld the directed verdict as to Carolina Chloride's remaining claims. On appeal, the County argued the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the directed verdict in its favor on Carolina Chloride's claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that "[a]lthough it is certainly unfortunate that a mistake occurred in this case, Carolina Chloride had no legal right to rely solely upon the representations of County personnel and should have consulted the official record to determine the legal zoning classification of its property.  Carolina Chloride's owner and its broker are both experienced in business matters, but it appears that neither [the Company] nor his broker personally inspected the County's official records prior to making a sizable investment in developing the property."  The Court reversed the appellate court's decision with respect to the directed verdict as to the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims. The Court affirmed the appellate court on all other matters.

Appellants A & A Taxi, Inc. and the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Uninsured Employers' Fund appealed a circuit court order that found Respondent Robert Pikaart was an employee of A & A Taxi, Inc. at the time he was injured in two automobile accidents and that he was entitled to certain workers' compensation benefits. Appellants contended Pikaart was an independent contractor, not an employee; therefore, the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission had no jurisdiction in this matter. They further argued the circuit court improperly made findings of fact that did not bear on the limited issue of jurisdiction that was before it. Because the issue on appeal concerned jurisdiction, the Supreme Court took its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the Court held that the facts in this case were preponderantly in favor of a finding that Pikaart was the general manager of A & A Taxi and as such, was an employee subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. To the extent Appellants contended the circuit court erred in making additional findings of fact that were not related to jurisdiction, the Court found the issue was not preserved for review. Consequently, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order in full.

Appellant "J. Doe" brought an action against Respondent Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) alleging various theories of negligence. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart. This case arose from the physical and sexual abuse of then three-year-old J. Doe (also "the victim"). "F. Doe" is the victim's guardian ad litem and great uncle. F. Doe and his wife (aunt) often kept the victim for months at a time. According to the aunt, both of the victim's parents physically abused him beginning when he was three months old. In August 1997, after arriving at her house, the aunt examined the victim and found two "wide strips" of bruising on his buttocks. She did not contact the police or the Department of Social Services (DSS) or seek medical treatment. Instead, she took two photographs of the victim's buttocks. Several days later, the aunt took the roll of film to Wal-Mart to be developed. When the aunt retrieved the photos, a photo technician informed her she had destroyed some of the photos because of a store policy requiring the destruction of photos depicting nudity. The aunt claimed the employee told her she was required to "destroy them," which the aunt believed meant the employee had destroyed the photos and the negatives. The aunt left the store with the remainder of the photos and all of the negatives, but erroneously believed the negatives depicting the victim's buttocks had been destroyed. The father pled guilty to first degree criminal sexual conduct and was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. In 2003, Appellant filed suit arguing the victim's injuries from the sexual abuse were a result of Wal-Mart's failure to report the suspected physical abuse depicted in the photos as required by the Reporter's Statute and/or Wal-Mart's negligent hiring and supervision of its employees and its violations of approximately twenty internal company policies. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart was proper because there could be no civil liability under the state Reporter's Statute and Wal-Mart owed no duty to the victim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Respondent optometrist Steven Hobbs sublet space leased by Cole Vision Corporation (Cole Vision) from Sears Roebuck and Company (Sears) for his optometry practice. The sublease agreement between Hobbs and Cole Vision contained indemnity provisions whereby Hobbs agreed to defend Cole Vision and Sears against any and all liabilities arising from events occurring in Hobbs' business location or as a result of Hobbs' activities at the business. The agreement also purportedly required Cole Vision to retain copies of Hobbs' patient records. Pursuant to the agreement, Hobbs obtained professional liability insurance with NCMIC Insurance Company (NCMIC). Mary and John Lewis (the Lewises) sued Hobbs, Cole Vision, and Sears based on Hobbs' alleged malpractice in failing to properly diagnose and treat Mary Lewis. Cole Vision and Sears brought this action for declaratory relief after Hobbs and NCMIC refused to defend them in the malpractice suit. Although the Lewises' case was pending when Cole Vision brought this declaratory judgment action, it eventually settled. Cole Vision and Sears also sought judgment against Hobbs and NCMIC for defense costs and settlement amounts of the malpractice action brought by the Lewises. In response to the complaint, Hobbs filed a defense and counterclaim for negligent spoliation of evidence against Cole Vision and Sears stemming from the loss of Mary Lewis's patient profile sheet. Hobbs contended that Cole Vision lost the profile sheet, which was a key piece of evidence needed to defend the malpractice claim. According to Hobbs, he incurred costs and attorney fees as a result of his inability to adequately defend against the Lewises' claim for malpractice. Cole Vision filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that South Carolina does not recognize a cause of action for spoliation of evidence. The circuit court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss. Hobbs appealed the circuit court's order and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court, finding that Hobbs pled facts sufficient to constitute a general negligence cause of action. The court of appeals did not determine whether South Carolina recognizes a cause of action for negligent spoliation, instead reversing the circuit court based on its characterization of Hobbs' claim as a general negligence claim. Upon review of the record of the courts below, the Supreme Court found that Hobbs' claim that Cole Vision breached a contractual duty to maintain the document at issue remained a viable defense in his action for indemnification. The Court declined to recognize the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence and accordingly found that the circuit court properly dismissed it as a counterclaim. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Following the resolution of his partition action in probate court, Petitioner James Judy (James) filed a "waste" suit in circuit court against his brother, Respondent Ronnie Judy (Ronnie), for the destruction of a pond located on a tract of real property involved in the partition. A jury found in favor of James and awarded him damages. Ronnie appealed the jury's verdict, arguing the circuit court erred in declining to dismiss the suit against him on the basis of laches, collateral estoppel, or res judicata. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's refusal to dismiss Ronnie's suit on the basis of collateral estoppel and laches. However, the court reversed the circuit court's refusal to dismiss the suit on the basis of res judicata. The Supreme Court granted James's petition to review the appellate court's decision as to whether res judicata operated to preclude the waste lawsuit. James contended the prior probate court action was conducted for the limited purpose of partitioning the real property of the Estate. Because the subject matter of his waste claim was not identical to the partition action, James asserted that the requisite elements of res judicata were not satisfied. The Supreme Court found that because the tort duties that were breached and the evidence was the same in both the probate and waste proceedings, there was "identity of subject matter" for the purposes of res judicata. Yet in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, James attempted to "split" his cause of action for waste by pursuing and procuring another remedy in circuit court for an identical claim. Given the probate court could have fully adjudicated the waste cause of action, James was precluded from initiating a second lawsuit in the circuit court as this cause of action could have been raised in the former suit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision effectively dismissing James' appeal.

