Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Employee-claimant Cathy Bone filed a workman's compensation claim for a work-related injury. The employer, U.S. Food Service, and its carrier Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America disputed the claim. The single commissioner and an Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission issued orders denying the claim. Under the procedure then in place, Bone appealed to the circuit court, which concluded the injury was compensable and remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceedings. The employer appealed the circuit court's order, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the basis the order was not a "final judgment" and thus not immediately appealable because further proceedings were ordered before the administrative agency. The Supreme Court granted Petitioners' petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The high court subsequently granted a petition for rehearing filed by the employer, and it additionally granted the following two motions: (1) Bone's motion to argue against precedent, and (2) the motion of the South Carolina Defense Trial Attorneys' Association to accept its Amicus Curiae Brief in support of Petitioners. After considering the record in this matter, as well as the briefs and arguments, the Court adhered to its original decision to affirm. View "Bone v. U.S. Food Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Health Promotion Specialists, LLC sued the state Board of Dentistry based on the Board's enactment and enforcement of regulations relating to certain procedures performed by dental hygienists in school settings. The Board was awarded summary judgment; Health Promotion appealed, arguing the circuit court erred by concluding: (1) the Board was immune from suit under the state Tort Claims Act; (2) Health Promotion could not maintain an action under the state Unfair Trade Practices Act because the Board was not a "person" and its actions were not within "trade or commerce;" and (3) Health Promotions could not amend its complaint. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the Board was immune from suit and affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment. View "Health Promotion Specialists v. SC Board of Dentistry" on Justia Law

Edward William Hunt (Father) appealed a jury verdict in favor of Don Gause which found him liable under the family purpose doctrine for damages caused by the negligence of his son Edward Raymond Hunt. Gause, a police officer for the City of Conway, was on duty when he responded to a call from a highway patrolman who had pulled over a Firebird driven by Son on suspicion of drunk driving. Instead of pulling off the highway into the emergency lane, Son stopped in the left lane of traffic on the four lane highway, and the patrolman stopped behind him with his lights flashing. When Gause arrived, he parked behind the patrolman, who subsequently left the scene, and also activated his blue lights. A second policeman also responded and eventually took Son into custody, leaving only Gause and the abandoned vehicle. Gause was filling out paperwork in his car and waiting for the tow truck to move the Firebird when a pickup truck driven by Nathan Smithers rear-ended him, propelling his cruiser into the Firebird. Gause sued Smithers and Father (assuming Father was the driver of the Firebird because it was registered in his name) for his injuries. Father moved to dismiss on the basis that Son, and not he, had been driving the Firebird that night. Realizing the mistake, Gause filed an amended complaint substituting Son as the defendant for the negligence claim and changing the claims against Father to negligent entrustment and liability under the family purpose doctrine. Son moved to be dismissed as a party because the amendment occurred after the statute of limitations had run, and the circuit court granted the motion, holding the amended complaint did not relate back under Rule 15(c), SCRCP. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Father argued he could not be found liable under the family purpose doctrine; Son's actions were not a proximate cause of Gause's injuries; he should have been granted a new trial due to prejudicial statements and a defective verdict form; and the punitive damages award should have been overturned as impermissible under the family purpose doctrine. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award of punitive damages, but affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Gause v. Smithers" on Justia Law

Palmetto Hardwood, Inc., employed Petitioner Clifton Sparks as a saw operator. Petitioner suffered three work-related injuries during this employment, the first two of which injured Petitioner's lower back. In the third incident, Petitioner was required to remove a piece of metal from under a gang saw. In the process, the metal exploded and a three- to four-inch cubic piece struck him in the head. Petitioner subsequently sought workers' compensation for his injuries. At the hearing, Petitioner testified to substantial head pain, loss of cognitive ability, and other brain-function-related symptoms, including inability to read without severe headache, loss of his mathematical abilities, inability to balance while standing or to walk without a cane, hand tremors, anxiety, and more. Petitioner argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Court of Appeals erred when it applied an improper definition of "physical brain damage" within the meaning of section 42-9-10(C). The Supreme Court disagreed. Because "physical brain damage" as contemplated in S.C. Code Ann. 42-9-10 required "severe and permanent physical brain damage as a result of a compensable injury" and the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that Petitioner did not suffer such brain damage was supported by substantial evidence in the record, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Sparks v. Palmetto Hardwood" on Justia Law

In an original jurisdiction action, Petitioner alleged that the sheer number of exemptions to and caps on South Carolina's sales and use tax removed any rational relationship they have to the underlying tax itself. He therefore requested that the Supreme Court strike down all of the exemptions and caps as being unconstitutional, leaving behind only the imposition of the tax. In particular, Petitioner contended that the entire exemption and cap scheme violated the State constitution's equal protection guarantee and prohibition against special legislation. The Court disagreed, finding that Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof. "We emphasize that our holding rests solely on the fact that [Petitioner's] challenge is to the number of caps and exemptions and not whether individual ones would withstand constitutional scrutiny. Thus, nothing in our opinion today should be construed as precluding a challenge based on the content of individual caps and exemptions at a later date." View "Bodman v. SCDOR" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Crisp, Jr. worked for Employer SouthCo, Inc., seeding grass and performing odd construction jobs. In 2004, Petitioner and other workers were installing silt fencing to combat ground erosion. Petitioner held a pole while another worker operated the Bobcat. As Petitioner bent down to reach for a pole, the bucket of the Bobcat fell on Petitioner, covering him. Petitioner suffered injuries to his head and hands. At the emergency room, Petitioner was treated for abrasions and bruises to the back of the head and neck and a complex fracture in his right hand. There was no mention of a brain injury in Petitioner's hospital records. Nearly two years after his injury, Petitioner's doctor opined that Petitioner sustained physical brain injury as a result of his 2004 injury. Petitioner's eventual workers' compensation claim for the brain injury was denied, and he petitioned the Supreme Court for review of an appellate court's decision to reverse a circuit court's finding that he sustained a compensable brain injury. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further consideration of whether Petitioner sustained physical brain damage as contemplated under the Workers' Compensation Act which would entitle him to benefits for life. View "Crisp v. SouthCo." on Justia Law

