Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Mildred H. Shatto sought workers' compensation benefits, claiming she was an employee of Respondent McLeod Regional Medical Center when she fell in an operating room and was injured. McLeod Regional opposed the claim on the basis of Shatto's purported status as an independent contractor. The Workers' Compensation Commission found that every factor of the common law employment analysis supported Shatto's contention of an employment relationship. The court of appeals reversed, finding that every factor of the common law employment analysis supported McLeod Regional's contention of an independent contractor relationship. The Supreme Court found disagreed with the appellate court's analysis and reversed its decision. View "Shatto v. McLeod Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

The Standard Fire Insurance Company appealed a court of appeals' decision that reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in its favor, and finding respondents Thomas, Debra, and Christopher were entitled to stack underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage despite an exclusion in Standard Fire's policy purporting to limit an insured's ability to stack such coverage when the vehicles insured under the subject policy were not involved in the accident. After review of the trial and appellate court records, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Carter v. Standard Fire Insurance" on Justia Law

Kenneth Poch and Kevin Key were temporary workers contracted through Personnel Resources of Georgia, Inc. and Carolina Staffing, Inc. d/b/a Job Place of Conway, to work for Bayshore Concrete Products/South Carolina, Inc. to clean up a concrete casting worksite and dismantle equipment used to produce concrete forms. As a result of a tragic, work-related accident, Poch was killed and Key was injured. Poch's estate and Key received workers' compensation benefits through Job Place. Subsequently, Key and his wife and the estate of Poch filed suit against Bayshore SC and its parent company, Bayshore Concrete Products Corporation. The circuit court granted the company's motion to dismiss the actions on the ground that workers' compensation was Petitioners' exclusive remedy and, therefore, the company was immune from liability in a tort action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's order. Though the Supreme Court agreed with the result reached by the Court of Appeals, it found the court incorrectly analyzed Petitioners' arguments. Accordingly, the Court affirmed as modified. View "Poch v. Bayshore Concrete" on Justia Law

Carl Aten, Jr. appealed the circuit court's order finding him personally liable for torts he committed as a member of a limited liability company (LLC). Although this case presented a novel question of whether the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (LLC Act) shields an LLC member from personal liability from his own torts, the Supreme Court declined to opine on that issue, and found that Aten committed no actionable tort. Therefore the Court reversed the portion of the circuit court's order which imposed personal liability upon Aten. View "16 Jade Street v. R. Design Construction" on Justia Law

Five questions of South Carolina law were certified to the State Supreme Court by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: (1) when a plaintiff seeks recovery for a temporary trespass or nuisance, are the damages limited to the lost rental value of the property?; (2) does South Carolina law recognize a cause of action for trespass solely from invisible odors rather than a physical invasion such as dust or water?; (3) is the maximum amount of compensatory damages a plaintiff can receive in any trespass or nuisance action (temporary or permanent) the full market value of the plaintiffs' property where no claim for restoration or cleanup costs has been alleged?; (4) when a plaintiff contends that offensive odors have migrated from a neighbor's property onto the plaintiff's property, may the plaintiff maintain an independent cause of action for negligence or is the plaintiff limited to remedies under trespass and nuisance?; and (5) if an independent cause of action for negligence exists under South Carolina law when a plaintiff contends that offensive odors have migrated from a neighbor's property onto the plaintiff's property, does the standard of care for a landfill operator and breach thereof need to be established through expert testimony? The South Carolina Supreme Court answered: (1) damages recoverable for a temporary trespass or nuisance claim are limited to the lost rental value of the property; (2) a trespass exists only when an intrusion is made by a physical, tangible thing; (3) the damages recoverable for a permanent trespass or nuisance claim are limited to the full market value of the property; (4) a negligence claim based on offensive odors is possible, but that such a claim would have to satisfy all the elements of negligence like any other negligence claim; and (5) the Court was unable to make a definitive determination as to whether establishing the standard of care of a landfill operator in regards to offensive odors required expert testimony, but offered guidelines for making such a determination. View "Babb v. Lee County Landfill" on Justia Law

Respondent Francina Bardsley's home was hit by a speeding car. The car ran through the house, struck and killed her husband, Frederic Bardsley, and caused substantial property damage. The liability coverage of the driver was exhausted in settlement of the wrongful death action, and upon review, the Supreme Court was asked to consider the impact of the collateral source rule on underinsured motorist property damage coverage where the homeowners' policy has already paid for the property damage. The Court held the collateral source rule did not apply and there was no underinsured motorist property damage coverage available. View "Bardsley v. Government Employees Insurance" on Justia Law

