Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Michael Crisp, Jr. worked for Employer SouthCo, Inc., seeding grass and performing odd construction jobs. In 2004, Petitioner and other workers were installing silt fencing to combat ground erosion. Petitioner held a pole while another worker operated the Bobcat. As Petitioner bent down to reach for a pole, the bucket of the Bobcat fell on Petitioner, covering him. Petitioner suffered injuries to his head and hands. At the emergency room, Petitioner was treated for abrasions and bruises to the back of the head and neck and a complex fracture in his right hand. There was no mention of a brain injury in Petitioner's hospital records. Nearly two years after his injury, Petitioner's doctor opined that Petitioner sustained physical brain injury as a result of his 2004 injury. Petitioner's eventual workers' compensation claim for the brain injury was denied, and he petitioned the Supreme Court for review of an appellate court's decision to reverse a circuit court's finding that he sustained a compensable brain injury. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further consideration of whether Petitioner sustained physical brain damage as contemplated under the Workers' Compensation Act which would entitle him to benefits for life. View "Crisp v. SouthCo." on Justia Law

Palmetto Hardwood, Inc. employed Petitioner Clifton Sparks as a saw operator. Petitioner suffered three work-related injuries during this employment, the first two of which injured Petitioner's lower back. In the third incident, Petitioner was required to remove a piece of metal from under a gang saw. In the process, the metal exploded and a three- to four-inch cubic piece struck him in the head. Petitioner subsequently sought workers' compensation for his injuries. Six doctors opined regarding whether Petitioner had suffered a physical brain injury. The Commission found that Petitioner had sustained a compensable injury to his head. It also found him to be totally and permanently disabled. The Commission ruled that Petitioner should receive only five hundred weeks of compensation as a result of his total and permanent disability and medical expenses causally related to the three compensable injuries. On appeal, the circuit court remanded to the Commission for it: (1) to explain whether the "physical brain injury" it found "border[ed] on the frivolous" was intended to be the same as or different from "physical brain damage" as used in section 42-9-10 (C); and (2) to reconcile the order's seemingly contradictory findings that Petitioner suffered a compensable injury to the head with its finding of no physical brain injury. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the Commission's order. Petitioner subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in an unpublished opinion. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred when it applied an improper definition of "physical brain damage" within the meaning of section 42-9-10(C). The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the circuit court. View "Sparks v. Palmetto Hardwood" on Justia Law

The United States District Court certified the following question to the South Carolina Supreme Court: "Does the 'dual persona' doctrine allow an injured employee to bring an action in tort against his employer as a successor in interest who, through a corporate merger, received all liabilities of a predecessor corporation that never employed the injured person but allegedly performed the negligent acts that later caused the employee's injuries, or is such action barred by the exclusivity provision of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act?" The decedent-employee of Walterboro Veneer, Inc. died resulting from a fall into a vat of heated milling solution while trying to access a leak to repair. the defendant-employers removed the case to federal court and subsequently moved to dismiss the case brought by the employee's estate, arguing that they were immune from suit under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. Each defendant sought dismissal based on the Act's exclusivity provision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that South Carolina recognizes the "dual persona" doctrine: "under South Carolina law, whether the dual persona doctrine applies in a particular case turns on whether the duty claimed to have been breached is distinct from those duties owed by virtue of the employer's persona as such. In this case, that determination lies with the federal court." View "Mendenall v. Anderson Hardwood Floors" on Justia Law

Shenandoah Life Insurance Company brought an action to void an insurance policy it issued on the life of Lorenzo Smallwood. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to Shenandoah, and narrowed the issue for trial to whether Lorenzo intended to defraud the insurance company when he did not disclose information related to his medical history on the insurance application. At trial, the court granted Shenandoah's motion for a directed verdict. Lakeisha Smallwood appealed the directed verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a jury could reasonably conclude that Shenandoah failed to meet its burden of proving Lorenzo made the misrepresentations with the requisite fraudulent intent. The Court reversed and remanded the case for trial. View "Shenandoah Life v. Smallwood" on Justia Law

Vernon Sulton was rendered paraplegic by gunshot wounds he received as a bystander at an armed robbery. After initial treatment at Richland Memorial Hospital, he was transferred to the HealthSouth Rehab Hospital in Columbia. He was admitted with a sacral stage two pressure ulcer. In the eleven days Sulton remained at HealthSouth, the pressure ulcer progressed from stage two to stage four. Sulton underwent a colostomy and surgery that included a skin graft, and the pressure ulcer eventually fully healed. Sulton and his wife, Willie Mae Scott (Scott), sued HealthSouth and several of its nurses, alleging that Sulton had been injured by the defendants’ negligent provision of nursing care. Scott alleged a cause of action for loss of consortium. Sulton died of unrelated causes prior to trial. In the survival action, a jury found against all defendants and awarded $306,693.25 in economic damages but no non-economic damages. In the loss of consortium action, the jury found HealthSouth alone liable to Scott for four million dollars in non-economic damages. The jury also found that HealthSouth had been willful, wanton, or reckless. In the punitive damages phase of the bifurcated proceedings, the jury awarded eight million dollars in punitive damages. HealthSouth moved for JNOV, new trial absolute, and new trial nisi remittitur. These motions were denied. HealthSouth and the individual named nurse defendants challenged the jury’s verdict in a negligence and loss of consortium action. Because the trial court improperly instructed the jury that Appellants owed Respondents a heightened duty of care, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on all issues as to all Appellants. View "Sulton v. HealthSouth" on Justia Law

