Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Pamela Russell injured her back in 2009 while working at a Wal-Mart store in Conway, South Carolina. The worker’s compensation commission found Russell suffered a 7% permanent partial disability, and awarded her twenty-one weeks of temporary total disability compensation. In 2011, Russell requested review of her award, claiming there had been a "change of condition caused by the original injury" pursuant to subsection 42-17-90(A) of the South Carolina Code (2015). An appellate panel of the commission remanded Russell's change of condition claim to a single commissioner for what was a third ruling on the same claim. Russell appealed the remand order to the court of appeals, which dismissed the appeal on the ground the order was not a final decision, and thus not immediately appealable. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the remand order was immediately appealable because the commission's unwarranted delay in making a final decision required immediate review to avoid leaving Russell with no adequate remedy on an appeal from a final decision. The Court reversed the court of appeals' order dismissing the appeal, reversed the appellate panel's remand order, and remanded to any appellate panel of the commission for an immediate and final review of the original commissioner's decision. View "Russell v. Wal-Mart" on Justia Law

On May 16, 2010, seventy pounds of copper wire and fifty pounds of aluminum tie wire were stolen from Aiken Electric Cooperative, Inc. In total, the stolen wire was worth $463.19. The following day, Mark Goss, Aiken's Loss Control and Safety Coordinator, and Deputy Maurice Huggins viewed a surveillance video from Aiken that depicted an unidentified black male removing copper and aluminum wiring from Aiken trucks. An Aiken employee also reported seeing a white Ford truck driving out of Aiken's parking lot around the time of the theft. As was Goss's typical practice when Aiken suffered a loss of this nature, Goss checked with local metal recyclers to see if the thief tried to sell the copper and aluminum. Following her arrest for receiving stolen goods, Meredith Huffman filed a complaint against the Orangeburg County Sheriff's Department (the Sheriff's Department), Sunshine Recycling, LLC (Sunshine), and Aiken Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Aiken), for negligence, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Huffman later settled her claims against the Sheriff's Department, and the two parties filed a stipulation dismissing the Sheriff's Department from the action. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sunshine and Aiken. The court of appeals reversed. Both Sunshine and Aiken filed petitions for writs of certiorari to review the court of appeals' opinion. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the petitions, and reversed the court of appeals' opinion as to Sunshine, and affirmed as to Aiken. View "Huffman v. Sunshine Recycling" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina certified a question of state law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Plaintiff was a former employee of BMW at its manufacturing facility in Spartanburg. During his employment, Plaintiff was subject to random drug tests. BMW contracted with Defendant to test hair samples of BMW employees for the presence of drugs. Plaintiff was selected for a random drug test, which was administered on-site by a contract nurse from a local hospital. According to Defendant's analysis, his hair sample tested positive for cocaine and benzoylecgonine (the primary metabolite of cocaine). Though Plaintiff asserted that he had not used any illegal substances, BMW suspended Plaintiff pending an investigation. On April 22, 2014, Plaintiff submitted a hair sample to an independent drug testing laboratory whose report determined that Plaintiff's hair tested negative for any illegal substances. BMW refused to accept the independent laboratory's results but permitted Plaintiff to submit a second hair sample for analysis by Defendant. The second hair sample also tested positive for cocaine and benzoylecgonine. BMW subsequently terminated Plaintiff due to the positive drug test results. Plaintiff maintained he was not and had never been a drug user. Plaintiff filed an action against Defendant, alleging negligence and negligent supervision. In response, Defendant filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss on the basis that Defendant did not owe a duty to Plaintiff. The certified question posed to the South Carolina Supreme Court asked whether a drug testing laboratory contracted with an employer to conduct and evaluate drug tests, owed a duty of care to employees subject to such testing that gives rise to a cause of action for negligence for failure to properly and accurately perform the test and report the results. The Supreme Court responded in the affirmative: “without the recognition of a duty, a terminated employee is often left without a means for redress, while the drug testing laboratory is effectively immunized from liability. … Therefore, absent a duty of care, drug testing laboratories are able to avoid liability for their negligence.” View "Shaw v. Psychemedics Corporation" on Justia Law