Palmetto Hardwood, Inc. employed Petitioner Clifton Sparks as a saw operator. Petitioner suffered three work-related injuries during this employment, the first two of which injured Petitioner's lower back. In the third incident, Petitioner was required to remove a piece of metal from under a gang saw. In the process, the metal exploded and a three- to four-inch cubic piece struck him in the head. Petitioner subsequently sought workers' compensation for his injuries. Six doctors opined regarding whether Petitioner had suffered a physical brain injury. The Commission found that Petitioner had sustained a compensable injury to his head. It also found him to be totally and permanently disabled. The Commission ruled that Petitioner should receive only five hundred weeks of compensation as a result of his total and permanent disability and medical expenses causally related to the three compensable injuries. On appeal, the circuit court remanded to the Commission for it: (1) to explain whether the "physical brain injury" it found "border[ed] on the frivolous" was intended to be the same as or different from "physical brain damage" as used in section 42-9-10 (C); and (2) to reconcile the order's seemingly contradictory findings that Petitioner suffered a compensable injury to the head with its finding of no physical brain injury. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the Commission's order. Petitioner subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in an unpublished opinion. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred when it applied an improper definition of "physical brain damage" within the meaning of section 42-9-10(C). The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the circuit court. View "Sparks v. Palmetto Hardwood" on Justia Law

The United States District Court certified the following question to the South Carolina Supreme Court: "Does the 'dual persona' doctrine allow an injured employee to bring an action in tort against his employer as a successor in interest who, through a corporate merger, received all liabilities of a predecessor corporation that never employed the injured person but allegedly performed the negligent acts that later caused the employee's injuries, or is such action barred by the exclusivity provision of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act?" The decedent-employee of Walterboro Veneer, Inc. died resulting from a fall into a vat of heated milling solution while trying to access a leak to repair. the defendant-employers removed the case to federal court and subsequently moved to dismiss the case brought by the employee's estate, arguing that they were immune from suit under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. Each defendant sought dismissal based on the Act's exclusivity provision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that South Carolina recognizes the "dual persona" doctrine: "under South Carolina law, whether the dual persona doctrine applies in a particular case turns on whether the duty claimed to have been breached is distinct from those duties owed by virtue of the employer's persona as such. In this case, that determination lies with the federal court." View "Mendenall v. Anderson Hardwood Floors" on Justia Law

Shenandoah Life Insurance Company brought an action to void an insurance policy it issued on the life of Lorenzo Smallwood. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to Shenandoah, and narrowed the issue for trial to whether Lorenzo intended to defraud the insurance company when he did not disclose information related to his medical history on the insurance application. At trial, the court granted Shenandoah's motion for a directed verdict. Lakeisha Smallwood appealed the directed verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a jury could reasonably conclude that Shenandoah failed to meet its burden of proving Lorenzo made the misrepresentations with the requisite fraudulent intent. The Court reversed and remanded the case for trial. View "Shenandoah Life v. Smallwood" on Justia Law

Vernon Sulton was rendered paraplegic by gunshot wounds he received as a bystander at an armed robbery. After initial treatment at Richland Memorial Hospital, he was transferred to the HealthSouth Rehab Hospital in Columbia. He was admitted with a sacral stage two pressure ulcer. In the eleven days Sulton remained at HealthSouth, the pressure ulcer progressed from stage two to stage four. Sulton underwent a colostomy and surgery that included a skin graft, and the pressure ulcer eventually fully healed. Sulton and his wife, Willie Mae Scott (Scott), sued HealthSouth and several of its nurses, alleging that Sulton had been injured by the defendants’ negligent provision of nursing care. Scott alleged a cause of action for loss of consortium. Sulton died of unrelated causes prior to trial. In the survival action, a jury found against all defendants and awarded $306,693.25 in economic damages but no non-economic damages. In the loss of consortium action, the jury found HealthSouth alone liable to Scott for four million dollars in non-economic damages. The jury also found that HealthSouth had been willful, wanton, or reckless. In the punitive damages phase of the bifurcated proceedings, the jury awarded eight million dollars in punitive damages. HealthSouth moved for JNOV, new trial absolute, and new trial nisi remittitur. These motions were denied. HealthSouth and the individual named nurse defendants challenged the jury’s verdict in a negligence and loss of consortium action. Because the trial court improperly instructed the jury that Appellants owed Respondents a heightened duty of care, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on all issues as to all Appellants. View "Sulton v. HealthSouth" on Justia Law