Tiffanie Rutland (Tiffanie) was killed when the car in which she was riding rolled over and fell on top of her after she was partially ejected. This case presented the novel issue of whether "pre-impact fear" should have been recognized as a cognizable element of damages in a survival action. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals that pre-impact fear was not compensable. Finding no evidence of conscious pain and suffering under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court reserved judgment on this question and affirmed as modified. View "Rutland v. SCDOT" on Justia Law

In this wrongful death and survival action involving a train collision, Appellant Connie Carson as personal representative of the estate of Beryl Harvey, argued on appeal that the circuit court erroneously excluded certain evidence, charged the jury, and permitted an inconsistent verdict in the survival action. Upon review of the circuit court's ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed the court's evidentiary determinations and jury charge, but reversed the circuit court's decision denying Appellant's request for a new trial nisi additur and remanded the survival action for a new trial. View "Carson v. CSX Transportation" on Justia Law

After finding a card for flowers for another woman in her husband’s car, Petitioner Gail Jennings confronted him. Respondent M. Lee Jennings confessed he had fallen in love with someone else, and although he refused to divulge her name, he admitted the two had been corresponding via e-mail for some time. Gail confided this situation to her daughter-in-law, Petitioner Holly Broome. Broome had previously worked for Jennings and knew he maintained a personal Yahoo! e-mail account. She accessed his account by guessing the correct answers to his security questions and read the e-mails exchanged between Jennings and his paramour. Broome then printed out copies of the incriminating e-mails and gave them to Thomas Neal, Gail’s attorney in the divorce proceedings, and Brenda Cooke, a private investigator Gail hired. Broome was sued civilly for hacking Lee Jennings' Yahoo! e-mail account. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Broome on all claims, including violation of the federal Stored Communications Act (SCA). The court of appeals reversed, finding that the e-mails she obtained from hacking Jennings' account were in electronic storage and thus covered by the SCA. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. After opening them, Jennings left the single copies of his e-mails on the Yahoo! server and apparently did not download them or save another copy of them in any other location. The Court therefore declined to hold that retaining an opened e-mail constitutes "storing it for backup protection" under the Act. "We emphasize that although we reject the contention that Broome's actions [gave] rise to a claim under the SCA, this should in no way be read as condoning her behavior. Instead, we only hold that she is not liable under the SCA because the e-mails in question do not meet the definition of 'electronic storage' under the Act." View "Jennings v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Frank Hutson was working as a crane operator for the State Ports Authority when he suffered an injury to his lower back and legs while attempting to remove a container from a ship. He was diagnosed with a disc bulge for which he was treated with steroid injections, physical therapy, and used a back brace. After reaching maximum medical improvement, he filed a Form 50 with the workers' compensation commission for continued benefits alleging permanent and total disability pursuant to Sections 42-9-10 and 42-9-30 South Carolina Code (1976 & Supp. 2011) or, alternatively, a wage loss under Section 42-9-20. He also asked to receive the award in lump sum. Although the Ports Authority and its insurance carrier, the State Accident Fund (collectively, Respondents), admitted the accident and the back injury, they disputed the claims to his legs and argued he should receive only permanent partial disability benefits. They also objected to Hutson's request that his benefits be paid in a lump sum. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether speculative testimony by the claimant concerning his possible future work as a restaurateur qualified as substantial evidence to establish he did not sustain a wage loss pursuant to Section 42-9-20 of the South Carolina Code (1976). The Court held it did not, and therefore reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hutson v. SC State Ports Authority" on Justia Law

India Graves, a six-month-old girl, died while being monitored by one of CAS Medical Systems' products. India's parents, Kareem and Tara Graves, subsequently filed a products liability lawsuit against CAS, contending the monitor was defectively designed and failed to alert them when India's heart rate and breathing slowed. The circuit court granted CAS's motion to exclude all of the Graves' expert witnesses and accordingly granted CAS summary judgment. The Graves appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of the Graves' computer experts. While the court did err in excluding one doctor's testimony, the Graves were still left with no expert opinions regarding any defects in the monitor. In the absence of this evidence, CAS was entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly the Court affirmed the circuit court. View "Graves v. CAS Medical Systems" on Justia Law