Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Following the resolution of his partition action in probate court, Petitioner James Judy (James) filed a "waste" suit in circuit court against his brother, Respondent Ronnie Judy (Ronnie), for the destruction of a pond located on a tract of real property involved in the partition. A jury found in favor of James and awarded him damages. Ronnie appealed the jury's verdict, arguing the circuit court erred in declining to dismiss the suit against him on the basis of laches, collateral estoppel, or res judicata. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's refusal to dismiss Ronnie's suit on the basis of collateral estoppel and laches. However, the court reversed the circuit court's refusal to dismiss the suit on the basis of res judicata. The Supreme Court granted James's petition to review the appellate court's decision as to whether res judicata operated to preclude the waste lawsuit. James contended the prior probate court action was conducted for the limited purpose of partitioning the real property of the Estate. Because the subject matter of his waste claim was not identical to the partition action, James asserted that the requisite elements of res judicata were not satisfied. The Supreme Court found that because the tort duties that were breached and the evidence was the same in both the probate and waste proceedings, there was "identity of subject matter" for the purposes of res judicata. Yet in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, James attempted to "split" his cause of action for waste by pursuing and procuring another remedy in circuit court for an identical claim. Given the probate court could have fully adjudicated the waste cause of action, James was precluded from initiating a second lawsuit in the circuit court as this cause of action could have been raised in the former suit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision effectively dismissing James' appeal.

This case stemmed from a class action lawsuit brought by Appellants John Doe #53, John Doe #66, John Doe #66A, John Doe #67, Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2 and Rachel Roe. The plaintiffs in the underlying class action consisted of two classes: one for victims of childhood sexual abuse by agents of the Diocese and one for the spouses and parents of victims. A settlement in the class action was approved by the trial judge over Appellants' objections. Appellants moved to alter or amend the order approving the settlement. While Appellants' motion to alter or amend was pending, they reached a separate settlement agreement with the Diocese and class counsel. This agreement provided that the Diocese would pay Appellants $1.375 million to their settle claims, in exchange for Appellants' agreement to opt out of the class action, execute releases, and withdraw all pending motions and objections with prejudice. Appellants presented several issues for the Supreme Court's review, including some relating to the trial court's approval of the settlement agreements. Upon consideration of the arguments presented by the class, the Supreme Court found that due to the executed settlement agreement, there were no issues for further consideration. The Court dismissed the appeal as moot.

Appellants Larry and Jeannie Boiter were injured when the motorcycle they were riding collided with a car driven by Nancy Kochenower at an intersection. The red light signal bulb for the road Ms. Kochenower was traveling on had burned out earlier that day. The Boiters suffered significant injuries. They settled with Ms. Kochenhower for her policy limits and sued Respondents the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) and the South Carolina Department of Public Safety (SCDPS), alleging negligence in their failure to prevent the accident. At trial, a jury found in favor of the Boiters and awarded them a total of $1.875 million. Respondents filed motions for "judgment notwithstanding the verdict," for a new trial, and to reduce the amount of the verdict pursuant to the state's Tort Claims Act. In response, the Boiters filed a motion to challenge the constitutionality of the two-tier cap in the Tort Claims Act. In the alternative, the Boiters argued that Respondents' negligence constituted two separate occurrences of negligence under the Act (one for each Appellant), and as such, were entitled to separate damages awards. The circuit court denied all parties' motions, and found that there was only one occurrence of negligence. The court reduced the damages to $600,000. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed part and reversed part of the trial court's order. The Court found that the two-tier statutory cap on damages is constitutional, but that more than one occurrence of negligence occurred at the time of the accident. The Court remanded the case for reconsideration of the damages award.

Appellant Martha Argoe's husband had her committed to Three Rivers Behavioral Health, LLC (Three Rivers). In June 2005, the probate court accepted the petition, and issued an order to have Mrs. Argoe involuntarily committed to the hospital and examined by licensed physicians. Physicians determined that Mrs. Agroe suffered from bipolar disorder with manic and psychotic features. Mrs. Argoe submitted to additional tests, and was prescribed medication as part of her therapy. In June 2007, Mrs. Argoe sued her husband, son and the hospitals, physicians and nurses who were involved in the involuntary commitment proceedings. She asserted multiple causes of action, including "intentional infliction of emotional distress," false imprisonment, conspiracy, defamation, and invasion of privacy. Three Rivers moved for summary judgment, arguing among other things, that Mrs. Argoe's claims should have been brought in 2005 when the original commitment order was issued. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mrs. Argoe argued that the probate court's order was invalid. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that Mrs. Argoe failed to timely and properly challenge the 2005 probate court orders, and that Three Rivers' conduct toward her was lawful, justified and reasonable. The Court affirmed the probate court's order.

AnMed Health admitted liability to Respondent Elise Burke stemming from a trial held in 2005. Respondent was injured from a preoperative procedure, and the jury awarded her $250,000 in damages. AnMed appealed the verdict, arguing that the trial court made several mistakes in the proceedings, which ultimately entitled it to a new trial. Specifically, AnMed looked to the state's "thirteenth juror" doctrine which allowed a trial court to grant a new trial if it determined the jury verdict was "contrary to the fair preponderance of the evidence." The Supreme Court conceded that the thirteenth juror doctrine grants a trials court very broad discretion in determining whether a new trial is warranted, and the Court agreed that the jury verdict in this case was "generous." However, the Court found the trial judge's ruling to deny AnMed's motion for a new trial was within his discretion, and affirmed the lower court's decision.

Appellants Hanson Brick America, Inc and Zurich North America appeal the circuit court's order reversing the appellate panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that Respondent Lawson's knee problems were not causally related to his back injury sustained on the job, and the awarding Respondent temporary total disability benefits. Respondent, a fork lift operator, was injured while moving a bag of motor. Diagnosed with degenerative disk disease, Respondent underwent surgery and had bones fused and screws inserted in his spine. Following surgery, Respondent still suffered from back pain; several months later, he developed pain in both knees that affected his ability to walk. Respondent filed a Form 50 with the Commission to report his injuries, and seeking temporary total disability benefits. Appellants challenged Respondent's claim. The Commission's hearing officer ruled that Respondent was entitled to receive temporary total disability benefits, but that the pains in his knees were not a compensible injury. Prior to the Commission's final order, Respondent sought to have newly discovered evidence admitted for the Commission's consideration; Appellants objected, but the commissioner determined that Respondent, in addition to benefits for his back injury, should also receive compensation for his knee pain. On review of the records, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's determination that Lawson was entitled to temporary total disability benefits and further evaluation of his knees, and remand the case back to the appellate panel for reconsideration of all evidence.