Automobile insurer Progressive Max Insurance Co. brought a contribution action against Floating Caps, Inc., d/b/a Silver Dollar Cafe (Silver Dollar), a Charleston bar, under South Carolina's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA) after Progressive settled a tort action involving a Silver Dollar patron. The circuit court found the contribution claim was not preserved and granted summary judgment to the Silver Dollar. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the UCATA provisions governing the right of contribution precluded Progressive's contribution action and that Progressive did not establish that it was entitled to reformation. Consequently, the Court found no error in the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the Silver Dollar. View "Progressive Max Insurance v. Floating Caps" on Justia Law

Following Appellant Darren Pollack's injury on the job, his employer accommodated his work restrictions by providing him light duty employment. Later, Appellant was discharged for violating a company policy by failing to report an accident involving an employer vehicle. Appellant filed a claim seeking Temporary Total Disability benefits. The Workers' Compensation Commission denied the claim, holding Appellant's termination and resulting incapacity to earn wages was due to his violation of company policy and not his work-related injury. Finding no error in the Commission's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pollack v. Southern Wine & Spirits" on Justia Law

In 1999 and 2001, Respondent John Hollman went to Appellants TLC Laser Eye Centers, LLC and the TLC Laser Center (the Centers) for a series of eye surgeries. In the several years following the surgeries, respondent's vision deteriorated. He sued the Centers' doctors and the Centers themselves alleging medical malpractice. Respondent's wife sued for loss of consortium. Respondents requested a patient database the Centers maintained through the discovery process. The Centers resisted, but was eventually ordered to produce the database under a protective order. While this case was still pending, respondents joined a class action against appellants. Before the database was produced, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in which they settled all their personal state and federal claims. The Centers were subsequently dismissed from the litigation. Respondents' claims against the doctors continued. As a result of the settlement, respondents withdrew as lead plaintiffs in the class action, and a new plaintiff took their place. The class action plaintiff requested the database. Appellants filed a notice of motion and motion for rule to show cause, motion to modify the protective order, and motion for sanctions in the class action although they were no longer parties in that action. The class action court issued an order denying the motion. Appellants moved for reconsideration. Respondents then settled their individual claims against the remaining state court defendants. Appellants moved the court to order respondents' counsel to prepare an order denying appellants' Rule 59(e) motion or, in the alternative, that the court prepare such an order. The trial court held a hearing on the motion denied it in part and granted it in part. It denied appellants' motion for reconsideration, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over appellants' request as a result of the dismissal of the case. Notwithstanding this finding, it also held that settlement and dismissal of the case operated as a final adjudication, barring further litigation of pre-settlement violations of the protective order. It held appellants waived their right to a written order denying the Rule 59(e) motion by failing to respond to respondents' counsel's letter advising of the impending dismissal of the case without an order on appellants' Rule 59(e) motion. With respect to the protective order, the court held it retained jurisdiction to hear appellants' request for return of the database and granted their motion for its return. Upon direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the issue was the denial of a motion for entry of a ruling on a motion for reconsideration and the motion for rule to show cause, for sanctions, and for modification of a protective order. The Court concluded that the trial court erred when it held it lacked jurisdiction to enter an order ruling on appellants' motion for reconsideration after the action had been dismissed when a protective order governed disclosure of certain materials discovered in that action. View "TLC Laser Eye Centers v. Woolfson" on Justia Law

Lawton Limehouse, Sr. ("Father") and Lawton Limehouse, Jr. ("Son") each sued attorney Paul Hulsey, and his law practice (collectively, "Hulsey") for defamation arising out of statements Hulsey made about L&L Services, LLC ("L&L"), a staffing agency they owned. Local newspapers published articles concerning housing raids performed on homes rented by L&L and fines assessed for overcrowding, inadequate heating and plumbing, and running illegal boarding houses. Hulsey filed a class action lawsuit in federal court on behalf of former employees of L&L, alleging violations of the RICO Act and other state and federal laws. One article quoted Hulsey as stating that L&L engaged in a "classic racketeering scheme . . . just like Tony Soprano." Neither Father nor Son was mentioned by name in the article. The case was moved to federal court based on the RICO claim; the federal court remanded the case back to the state court on the ground it lacked federal question jurisdiction over the issues presented. After the remand, the state court clerk of court entered a default against Hulsey. Following a damages hearing, a jury awarded Father $2.39 million in actual damages and $5 million in punitive damages. While the appeal in Father's case was pending, a damages hearing was held for Son's case. A jury awarded Son $1 million in actual damages and $2.6 million in punitive damages. Hulsey appealed both judgments. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that the state court proceedings were void as the lack of a certified remand order precluded the state court from resuming jurisdiction over the cases. The cases were remanded back to the circuit court to start over from the procedural point at which the state court received a certified remand order from the federal court. View "Limehouse v. Hulsey" on Justia Law