This case stemmed from a class action lawsuit brought by Appellants John Doe #53, John Doe #66, John Doe #66A, John Doe #67, Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2 and Rachel Roe. The plaintiffs in the underlying class action consisted of two classes: one for victims of childhood sexual abuse by agents of the Diocese and one for the spouses and parents of victims. A settlement in the class action was approved by the trial judge over Appellants' objections. Appellants moved to alter or amend the order approving the settlement. While Appellants' motion to alter or amend was pending, they reached a separate settlement agreement with the Diocese and class counsel. This agreement provided that the Diocese would pay Appellants $1.375 million to their settle claims, in exchange for Appellants' agreement to opt out of the class action, execute releases, and withdraw all pending motions and objections with prejudice. Appellants presented several issues for the Supreme Court's review, including some relating to the trial court's approval of the settlement agreements. Upon consideration of the arguments presented by the class, the Supreme Court found that due to the executed settlement agreement, there were no issues for further consideration. The Court dismissed the appeal as moot.

Appellants Larry and Jeannie Boiter were injured when the motorcycle they were riding collided with a car driven by Nancy Kochenower at an intersection. The red light signal bulb for the road Ms. Kochenower was traveling on had burned out earlier that day. The Boiters suffered significant injuries. They settled with Ms. Kochenhower for her policy limits and sued Respondents the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) and the South Carolina Department of Public Safety (SCDPS), alleging negligence in their failure to prevent the accident. At trial, a jury found in favor of the Boiters and awarded them a total of $1.875 million. Respondents filed motions for "judgment notwithstanding the verdict," for a new trial, and to reduce the amount of the verdict pursuant to the state's Tort Claims Act. In response, the Boiters filed a motion to challenge the constitutionality of the two-tier cap in the Tort Claims Act. In the alternative, the Boiters argued that Respondents' negligence constituted two separate occurrences of negligence under the Act (one for each Appellant), and as such, were entitled to separate damages awards. The circuit court denied all parties' motions, and found that there was only one occurrence of negligence. The court reduced the damages to $600,000. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed part and reversed part of the trial court's order. The Court found that the two-tier statutory cap on damages is constitutional, but that more than one occurrence of negligence occurred at the time of the accident. The Court remanded the case for reconsideration of the damages award.

Appellant Martha Argoe's husband had her committed to Three Rivers Behavioral Health, LLC (Three Rivers). In June 2005, the probate court accepted the petition, and issued an order to have Mrs. Argoe involuntarily committed to the hospital and examined by licensed physicians. Physicians determined that Mrs. Agroe suffered from bipolar disorder with manic and psychotic features. Mrs. Argoe submitted to additional tests, and was prescribed medication as part of her therapy. In June 2007, Mrs. Argoe sued her husband, son and the hospitals, physicians and nurses who were involved in the involuntary commitment proceedings. She asserted multiple causes of action, including "intentional infliction of emotional distress," false imprisonment, conspiracy, defamation, and invasion of privacy. Three Rivers moved for summary judgment, arguing among other things, that Mrs. Argoe's claims should have been brought in 2005 when the original commitment order was issued. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mrs. Argoe argued that the probate court's order was invalid. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that Mrs. Argoe failed to timely and properly challenge the 2005 probate court orders, and that Three Rivers' conduct toward her was lawful, justified and reasonable. The Court affirmed the probate court's order.

AnMed Health admitted liability to Respondent Elise Burke stemming from a trial held in 2005. Respondent was injured from a preoperative procedure, and the jury awarded her $250,000 in damages. AnMed appealed the verdict, arguing that the trial court made several mistakes in the proceedings, which ultimately entitled it to a new trial. Specifically, AnMed looked to the state's "thirteenth juror" doctrine which allowed a trial court to grant a new trial if it determined the jury verdict was "contrary to the fair preponderance of the evidence." The Supreme Court conceded that the thirteenth juror doctrine grants a trials court very broad discretion in determining whether a new trial is warranted, and the Court agreed that the jury verdict in this case was "generous." However, the Court found the trial judge's ruling to deny AnMed's motion for a new trial was within his discretion, and affirmed the lower court's decision.