Denise Wright was abducted and robbed at gunpoint by two unknown assailants in a common area of an apartment complex (Wellspring) in which she resided. Wellspring was owned by Respondent Franklin Pineridge Associates and operated by Respondent PRG Real Estate Management, Inc. Respondent Karen Campbell was Wellspring's property manager and an employee of PRG at the time of the incident. Wright sued Respondents for negligence, alleging Respondents voluntarily undertook a duty to provide security to residents of Wellspring and breached this duty, thereby causing her damages. She also alleged Respondents were negligent in failing to properly maintain shrubbery and lighting on the premises. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents on Wright's negligence claim. A divided court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Wright's petition for a writ of certiorari to review: (1) whether Respondents voluntarily undertook a duty to provide security services to residents; (2) if such a duty existed under the facts of this case, whether there was a genuine issue of material fact that Respondents breached the duty; and (3) whether there was a genuine issue of material fact that any such breach proximately caused Wright's damages. The Supreme Court concluded the court of appeals erred in affirming the circuit court’ grant of summary judgment in favor or Respondents. The matter was remanded back to the circuit court for trial. View "Wright v. PRG Real Estate Management" on Justia Law

The underlying dispute arose following a deadly motor vehicle accident in Bamberg County, South Carolina in January 2008. At the time of the accident, decedent James Buchanan was driving a tractor trailer traveling northbound on U.S. Highway 321. Heading southbound on U.S. Highway 321 were three vehicles: a logging truck followed by two tractor trailers, one driven by Willie Pelote and the other by his brother Roger Pelote, both of whom were former parties to this action. As the vehicles converged, a set of tandem tires came loose from the logging truck and struck Buchanan's vehicle, breaking the front axle. As a result, Buchanan's truck crossed the center line and struck the second tractor trailer. Buchanan's tractor trailer caught fire, and he died at the scene. Respondents, as co-personal representatives of Buchanan's estate, filed a wrongful death claim against the driver of the logging truck; the owner of the logging truck; Strobel Tire Co., which performed tire maintenance work on the logging truck shortly before the accident; and the Pelotes. On certiorari, the South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (the Guaranty) argued the court of appeals erred in construing the provisions of the South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association Act (the Act) and affirming the trial court's finding that the Guaranty's statutory offset of $376,622 should be deducted from the claimant's total amount of stipulated damages of $800,000 rather than the Association's mandatory statutory claim limit of $300,000. The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded the Act was ambiguous, and found the court of appeals correctly construed the Act to require that settlement amounts be offset from the total amount of an injured party's damages rather than from the $300,000 statutory cap. The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals' decision as modified. View "Buchanan v. SC Property and Casualty Insurance" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina certified a question of law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Jack Poole and his wife, Jennifer, were riding in a vehicle owned by Doris Knight, Jennifer's mother, when a drunk driver crossed the center line and struck them. The Pooles were both seriously injured in the collision; although Jack survived, Jennifer's catastrophic injuries resulted in her death several days later. In contrast with the substantial bodily injuries, the Pooles sustained minimal property damage because they did not own the vehicle. The at-fault driver's liability carrier tendered its policy limits. Farm Bureau, the insurer on Knight's vehicle, then tendered its underinsured motorist (UIM) policy limits for bodily injury to Jack individually and to Jack as the representative of Jennifer's estate. The Pooles then sought recovery from their own insurer, Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO), which provided them a split limits UIM policy with bodily injury coverage of up to $100,000 per person and $50,000 for property damage. GEICO tendered the UIM bodily injury limits of $100,000 each for Jack and Jennifer's estate. The Pooles requested another $50,000 from the UIM policy's property damage coverage in anticipation of a large punitive damages award, but GEICO refused. GEICO then initiated a declaratory judgment action with the federal district court to establish that it was not liable to pay any amounts for punitive damages under the property damage provision of the UIM policy because the source of the Pooles' UIM damages was traceable only to bodily injury. The federal court asked the South Carolina Supreme Court whether, under South Carolina law, when an insured seeks coverage under an automobile insurance policy, must punitive damages be apportioned pro rata between those sustained for bodily injury and those sustained for property damage where the insurance policy is a split limits policy? The Supreme Court answered the question, "No." View "Government Employees Insurance Company v. Poole" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina certified a question of state law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. This wrongful death action arose from the death of a minor. The deceased was a young child experiencing seizures; the treating physician sent the child's DNA to Defendants' genetic testing laboratory for the purpose of diagnosing the child's disease or disorder. The allegation against the genetic testing laboratory was that it failed to properly determine the child's condition, leading to the child's death. Defendants argued the genetic testing laboratory was a "licensed health care provider" pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. 38-79-410 (2015). Defendants further contended Plaintiffs' claims concerned medical malpractice, thereby rendering the medical malpractice statute of repose applicable. The district court asked whether the federally licensed genetic testing laboratory acted as a "licensed health care provider" as defined by S.C. Code Ann.38-79-410 when, at the request of a patient's treating physician, the laboratory performed genetic testing to detect an existing disease or disorder. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. View "Williams v. Quest" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of South Carolina law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Sarah Hartsock was killed in an automobile crash on Interstate 26 in Calhoun County, South Carolina. Her personal representative, Theodore Hartsock, Jr., brought a survival and wrongful death action asserting claims under South Carolina law for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. Hartsock alleged that the vehicle in which Mrs. Hartsock was riding was struck head-on by another vehicle. That vehicle had crossed the median after suffering a blowout of an allegedly defective tire that Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America Ltd. and Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company [collectively "Goodyear"] designed, manufactured, and marketed. The federal court had subject-matter jurisdiction based upon complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and damages alleged to be greater than $75,000. During pretrial discovery a dispute arose between the parties over certain Goodyear material relating to the design and chemical composition of the allegedly defective tire. Goodyear objected to producing this material, asserting that it constituted trade secrets. The district court eventually found, and Hartsock did not dispute, that the material did, in fact, constitute trade secrets. However, the court ordered Goodyear to produce the material subject to a confidentiality order. In doing so, the court applied federal discovery standards, rejecting Goodyear's contention that South Carolina trade secret law applied. The federal appellate court asked the South Carolina Supreme Court whether South Carolina recognized an evidentiary privilege for trade secrets. The South Carolina Court responded yes, but that it was a qualified privilege. View "Hartsock v. Goodyear" on Justia Law

Respondent Otis Nero filed a workers' compensation claim alleging he sustained injuries to his back and shoulder while on the job. The single commissioner found respondent suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of respondent's employment, and awarded benefits. The appellate panel reversed the decision of the single commissioner, finding respondent failed to provide timely notice of the injury. On appeal from the commission's decision, the court of appeals employed the de novo standard of review applicable to jurisdictional questions, and reversed the commission. In finding the question of timely notice was a jurisdictional question subject to de novo review, the court of appeals relied on Shatto v. McLeod Regional Medical Center, 753 S.E.2d 416 (2013) and Mintz v. Fiske-Carter Construction Co., 63 S.E.2d 50 (1951). The South Carolina Supreme Court found neither Shatto nor Mintz supported the court of appeals' use of the de novo standard. Until this case, the court of appeals consistently applied the substantial evidence standard when reviewing decisions of the commission on the question of timely notice. The Supreme Court found that under well-settled law, the commission's determination of whether a claimant gave timely notice under section 42-15-20 was not a jurisdictional determination, and had to be reviewed on appeal under the substantial evidence standard. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for a decision under the proper standard of review. View "Nero v. SCDOT" on Justia Law

This appeal presents the South Carolina Supreme Court with the opportunity to revisit Roddey v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 784 S.E.2d 670 (2016), wherein the Court reversed and remanded for a new trial after determining the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's decision granting Wal-Mart's motion for a directed verdict on the appellant's negligence action. On remand, the circuit court, believing the new trial to be limited to the negligence action, issued an order striking the negligent hiring, training, supervision, and entrustment action and barring any evidence in support of the action on the basis of res judicata. Travis Roddey, individually and as the personal representative of Alice Hancock's estate, ("Appellant") appealed the order and the Supreme Court certified the appeal pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR. Wal-Mart suspected Alice Hancock's sister, Donna Beckham, of shoplifting. As Beckham was exiting the store and heading for Hancock's car, Wal-Mart's employees told Derrick Jones, an on-duty Wal-Mart security guard employed with U.S. Security Associates, Inc. ("USSA"), to delay Beckham from leaving its premises. Beckham, however, got into Hancock's car and Hancock exited the parking lot and entered the highway. Jones pursued Hancock onto the highway in contravention of Wal-Mart's policies after Wal-Mart's employees repeatedly asked him to obtain Hancock's license tag. Hancock died in a single-car accident shortly thereafter. Appellant filed suit against Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, USSA, and Jones (collectively "Respondents"), alleging negligence and negligent hiring, training, supervision, and entrustment. At the conclusion of Appellant's case, Wal-Mart moved for a directed verdict on both causes of action. The circuit court granted Wal-Mart's motion and dismissed it from the case, concluding "there is insufficient evidence that Wal-Mart was negligent, or even if they were there is [a] lack of proximate cause that the events were not foreseeable." USSA subsequently moved for a directed verdict on the negligent hiring cause of action, arguing Jones had a suspended driver's license and a criminal record did not make it foreseeable that "Jones would engage in a high speed pursuit down the highway off [Wal-Mart's] premises." The court denied the motion and both the negligence action and the negligent hiring action were sent to the jury. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the circuit court’s judgment, and affirmed it. View "Roddey v. Wal-Mart" on Justia Law